Jayaprakash Narayan : democratic theory and practice by McGushin, S
JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
by 
Sally McGushin B.A.Hons, LI.B. 
in the Department of Political Science 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
University of Tasmania 
June 1992 
ii 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the 
award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary 
institution. To the best of this candidate's knowledge and belief, the 
thesis contains no material previously published or written by 
another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the 
thesis. 
v7/' /z60 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
In presenting this thesis I would first like to acknowledge both my supervisor, 
Dr Philip Eldridge, who has remained a constant guide, and my family who 
have remained with me throughout. 
There are many other people and institutions which have been of assistance to 
me in the course of my research, especially in India. Firstly, I would like to 
thank the Jayaprakash Institute of Social Change, Calcutta, which sponsored my 
time in India. In particular I would like to pay tribute to the late Sugata 
Dasgupta, a former Director of the Institute, for his initial encouragement. In 
addition I was helped by the A N Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna, 
especially Dr Sachchidanand, and by the Xavier Institute of Social Service. I 
am very conscious of the fact that their cooperation greatly facilitated my work 
in Bihar. The Gandhian Institute in Benares was most supportive too. 
Particular thanks must go to all friends associated with the voluntary 
organisations that I visited for their time, patience, assistance, hospitality and 
encouragement. These include those specifically mentioned in the dissertaion, 
that is: IMSE, SAREEK, NBJK and those associated with the CYSV in Bodh 
Gaya and at the National Maidan in Patna. However I also spent time with 
many other organisations whose time and support were invaluable to my 
research, and whom I will attempt to name individually: Prayas (Bihar), 
Sokhodeora Ashram (Bihar), Simultala Ashram (Bihar), Samanvay Ashram 
(Bihar), Visual Aids for Human Consciousness (West Bengal), the Socio 
Economic Development Programme (West Bengal), the Centre for 
iv 
Communication and Cultural Action (West Bengal), Rural Welfare Society 
(West Bengal), Unnayan (West Bengal), the Historical Institute (Calcutta), the 
Gandhi Peace Foundation (New Delhi and Calcutta), AVARD (New Delhi), 
Sarva Seva Sangh (Benares), Rural Communes (Bombay) and Community Aid 
Abroad (Pune). 
There were also many individuals whose advice and opinions I greatly valued, 
especially Sri Sachchidananand (Patna), Sharad Kulkarni (Pune) and Comrade 
M A Rasul from CPI(M) (Calcutta). Geoffrey Ostergaard (University of 
Birmingham, UK) was most helpful in enabling me to reflect constructively on 
the time that I had already spent in India and the plan for my return trip. 
Needless to say I also appreciated the many friendships generated throughout 
my stay in India, not to mention the companionship and foot slogging endured 
by my husband Gerry. 
At home I have been pleased to know all staff and students, past and present in 
the department of Political Science. They have all played an important role in 
my own personal development and the subsequent shaping of my thesis. I must 
especially thank colleagues with whom I have shared study rooms, seminars 
and tutoring responsibilities; and particular thanks go to Beth, Jennie, Indra, 
Rosemary, Liz and especially Beverley who has spent many agonising hours 
helping me present this dissertation in a legible form. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION 	 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 	 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABBREVIATIONS 
GLOSSARY 	 xii 
ABSTRACT 	 xx 
INTRODUCTION 	 1 
CHAPTER 	1. THE RELEVANCE OF GANDHI'S  
VOLUNTARIST STYLE OF POLITICS 	13 
I. INTRODUCTION 	 13 
II. GANDHI 	 14 
III INDIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL PATH 	20 
IV THE COMMUNIST PARTIES 	 26 
V THE NAXALITES 	 27 
VI M N ROY 	 33 
VII .CONCLUS ION 	 34 
2 EVOLUTION OF JP'S THOUGHT 	 38 
I. INTRODUCTION 	 38 
II. JP PRE-INDEPENDENCE 	 39 
III. SARVODAYA PERIOD 42 
IV. IDEAS ABOUT LINKING VILLAGE LEVEL  
VOLUNTARY ACTION TO WIDER  
STRUCTURES 	 50 
V. POSITIVE ACTION 	 58 
VI. BIHAR MOVEMENT 67 
VII ELECTION OF THE JANATA PARTY 	78 
VIMP'S LAST STEPS 	 81 
vi 
IX CONCLUSION 	 81 
3. LIMITATIONS OF JP'S IDEAS IN THE CONTEXT  
OF HIS POLITICAL ACTION 	 83 
I. JANATA 	 83 
II. REASONS FOR JANATA FAILURE 	88 
III. SARVODAYA AND POLITICS 	94 
IV. CONCLUSION 	 101 
4. BIHAR AND WEST BENGAL BACKGROUND 104 
I. BRITISH LEGACY 	 104 
II. BIHAR 	 109 
III. WEST BENGAL 	 119 
IV. CONCLUSION 134 
5. BACKGROUND AND IDEOLOGY OF THE  
VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS 	136 
I. INTRODUCTION 	 136 
II. CYSV 	 140 
III NBJK AND LOK SAMM 	 147 
IV. rmsE 	 151 
V. S AREEK 159 
VI CONCLUSION 	 163 
6. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND  
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 	165 
I. INTRODUCTION 	 165 
II. LOK SAMM AND NBJK 	 166 
1. Structure 	 166 
2. Participation 170 
3. Field Workers 	 173 
4. Funding 	 175 
v ii  
III. CYSV 	 177 
1&2. Structure and' Participation 	177 
3. Field Workers 	 179 
4. Funding 	 180 
IV. IMSE 	 181 
1&2. Structure and Participation 	181 
3. Field Workers 	 183 
4. Funding 	 184 
V. SAREEK 	 189 
1. Structure 	 189 
2. Participation 191 
3. Field Workers 	 193 
4. Funding 	 195 
VI. COMPARISON OF ORGANISATIONS 	196 
VII.CONCLUSIONS 	 199 
7. EXPANDING LOKNITI THROUGH  
CONSTRUCTIVE WORK 	 201 
I. JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN 	 201 
II. CYSV 	 202 
III. NBJK 203 
IV. SAREEK 	 206 
V. IMSE 214 
VI. CONCLUSION 	 218 
8. GOOD GOVERNMENT 	 220 
I. INTRODUCTION 
	 220 
II. CYSV 
	 221 
viii 
III. NBJK AND LOK SAMM 	 228 
1. Elections and the Party Process 	228 
2. Awareness of and Participation in  
Government Programmes 	 230 
3. Struggle 	 231 
IV. SAREEK 	 233 
1. Elections and the Party Process 	233 
2. Awareness of and Participation in  
Government Programmes 	 235 
3. Struggle 	 237 
V. IMSE 	 237 
1. Elections and the Party Process 	237 
2. Awareness of and Participation in  
Government Programmes 	 238 
3. Struggle 	 242 
VI.  CONCLUSION 	 244 
9. OVERVIEW OF VOLUNTARY  
ORGANISATIONS IN RELATION TO  
ACHIEVEMENT OF JP'S GOALS 
	 246 
I. BIHAR AND WEST BENGAL. SOCIO-
CULTURAL CONTEXT 	 246 
II. COMMON THEMES BETWEEN JP'S IDEAS  
AND THE VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS  
248 
1. Trained Motivators 	 249 
2. Organisational Structure 	 252 
3. Coalition Building or Networking 	254 
4. Constructive Programme 	 257 
5. Funding 	 258 
6. Demands on Government 	 260 
III. CONCLUSION 	 263 
ix 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. General Background 
2. By And About Jayaprakash 
Narayan 
3. Voluntarist Idiom, Including 
Gandhian Traditions And Tagore 
(Excluding Those Works Specifically 
Concerned With JP) 
4. Marxist Traditions, Including M N 
Roy, Mao Tse-Tung, CPI(M) And The 
Naxalites 
5. Voluntary 
Organisations/Movements 
6. Newspapers And Bulletins 
265 
272 
278 
281 
284 
286 
289 
x 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AVARD 	Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural 
Development 
BCSS 	Bihar Chhatra Sangharsh Sarniti (Bihar 
Student Struggle Committee) 
BDO 	 Block Development Officer 
BLD 	 Bharatiya Lok Dal (National People's Party) 
CCP 	 Chinese Communist Party 
CFD 	 Citizens for Democracy 
CISRS 	Christian Institute for the Study of Religion 
CPI 	 Communist Party of India 
CPI(M) 	Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
CPI(ML) 	Communist Party of India (Marxist- 
Leninist) 
CPSU 	Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
CSP 	 Congress Socialist Party 
CYSV 	Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini (Student and 
Youth Struggle Movement) 
DC 	 District Commissioner 
DMK 	 Dravidia Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian 
People's Party) 
EZE 	 Protestant Central Agency for Development 
Aid (Germany) 
ICDS 	 Integrated Child Development Scheme 
xi 
IMSE 
INTUC 
IRDP 
NBJK 
Indian Institute of Technology 
Institute for Motivating Self Employment 
Indian Trade Union Congress 
Integrated Rural Development Programme 
Nay Bharat Jagriti Kendra (New Indian 
Development/Awareness Institute) 
PS P 	 Praja Socialist Party (People's Socialist 
Party) 
RLS 	 Rashtriya Lok Sarniti (National People's 
Committee) 
RCPI 	 Revolutionary Communist Party of India 
RS S 	 Rashtriya Swayemsevalc Sangh (National 
Voluntary Service Organisation) 
SAREEK 	Society for the Advancement of Rural Economy, 
Education and Kultur 
SGBK 	 Sarbik Gram Bikash Kendra (Total Village 
Development Centre) 
XISS 	 Xavier Institute of Social Service. 
x i i 
GLOSSARY 
Adivasi 	 aboriginal/tribal 
Alcali Dal 	 one of the major moderate Sikh 
parties; it formed an alliance with the CPI(M) 
in the 1977 elections. 
anchal 	 a cluster of villages 
anganwadi 	 health workers 
antyodaya 	 uplift of the poorest 
ashram 	 place of abode, generally religious 
bandh 	 strike 
Bania 	 moneylending and land-owning 
caste in Bihar 
bargadar 	 sharecropper 
benami 
	 being nameless or fictitious or 
fraudulent as with the purchase of 
land under a false name or land 
held in another name. 
bhadralok 	 educated Bengali caste class formation of 
Brahmins, Kayasthas and Vaidyas. 
Bharat 	 India or the nation 
Bharatiya 	 Indian 
Bharatiya Lok Dal 	name of a political party, meaning 
National People's Party 
bhindi 	 okra or lady's finger (green 
vegetable) 
bhoodan 	 voluntary renunciation of land or 
land gift 
Bhumihars 	 upper caste in Bihar 
Brahman 	 highest and priestly caste 
charkha 	 spinning wheel 
chhatra 	 students 
chhatra sangharsh  
samiti 	 students' struggle committee 
chhatra yuva sangharsh  
samiti 	 student and youth struggle 
committee 
chhatra yuva sanghharsh  
vahini 	 student and youth struggle 
movement 
chulla 
crore 
dacoit 
dan 
dharna 
clay stove, usually fuelled by wood 
a unit of measure equalling 
10,000,000 
bandit 
gift 
a form of non-violent moral pressure used as a 
political weapon; e.g. a sit in. 
Dravidia Munnetra  
Kazhagam 	 Dravidian People's Party 
gherao 	 picket or surround 
goondas 	 thugs 
gram 	 village 
x iv 
gramdan 	 gift of village, that is, transfer of 
most (ideally all) private land to the village 
community 
gram kosh 	 village collective fund 
gram sabha 	 village assembly, including all 
adult residents 
Harijan 	 name given by Gandhiji to ex-untouchable 
castes 
hartal 	 strike 
hatao 	 get rid of 
iagriti 	 awareness/development 
belonging to the people 
jana samiti 	 people's committee or forum 
Jana Sangh 	 name of a political party, meaning 
People's Party 
jana sangharsh samiti 	people's struggle committee 
jan/a jagaran 	 people's vigilance organisation 
jan/a shakti 	 people's power 
janata 	 people 
Janata Dal 	 people's party 
Jats 	 backward peasant caste in North India 
Kathaks 	 professional readers 
Kayastha 	 caste of clerks, accountants, professional letter 
writers etc 
XV 
kendra 	 centre 
khadi 	 homespun cloth 
kisan 	 cultivator, peasant or farmer 
kisan sabha 	 peasant front 
Koiris 	 Bihari backward caste 
Kshatriyas 	 warrior caste 
Kurmis 	 Bihari backward caste 
lakh 	 a unit of measure equalling 100,000 
lathi 	 bludgeon 
lok 	 people 
lok adlat 	 people's court 
lokniti 	 politics of the people or people's power 
lok sabha 	 literally means people's council; also it is the 
name for the lower house of the Indian 
parliament constituted of directly elected 
representatives from electoral constituencies in 
the entire country. 
lok samiti 	 people's committee 
Lok Samiti 	 national organisation of People's 
Committees 
lok sevaks 	 social workers 
lok sevalc sangh 	 organisation of social workers 
lok shakti 	 people's power or force 
lok swaraj 	 people's freedom 
xv i 
Mahant 	 elected head of temple 
mahila: 	 woman 
mahila mandal 	 women's organisation 
Mawaris 	 Bengali term for rich, Hindi- 
speaking businessmen, meaning 
from the land of the deserts. 
mazcloor 	 labourer 
mazdoor kisan samiti 	labourers' and farmers' 
organisation 
mazdoor lcisan morcha 	labourers' and farmers' movement 
mohalla 	 ward, ie subdivision of a town 
nay 	 new 
Nay Bharat Jagriti  
Kendra 	 New Indian Development 
Institution 
Naxalite 	 Maoist revolutionaries 
nirman 	 reconstruction; also used to describe the third 
stage of gramdan  
paise 	 coin in Indian currency; one 
hundred paise make one rupee 
panchayat 	 council 
panchayat/i raj 	 village council, denoting a system 
of village self-government. 
Rani 	 water 
panidars 	 waterlords 
xv ii 
plattas 	 small peasants 
noorna swami 	 complete independence by truthful 
and non-violent means 
rp_aja 	 subjects 
PraPti 
	 receiving; also used to describe the first stage 
of gramdan  
pushti 	 completion; also used to describe the second 
stage of gramdan  
rajniti 	 politics of the state or power 
politics 
Rajput 	 major land-owning caste in Bihar 
Rajya Sabha 
Rashtriya Swayemsevak 
Saneh  
literally means Council of States; it is the 
name for the upper house of the Indian 
parliament. 
name of political party, meaning 
National Voluntary Service 
Organisation 
sabha 	 council 
Salcar 	 government 
committee or meeting 
sampurna kranti 
	
total revolution 
sangharsh 	 struggle 
Santiniketan 	 abode of peace 
sarbik 	 total 
sarbik gram bikash  
kendra 	 total village development centre 
sarva seva sangh 	 association for the service of all 
sarvodaya 	 uplift of all 
sarvodayists 	 sarvodaya workers 
aad 	 the practice of self-immolation by 
widows on their husband's funeral 
pyre 
satya 	 truth 
satyagraha 	 force of truth 
satyagrahi 	 civil resistor 
shanti sena 	 the peace brigade 
shramdan 	 donation of labour 
Siksha-satra 	 centre for education 
Sriniketan 	 abode of beauty and prosperity 
sulabh gramdan 	 gramdan made easy 
Swadeshi movement 	buy India movement 
Swaraj 	 self-rule; popularly used in the Indepednce 
movement 
taluka 	 village area, below a district and 
above 100,000 people 
toofan 	 whirlwind 
udyog parishad 	 people's initiative committee 
Nk yl 	 Bengali caste of physicians 
ixx 
Vaisya 	 third varna, commercial caste 
varna 	 ritual status of a caste 
Vidhan Parishad 	 Legislative Council (state level) 
Vidhan Sabha 	 Legislative Assembly (state level) 
Visva Bharati 	 literally means Institution for World Culture; it 
is the name of the university founded by 
Rabindranath Tagore. 
Yadavas 	 backward Bihari caste 
zamindar 	 landlord, receiver of rent 
zilla 	 district 
zotdars 	 local power-holders 
XX 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores Jayaprakash Narayan's ideas on democracy as he 
commuted between constitutional and extra-constitutional politics. It seeks to 
help establish whether those ideas were merely confused or whether they broke 
new ground by developing new styles of popular mobilisation that would 
improve or pave the way for an alternative to the modem state in India. The 
strengths and weaknesses of his ideas are drawn out from a study of four 
voluntary organisations and their work in the states of Bihar and West Bengal. 
These are the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini  (Bodh Gaya); Lok Samiti in 
conjunction with Nay Bharat Jagriti Kendra  (Hazaribagh district); the Institute 
for Motivating Self Employment (West Bengal and the Santhali Area in Bihar); 
and the Society for the Advancement of Rural Economy, Education and Kultur 
(West Bengal). 
What becomes apparent is that, while JP basically came to believe in a 
voluntarist or Gandhian philosophy of participatory democracy, that is lokniti, 
focusing on the role of the individual in society, his approach was most 
eclectic. For example he had been attracted to Marxism in his youth and he 
founded the Congress Socialist Party. In addition, JP always maintained an 
interest in ideas from many sources and he encouraged community type 
networking so that community groups could support each other, pooling 
resources and information in order to maximise any benefits. 
Central to JP's ideas were his organisational work to develop the foundation for 
an alternative political structure and his decision to integrate the "new" 
voluntarist politics with the "old" constitutional politics, believing that if the 
xxi 
former was to be developed then cognisance had to be taken of the latter. JP's 
own success was limited, particularly as his ideas came to be identified with the 
political defeat of the Congress (I), but this was not the essence of his ideas. 
JP's basic concern was at the grass roots level. 
It is this concern that is brought out in the study of the four voluntary 
organisations, although not all the organisations were directly inspired by JP. 
The scale of the organisations was very limited and no clear cut goal emerged 
but the general theme was with self-reliant people's movements as agents of 
transformation towards improving or changing the polity. All of them 
recognised the need for a balance between popular mobilisation and economic 
development, although the CYSV did not regard that as its role. 
The strategies employed by the organisations were effective in improving the 
bargaining position of the poor and the development of independent resources 
and capabilities at the local level. However, they have not been able to 
formulate any definite mode of popular representation and participation. 
Nevertheless, a systematic understanding of the extra-constitutional operation 
of these four organisations gives further insight into JP's ideas and his attempts 
to launch a "total revolution" in Indian democracy by developing new styles of 
popular mobilisation. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Basically this thesis is concerned with Jayaprakash Narayan's exploration of 
the tensions between his idea of lokniti (or people's power), that is essentially a 
very direct form of democracy, and rkiniti (or state/power politics), which he 
saw as manifested in the form of representative or party democracy. 
Jayaprakash Narayan, popularly known as JP, wanted to move away from 
rajniti, and the constitutional framework that supported it, towards lokniti, 
which essentially he thought operated outside the current constitution of 
independent India. At the same time he hoped to simultaneusly develop and 
strengthen lokniti. This was not a straight forward path, and involved many 
tensions and contradictions as he sought to operate within both spheres, 
presenting a very confused model. This thesis will look at the implications of 
his ideas: whether they were simply mixed up or whether they presented the 
groundwork for new styles of popular mobilisation that could at least modify 
the modern state in India, if not develop an alternative. 
Firstly this will be done by looking at Gandhi and the concept of voluntarism as 
a means of achieving lokniti in the Indian political situation in contrast with the 
constitutional democracy that independent India has pursued, and the 
communist challenges it has faced. Then the evolution of JP's ideas and the 
extent to which they manifested themselves in the workings of a number of 
voluntary social action groups that have operated in Bihar and West Bengal will 
be examined. 
2 
JP was not satisfied with the Indian state. His discontent stemmed from what 
he described as its rajniti character as he believed its centralised decision making 
processes left the bulk of the population increasingly powerless. In particular 
he was concerned with the party political nature of government and its emphasis 
on personal leadership. He maintained that democratic values were being 
steadily eroded by this trend, which was characterised by a lack of impartiality 
and dedication to duty and efficiency by the bureaucracy and general galloping 
political corruption. He charged that those at the centre were concerned with 
their own personal gain at the expense of the mass of the ordinary people. So 
far as they purported to put forward welfare schemes and development 
programmes for the benefit of the impoverished masses he held that these plans: 
remain either unexecuted or mal-executed, leaving comparatively little 
of lasting value or use. The so called state "core" sector becomes a 
bottomless pit from which little is retrieved as compared with the vast 
amounts sunk in them. Land reforms and other similar reforms 
remain infructuous, and even land specifically reserved for the 
landless is grabbed by powerful politicians and officers and their 
relatives. Controls fail and the black market flourishes. 1 
JP saw the solution in lokniti. This did not represent any single ideology, but it 
was essentially a concept of decentralisation, based on the premise that people, 
could by their own actions change and better their situations while having due 
consideration to the welfare of all. Thus JP believed that ordinary citizens had a 
role to play, but he realised that this required their learning to stand on their 
own, rather than being used by political parties. 
1 Jayapralcash Narayan, "First Things First," Everyman's, July 28, 1973. Reprinted in 
Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4: Total Revolution, ed. Brahmanand 
(Bombay: Popular Pralcashan, 1978), p.15. 
3 
In order to understand JP's views and the concepts of rajniti and lokniti one 
needs to comprehend the overall political scene in which he worked. This is 
not easy as there are many forces operating at the one time, like a web of 
variegated tissues interwoven so that the polity cannot be simply 
compartmentalised with different aspects treated in isolation. It is as Morris-
Jones suggested, rather like a cat playing with the stage curtains. 2 The cat is 
seen by the audience but not the actors, who may detect the audience's 
distraction but not understand it. Just to further complicate matters, the hero's 
make-up may start to come apart, giving the cast cause for concern while the 
audience are quite unaware of this situation. 3 
Morris-Jones identified three distinct idioms in which political life in India is 
conducted. They are modern, traditional and saintly. These languages of 
politics are useful in describing the different forces at work on the Indian 
political scene. The modern language or idiom refers to the political institutions 
of the nation state, that is the political system adopted at independence, 
including: the constitution, parliament, the Indian Civil Service, political 
parties, centre and state governments, the Prime Minister and the Chief 
Ministers. It refers also to the operation of modern politics such as 
parliamentary debates, party politics and party politicking generally. 
Morris Jones saw the traditional idiom largely along caste lines: varna and j& 
However this does not mean that it represents a simple social hierarchy. There 
are many variables acting within a single village, and of course from village to 
village, region to region, such as religious factors and land-ownership patterns. 
Some elements within the traditional idiom have been strengthened by modern 
2 i H Moths-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson Uni 
Library, 1971), p.55. 
3 Ibid.. 
4 
politics, for example some castes have found that they have been able to use 
this traditional grouping to advance their social, political and economic 
positions. At the same time, some traditional elements have been undermined - 
in particular the self supporting nature of village life which provided both a 
social and economic role for everybody, largely independent of outside forces. 
Third is saintly politics, that is Gandhi's legacy of satyagraha and the search for 
truth. Morris-Jones described this as a grass roots, bare foot type of politics 
based on individual self-restraint and responsibility serving as a conscience on 
the wider political spheres - a language of comment rather than practical; 
widespread action. He maintained that Vinoba Bhave exemplified the saintly 
idiom but he also mentioned JP in this category. 4 At the time of his writing, 
this emphasis on Vinoba represented the play at that stage. However from the 
early 1970s, the ideas of Jayaprakash Narayan gained importance and 
momentum renewing the relevance of the Gandhian legacy beyond that which 
Morris-Jones seemed to accord it, developing a much broader idiom than 
Vinoba espoused, and much more interwoven with the other idioms. This is 
significant because Morris-Jones thought the language of saintly politics is to be 
found "at the margin" of Indian politics, "spoken only by a few and occupying 
a definitely subsidiary place on the political page." 5 Yet he acknowledged it 
had an effect on the whole political field. However the JP movement 
challenged this limited role suggesting much greater scope. For this reason the 
phrase "voluntarist idiom" or "voluntarist politics" will be favoured rather than 
"saintly idiom". Its connotations are less romantic and more accurately 
approximate the political style envisaged by JP. 
4 Ibid., pp.59-61. 
5 Ibid., p.59. 
5 
Voluntarism as understood by JP is basically a belief in liberty and equality and 
an understanding that this can be achieved largely through voluntary efforts, 
without the use of state power, representing a move towards self-government, 
lokniti or people's power rather than government by others, amounting to 
rajniti. It is essentially a theory of decentralisation based on a confidence in the 
essential goodness of human nature, emphasising a local self-sufficiency either 
of individuals or communities, with social and economic equals acting together 
in voluntary cooperation. Moreover JP's approach involved a moral 
commitment not to rule or deceive others. It was based on the exercise of free 
will by the individual requiring a consciousness based on self-restraint and 
mutual cooperation. However, to achieve this good will inevitably involves a 
struggle against any prevailing centralist or authoritarian powers which can be 
seen as representing rajniti. Such centralist powers have been supported by the 
modem idiom as well as some aspects of the traditional one. JP wanted to raze 
rajniti. He wanted to raze it down towards lokniti, which he saw along the 
lines of a people's politics in the saintly or voluntarist idiom, based on 
voluntary cooperation for mutual benefit. Nevertheless he recognised that this 
would require an integrating process combining parliamentary politics with the 
voluntarist idiom, and as such power would only gradually be devolved from 
the centre. 
JP saw these ideas as requiring the organisation and education of organs of 
struggle, that is, struggle against those forces that frustrate people's 
participation in decision making. However, the organs of struggle were not 
simply to be negative forces undermining the prevailing structure. They were 
to provide first-hand experience in lokniti which meant decentralised politics, 
economic and social justice. Thus, he saw the organisations working at two 
levels; undertaking constructive work to extend lokniti; and political activist 
work aimed at undermining rajniti. He thought that both dimensions of action 
6 
needed to develop simultaneously and that a balance needed to be struck 
between the two. 
It will be argued that the importance of JP's ideas have been demonstrated by 
the emergence of an increasing number of voluntary organisations concerned 
with direct social action amongst the poorest elements, for whom modernisation 
provided little role other than "ritualistic" voting, and serving as cheap labour 
and targets of new forms of social oppression in their villages. 6 The 
organisations that have been studied here viewed development as a struggle, 
and were aware of a need to change the prevailing power structures, and like JP 
they looked outside modern politics as the place for action. They emphasised 
mobilisation and organisation and were concerned with transforming power 
structures and raising political consciousness. As voluntary organisations they 
worked outside the party structure, were flexible in approach and not 
constricted by any narrow logic of capturing state power. They aimed to 
decentralise economic and political power, and work with people rather than for 
them, viewing them not in any instrumental sense but rather as an integral part 
of the social and cultural transformations that were seen as necessary to fight 
state power and political repression. 7 There was increasing interaction 
between such groups as they worked amongst the poorest sections of the 
community, committed to the empowerment of people, raising political 
consciousness and establishing people's organisations for direct action. Thus 
they took up immediate issues of oppression and exploitation, raising 
awareness about the exploitative and oppressive nature of the prevailing 
structures at both the micro and macro-levels. 
6 This is illustrated by the work of the Lokayan Institute based at the Centre for the Study 
of Developing Societies, Delhi. Lokayan is engaged in identifying and engaging in dialogue 
with action groups. 
7 cf. D L Sheth, "Grass Roots Stirrings and the Future of Politics", Alternatives, IX 
(1983): 21. 
7 
JP's philosophy will be examined firstly in the context of his own ideas and 
actions, and secondly, through its expression in the ideas and work of selected 
voluntary action type organisations. 
The methodology employed in researching this thesis has included both 
secondary materials and empirical work. The empirical work involved a six 
months field trip to India during which time I was attached to the Jayaprakash 
Institute of Social Studies, Calcutta. I also worked from 
The A N Sinha Institute, Patna 
Xavier Institute of Social Services, Ranchi 
The Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi, 
AVARD and the Gandhi Peace Foundation, New Delhi. 
JP's ideas are supported by his own writings as well as various written 
commentaries. In addition, as JP was a contemporary figure there are many 
people with whom he worked or was associated, and some of them were able 
to comment both on JP's character and their respective interpretations of his 
ideas, as well as their views on the same. These include particularly JP's 
former secretary, Sri Sachchidanand, other sarvodayists, Vahini members, and 
people associated with AVARD and the JP and Gandhian Institutes. 
Two of the organisations studied were identified from JP's own work: that is, 
Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini and Lok Samiti. The other two organisations, 
based in West Bengal, were IMSE and SAREEK. They were selected quite 
independently of JP but were chosen because they exhibited many parallels in 
their ideas, and they had been identified by the Jayaprakash Institute as 
organisations undertaking new political type initiatives. The study of these 
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organisations has included some written materials such as their own reports and 
publications as well as two evaluations from the JP Institute on IMSE and 
SAREEK. Further, the Vahini's work in Bodh Gaya attracted publicity and has 
been reported in a number of different sources. I engaged in dialogue with 
leaders and cadres of the organisations, and held meetings with groups of 
people involved in the organisations' work. The discussions took the form of 
both structured and unstructured interviews, and were conducted in both city 
offices and in the villages where they were working. The main aim was to 
obtain perceptions of the organisations in their local environments. Specific 
topics included philosophy, structure and participation, target groups, 
community responses, role of cadres, types of programmes adopted, types of 
conflict confronted, awareness-raising processes, and relationships with other 
voluntary associations and with government organs. Generally these were 
discussed in the context of the situations faced by those organisations. I also 
sought observations on the organisations from people outside them but closely 
associated with the voluntary sector. 
The main themes that emerge throughout the study are: the wholeness of the 
approach required to fulfill JP type ideas; the need to educate and organise 
people towards their own empowerment through popular participation and 
decentralisation; and the tensions involved in seeking to balance the concepts of 
developing lokniti against the prevailing rajniti. Yet, as is clear from Morris-
Jones' explanations of the idioms, the issues between the two ideas cannot be 
treated as a total polarisation. Many variables need to be considered. 
The first chapter examines the idea of lokniti as a process of the voluntarist 
idiom and the operation of rajniti in the modern idiom, looking at the possibility 
of extending the margin of voluntarist politics from Morris-Jones' description 
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as a language of comment to one of practical behaviour. It looks especially at 
the ideas of Gandhi. Then it examines the direction that modem politics has 
taken and the challenges that this has thrown up, in particular the emergence of 
the Naxalites, who presented a Maoist idiom. Finally the chapter returns to the 
voluntarist idiom to discuss what it potentially has to offer the modern idiom as 
a way to help meet its shortcomings. 
The second chapter concentrates on the evolution of JP's ideas, tracing his 
activities from the time when he was a student in the US, to his return to India 
and his involvement in the Congress Socialist Party, his involvement with 
bhoodan and his leadership of the Bihar movement. However, it is not just a 
simple chronology as JP's interests were always very wide. He was concerned 
with the wholeness of society, and with educating and organising it from that 
angle. From this, his concept of "total revolution" can be drawn and 
understood. 
Chapter Three deals with the difficulties and contradictions in actually applying 
JP's ideas to the modern polity, particularly the inability of the Janata party to 
achieve any major transformation through rajniti, emphasising the need to go 
beyond institutionalised politics. This experience throws light on tensions 
between the role of parties and movements. 
The fourth Chapter is a background chapter on Bihar and West Bengal, the 
areas in which the second part of the study is focussed. JP had been active in 
Bihar. The neighbouring state of West Bengal provides a useful contrast, 
especially in view of the fact that they are both volatile states. However, West 
Bengal has quite a different political tradition with Marxism apparently 
representing a dominant force. Even so elements of JP's thought find parallels 
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in the ideas of Tagore and M.N.Roy This chapter sets the scene for the 
environment in which the organisations which are studied work, in particular, 
the rajniti forces against which they struggle. 
Chapter Five introduces the organisations: Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, 
CYSV, a JP initiated youth movement; Nay Bharat Jagriti Kendra, NBJK, in 
association with Lok Samiti, which was also a JP initiated organisation, which 
aimed to establish a decentralised structure from the village upwards; the 
Institute for Motivating Self Employment, IMSE, which had Marxist origins; 
and the Society for the Advancement of Rural Economy, Education and Kultur, 
SAREEK, an organisation which grew out of a disillusionment with the 
parliamentary political process' ability to bring about any real social change. 
The structure of these organisations is examined in Chapter Six, looking at their 
basic mechanics, in particular the scope for democratic participation within their 
operations and their subsequent ability to educate and organise people towards 
their own empowerment. 
The seventh chapter deals with the constructive work undertaken, that is, the 
programmes of immediate action that seek to deal with people's situations in 
their totality looking at basic needs such as health, education and productivity, 
presenting a holistic approach. It outlines the basis of grass roots 
organisational structures moving towards some degree of self-government. 
This is mainly a focus on local work, including local struggle programmes that 
seek to devolve power at that level. 
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The macro level is studied in Chapter Eight, concentrating on the organisations' 
interaction with the larger political structure, particularly elections and the party 
process, an awareness of and participation in government programmmes, 
struggle against injustices within the modern state structure such as corruption 
and bureaucratic inertia. It emphasises rajniti/lokniti tensions. 
Chapter Nine draws out the links between JP and the work of the voluntary 
organisations, in the context in which they have occurred. It looks at both JP's 
and the voluntary organisations' respective ideologies and the ways that they 
have sought to fulfil them, especially the use of trained motivators, 
organisational structures, networking, constructive programmes, methods of 
funding and demands that they have placed on government. It also looks at the 
problems that these approaches have presented in terms of meeting their goals. 
This presents many variables, and the continuous nature of the process is 
drawn out. 
The conclusion that is drawn out from this analysis does not attempt to evaluate 
the work of the voluntary organisations, rather it seeks to establish a 
convergence of their ideas with those of JP, demonstrating the relevance of 
JP's ideas to India's political situation in an immediate, practical and continuing 
sense. The scenario is generally local, but it is a continually evolving one in 
which people have been increasingly encouraged to view themselves as the 
means of their own social transformation rather than being reliant on the State. 
From this standpoint, while the State would still play an important role, it is 
conceived as only a partial means to further people's larger transformation. On 
the one hand they can draw on its financial resources; and on the other, they 
can struggle to resist any repressive measures it might employ to hinder popular 
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movements. So although there is no blueprint for an alternative form of 
politics, JP's ideas represent the exploration of possibilities for the foundation 
of a grass roots approach, largely independent from government, yet providing 
strength to the government's democratic nature. 
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CHAPT'ER ONE 
THE RELEVANCE OF GANDHI'S VOLUNTARIST STYLE OF POLITICS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the leader of the independence movement Gandhi, had believed that 
voluntarism should have been the basis of the independent Indian polity. One 
of his supporters, Agarwal, went so far as to draw up a voluntarist-style 
constitution.' Strictly speaking the voluntarist idiom in its truest form would 
not have a constitution but at the time of independence it was impractical to 
think that the British would hand over political power without any form of 
written guidelines. This chapter looks at Gandhi's ideas, and Agarwal's 
interpretation of the same. Then it looks at the actual political path that 
independent India took, that is modern idiom; and it looks at the rajniti type 
scenario that this has presented and its shortcomings in terms of its aim to 
achieve democracy. The operation of modem politics should not be understood 
simply as a constitutional outline. It was superimposed on the traditional 
idiom. Furthermore it sought to absorb elements of a communist style idiom 
that was seen to represent a threat to the stability of the modern order. This 
presented problems amongst the communists, leading to the emergence of the 
Naxalites who sought to present their own Maoist based idiom. The Naxalites 
were not able to maintain themselves but they served to further highlight the 
inadequacies of the modern political power structures to present a democratic 
model, and the relevance of the voluntarist idiom to the Indian situation. 
Reference is also made here to M N Roy who had also come from a communist 
1 Shriman Narayan Agarwal, Gandhian Constitution for Free India, (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 
1946), Gandhi wrote the foreword. 
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background, and later moved to a voluntarist position in the Indian context. 
Thus this chapter seeks to review the relevance of Gandhian type ideas and the 
democratic potential they offered the Indian polity. It is not a straightforward 
case and it may be useful to remember Morris Jones' cat playing with the stage 
curtains distracting the audience, that is a play within a play. 
II. GANDHI 
Central to Gandhi's beliefs was the need to struggle for a "non-violent 
democracy, otherwise spelt true education of all. The rich should be taught the 
doctrine of stewardship and the poor that of self-help". 2 In other words what 
was required was a moral committment by all towards lokniti type ideals of 
social, political and economic equality free from both exploitation of others and 
dependence on others. 
Gandhi was a practical idealist and a deeply religious man who was concerned 
with the suppressed and oppressed sections of humanity, hoping for a world 
free from exploitation and injustice. Gandhi never claimed any rigid structure 
or application and was not deeply involved with theoretical considerations of 
Marxism or any other concepts, nor did he express himself in scientific or 
economic terminology. He foresaw no inevitable utopia for he believed 
societies would evolve continually with experiences of life through trial and 
error. Jayaprakash Narayan built on and gave a new, often controversial 
direction to Gandhi's ideas, mixing them with elements of Western democratic, 
and Marxist thought. 
2 M K Gandhi, 4.6.1940, published in The Harijan, 8.6.1940. Reprinted in Gandhi, Ih 
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,  vol. LXXII (Ahmedabad: The Publications Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1963), p.36. 
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Gandhi's philosophy was based on satyagraha, that is, force of truth, and he 
saw life as a continuing search for truth. He saw truth as God but because of 
the imperfections and limitations of mankind, Gandhi believed that what was 
important was the integrity of one's own conscience maintaining that it was 
mind not matter that was the basis of social progress. He stressed the role of 
the individual in bringing about his particular vision of revolution for he saw 
satyagraha as a way of life based entirely on individual moral responsibility 
representing the fundamental everlasting means of social transformation. 
Gandhi wanted a continual transformation, not one absolute revolution that 
would occur at a certain time and place. Satyagraha was not simply a means 
towards the end of capturing power. It was both means and ends, a continuing 
process based on non-violence. Gandhi did not believe that violence would 
bring about revolutionary change. Rather, he thought violence simply begets 
violence so that if a rule is established through violence it inevitably sets up a 
violent regime. 
Central to satyagraha was Gandhi's idea of a constructive programme, 
"otherwise and more fittingly . . . called construction of pooma swaraj or 
complete independence by truthful and non-violent means". 3 He developed 
the constructive programme after being confronted with the impoverished 
bonded labourers in Champaran, Bihar. These were no longer self-reliant 
independent peasants. They were dependent on the success or failure of their 
cash crops, indigo, and if the crop or market failed then they were dependent on 
the goodwill of their respective landlords who dictated that they grow indigo in 
the first place. Gandhi's constructive programme aimed to overcome this type 
of situation. It involved the slow construction of an infrastructure for a just 
society through cooperative effort. Gandhi never offered an exhaustive 
3 M K Gandhi, "Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place", 13.12.1941, Gandhi, 
Collected Works vol. LXXV, p.146. 
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constructive programme. He believed that this was something that had to be 
determined according to the situation. He was a very practical person who 
sought workable solutions. Some elements that he regarded as important on the 
immediate Indian scene were: communal unity, the removal of untouchability, 
village sanitation, education in health and hygiene, adult education and basic 
education of a kind appropriate for village life. 
The constructive programme came to be symbolised by khadi and the charka, 
that is homespun cloth and the spinning wheel. Gandhi maintained that: 
"Khadi mentally means decentralisation of the production and distribution of the 
necessities of life".4 The concept presented a challenge and an alternative to 
the importation of ready-made cloth which had meant a drain of resources from 
the villages. It was a drain that reverberated throughout the community. The 
spinners and weavers were adversely affected. Gandhi's promotion of khadi  
was politically, economically and socially significant. It was political in that it 
provided a strategy to fight the commercial power of the British Raj; it was 
social in providing dignity to individuals who were thus transformed from 
being beggars to wage earners. More than that, khadi represented a change in 
outlook and the whole way of life based on moral values of self-limitation, that 
is, limiting oneself to one's consumption needs rather than being motivated by 
profit and greed. Thus men and women would live freely and be prepared to 
face the whole world with no-one living indolently or luxuriously. This was 
the essence of the spinning wheel. It is also the essence of voluntarism. 
Gandhi applied this argument to industry generally for he appreciated the evils 
of exploitation by the competitive capitalist economy based on large scale 
industry. So he suggested a decentralised economy based on village self-
sufficiency and self-limitation. Gandhi believed that economic equality was the 
4 Ibid, p.150. 
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"master key to independence". He continued by explaining that economic 
equality: 
means the levelling down of the few rich in whose hands is concentrated 
the bulk of the nation's wealth on the one hand, and the levelling up of 
the semi-starved naked millions on the other. A non-violent system of 
government is clearly an impossibility so long as the wide gulf between 
the rich and the hungry millions persists. 5 
Gandhi believed that self-limitation and self-control applied to all aspects of life. 
Consequently he decried the adverse effects of the centralised Western legal 
system for he believed that the authority they exercised perpetuated Western 
colonialism, and thus hindered the development of lokniti that is, people's 
power. He argued that if people were prepared to resolve their own disputes 
then they would not need to resort to third parties and could move instead 
towards lokniti, which emphasises the role, rights and responsibilities of the 
individual.6 
However, to achieve lokniti it would be necessary to develop a decentralised 
political structure which enabled the weakest to have the same opportunity as 
the strongest. Gandhi had in mind as direct a form of democracy as could be 
achieved. He felt this entailed decentralised, self-sufficient communities based 
on mutual dependence of the members within those respective communities. 7 
He saw each individual as being conscious of his own responsibilities for 
himself and towards the community. Gandhi attributed little importance to any 
state structure for his methodology was not based on the capture or destruction 
of the state. Rather Gandhi wanted a mass moral and peaceful social revolution 
which he thought could be achieved by a change in individual's hearts. Non- 
5 Ibid, p. 158. 
6 cf Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Hind Swarai, 1910, Reprinted in Gandhi, The 
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. X, pp.6 - 68. 
7 Ibid, p.10. 
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violent civil disobedience was developed as a strategy to help achieve this. 
Nevertheless he gave priority to constructive work, warning that the role of 
civil disobedience was limited. For example he held that civil disobedience 
could not be directed for a general cause such as independence. The issue had 
to be definite and capable of being clearly understood and within the power of 
the opponent to yield for the purpose of redressing a specific local wrong. 8 
Gandhi did not foresee any inevitable utopia, and he never committed himself to 
any details. He was wary of long term planning stating: "For me, I say with 
Cardinal Newman: 'I do not seek the distant scene; one step enough for 
me".9 However, he sympathised with the constitutional framework drawn 
up by Shriman Narayan Agarwal who tried to base his work in Gandhi's 
writings. 10 This framework laid out the fundamental rights such as freedom 
of speech, assembly, conscience, basic education, as well as fundamental 
duties of the individual such as avoiding and checking, if necessary, 
exploitation of man by man. 
The village was seen as the central unit in Agarwal's proposed political 
structure. It was to be governed by a panchayat that was elected every three 
years on the basis of full adult suffrage. The panchayat functions were to 
include education, recreation, security, agriculture, industry, trade and 
commerce, sanitation, medical relief and courts administering speedy civil and 
criminal justice. This involved running schools, maintaining an educative 
library, encouraging sports and games, arranging exhibitions and fairs, 
8 Gandhi, "Constructive Programme", p. 165. 
9 Gandhi, Young India, 24.12.1920, reprinted in Gandhi, Collected Works, vol. XIX, 
pp.173 - 174. 
10 Shriman Narayan Agarwal, Gandhian Constitution for Free India, (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 
1946), Gandhi wrote the foreword. 
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promoting cooperative farming, discouraging commercial crops, organising 
village industries on cooperative lines and ensuring healthy drinking water. 
In addition Agarwal's scheme provided for taluka panchayats, district 
panchayats (or ward panchayats and municipal councils at the urban level), 
provincial government and central government. Elections to the higher levels of 
government were to be indirect. The President of each lower level was his or 
her panchayat's representative at the next level. This process continued to the 
central government so that all representatives on the central government were 
also presidents of their local village panchayat, a factor which Agarwal regarded 
as most important for decentralised government ensuring the representatives' 
familiarity with day-to-day reality in the village. 11 Later, independent India 
sought to take up these ideas from the district to village levels under the 
panchayati raj system. The role of the higher levels of government tended to be 
more supervisory and coordinating, although there were a number of 
specifically national tasks accorded to the central government such as managing 
all India departments of transport and communications, regulating currency, 
customs and international trade. Agarwal prepared his draft constitutional 
guidelines at a time when there were many attempts to develop an Indian 
constitution. His decentralised structure provided for a form of limited 
representative democracy that would ensure a high degree of people's 
participation. Nevertheless he did not emphasise consensus in decision making 
and consensus would have required a very deliberate effort on the part of 
everyone to contribute towards decision making, thus maximising participation. 
Agarwal's decentralised structure accepted the inevitability of some form of 
constitutional government at that time, but it sought to minimise its effects, 
allowing for greater participation and voluntary effort. 
11 Ibid, p.102. 
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III 	INDIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL PATH 
Gandhi had advocated the dissolution of the Congress after independence, 
rather than have it transform itself into a political party. However most of the 
Congress leaders maintained that: 
India requires for its gradual and orderly political, social and economic all 
round progress, one big political party, large enough to guarantee a stable 
government, and strong enough organisationally to maintain its hold and 
influence over the people. 12 
Gandhi's ideas were not regarded as a serious alternative by either the British or 
most of the Western educated Congress leadership. Basically they saw 
Western parliamentary democracy as the only option, that is a constitutionally 
defined parliamentary democracy. However they recognised communism as a 
possible threat. This was the beginning of the Cold War period. Moreover it 
was the time of the communist success in China, and the consequent founding 
of the People's Republic of China under Mao Tse-Tung. Many parallels could 
be drawn between the development of the Indian National Congress and the 
Chinese Communist Party in their respective struggles for independence. 
However the Congress, under Nehru, opted for a Western style parliamentary 
democracy and India came to be seen as the bastion of democracy in Asia. 
Meanwhile Gandhi's ideas were not affordedmuch credibility in terms of the 
constitutional path which India chose to pursue. India's first Prime Minister, 
Nehru, described the villages, where the mass of the Indian population lived, as 
"just a collection of mud huts and individuals". 13 He saw villages as old 
12 This statement appeared in the All India Congress Bulletin,  7.11.1947, and is cited in G 
Austin, The Indian Constitution Cornerstone of a Nation  (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1972), p.29. 
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fashioned and backward, not as a way forward, and he could not understand 
Gandhi's ideas as to: 
why a village should necessarily embody truth and non-violence. A 
village normally speaking is backward intellectually and culturally and 
no progress can be made from a backward environment. Narrow 
minded people are much more likely to be untruthful and violent. 14 
He spoke of the need to speedily obtain material objectives through the 
modernisation process, and wanted to "encourage the village to approximate 
more to the culture of the town". 15 Generally the Independence leaders 
believed that the tasks of governing such a large population with its 
geographical and social complexities and economic disparities required a 
strong, central political authority. 
Thus the constitution laid out a republican, secular and federal parliamentary 
form of democracy with a strong central government that controlled the major 
sources of government finance. In addition it enjoyed such powers as Article 
356 of the Constitution. This enabled it to institute Presidential Rule in the 
states thereby suspending respective state legislatures, bringing them under the 
control of the Centre. The constitutional wording was very vague giving wide 
scope for central interference. 16 Structurally the Union government consisted 
of the President and two houses, the Lok Sabha (People's House) and the 
Rajya Sabha (Council of States). Constituencies were divided into roughly 
13 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), 
p.523. 
14 J Nehru, 9.10.1945, A Bunch of Old Letters  (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), 
p.508. 
15 Ibid, p.509. 
16 This statement appeared in the All India Congress Bulletin, 7.11.1947, cited in Austin, 
Cornerstone of a Nation,  p.29. 
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equal size population-wise and were elected on the basis of five year terms. 
The upper house members were mainly elected by their respective state 
assemblies. Some members could be appointed by the President. Whilst the 
upper house had the right to be fully informed by the Government's activities, it 
could not raise a censure motion. Parliament was not a deliberative policy 
making body although it could modify legislation. Decision making was 
concentrated with the Prime Minister, Cabinet and high levels of bureaucracy. 
The Prime Minister and Ministers were a part of parliament, and are appointed 
by the President. In practice, the Prime Minister was the leader of the majority 
party in the Lok Sabha, and the Ministers were selected by the Prime Minister. 
The Prime Minister also chaired the Planning Commission, an extra-
constitutional advisory body empowered to draw up plans for the country's 
development but not accountable to Parliament. Nevertheless, the Planning 
Commission had no executive powers, and had to work through the Ministries 
and Prime Minister's department. 
The state level government was similar in organisation and structure to the 
Union government. It had a governor who was appointed by the President, the 
Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) and some states had an upper house or 
Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad). The Chief Minister was the leader of 
the majority party or coalition in the lower house. The state government 
undertook its administration largely through the levels of local government, that 
is the village panchayat, the Development Block (about 100 panchayats) and the 
District (covering several blocks). 
The judicial system was integrated and centralised extending from the 
subordinate and district courts to the State High Courts, with the Supreme 
Court at the centre with original and exclusive jurisdiction in any case relating to 
the Constitution. The Judges were appointed by the President in consultation 
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with the Chief Justice, other Judges, and if necessary the State High Courts. 
The Chief Justice was chosen by the President on the advice of the Prime 
Minister. 
So although it was universal adult suffrage, the political system was centralised 
to such an extent that participation in decision making by people generally was 
minimal. Indeed the Constitution afforded the basic responsibility for 
governing to the State, that is, the Centre. The extent of the State policy was 
enumerated in Part IV of the Constitution. These principles were not 
enforceable by any court but nevertheless were held out to be "fundamental in 
the governance of the country". 17 The basic direction was laid down in Article 
38: 
The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing 
and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice - 
social, economic and political - shall inform all the institutions of national 
life. 
The State was entrusted the major responsibility for raising the masses by 
ensuring social and economic justice. So it is understandable why government 
powers were so centralised for if social and economic progress were to emanate 
from the State, then the State had to have the means of social and economic 
control. To the extent that the central government took this responsibility, 
direct participation by people was limited. Their participation was indirect, and 
in the Indian situation basically this took the form of universal adult franchise. 
So theoretically there was scope for the adult population to play a role in 
decision making even if it was simply to give assent or register dissent to the 
manner in which they were being governed. In addition to a high rate of 
illiteracy 18 and general lack of education, which made for a limited outlook, 
17 Article 37. 
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their political experience was that of colonialism, princes, the caste system and 
feudal landlords, so that there was always someone with higher authority to be 
responsible for decision making. The Indian constitution perpetuated this 
situation by assuming this role, albeit with the ostensible consent of the people. 
The theory was that the Indian Constitution would nurture people to the extent 
that they could take on that responsibility. However, the centralised Indian 
system afforded two major weaknesses: firstly, it was more likely that abuses 
of power could occur; and, secondly, that participation would be simply 
"ritualistic" so that effective devolution of power by the centre and simultaneous 
assumption of responsibility by people would be hindered. On the other hand 
the underlying concern of the Indian constitution was with achieving order and 
national unity under a democratic system. It imposed the maintenance of 
democratic rights as an obligation on the part of the government, detailed in Part 
III of the constitution. The Fundamental Rights included rights to equality, to 
freedom against exploitation, to cultural and educational rights, to property, and 
to constitutional remedies ensuring the enforcement of these rights. These 
rights were held to be so fundamental that they were declared to be in force 
immediately, even before the commencement of the Constitution. 
Consequently, all existing laws that were inconsistent with Part III were 
declared to be invalid in so far as they were inconsistent. However, the Centre 
sought to circumvent these rights and further centralise its power. For 
example, the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, 1971, restricted the 
constitutionally entrenched fundamental right to property. Such steps implied 
that the Central Parliament was omnipotent and could alter the constitution to 
suit its own ends. 
18 The 1951 census recorded 16.67% adult literacy. Research and Reference Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, India 1987 (New Delhi: 
Allied Publishers, 1988), p.72. 
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Together the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles were seen as "the 
Conscience of the Constitution" 19 because they were to pave the constitutional 
path to social revolution, with the Constitution serving as an instrument for 
social change. The theory was that it would nurture people to the extent that 
they could take on that responsibility. One of the most important means was 
seeking to ensure social and economic justice. The State was to secure a social 
order for the promotion of the people's welfare, undertaking duties such as 
raising nutrition levels and standards of living. The Directive Principles served 
to uphold the virtues of the Constitution. Also it gave credibility to government 
policy and party platforms apparently made in pursuance of the aims of the 
Directive Principles. 
The parliamentary system largely reinforced the traditional political idiom of 
land ownership and patterns of caste dominance in rural areas, establishing a 
series of patron-client relationships with the parliamentary parties at the apex. 
The government effectively established channels for rewards to the power 
holders who secured the largest vote blocs. For example, the government 
invested very heavily in the Green Revolution building up an infrastructure 
including irrigation, roads, electricity, credit facilities and the distribution of 
new seeds. It has been claimed that the rich farmers, with twenty acres or 
more, benefited the most from the Green Revolution, while the vast majority 
suffered a "relative decline in their economic position."20 The "top down" 
planning bias did not take local situations into account, nor did it involve local 
populations in their own development. Even when certain rights were vested 
through legislation, dominant groups were able to neutralise these because of 
their monopoly over power through their ownership of land, credit and other 
19 G Austin, The Indian Constitution Cornerstone of a Nation  (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), p.50. 
20 F Frankel, India's Green Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 
p.12. 
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economic resources. Thus, according to such accounts, the parliamentary 
system did not fulfil Nehru's vision of it serving as a means for expanding 
participation. Rather it operated as a vehicle of power through the operation of 
a traditional patron-client order. 
IV. COMMUNIST PARTIES  
It was within this system that the Communist Party of India worked, although 
initially it embarked on a fierce programme of terrorist sabotage towards the 
government of the newly independent India, suggesting perhaps, the operation 
of another idiom. However the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was 
anxious to cultivate an alliance with India at that time. Thus it directed the CPI 
to abandon its guerilla warfare and to begin cooperating with the Indian political 
leaders instead. So the CPI entered the electoral field. 
Nevertheless, there were many within the CPI who were concerned with the
• CPI's subservience to the CPSU. This subservience was demonstrated clearly 
by the CPI's withdrawal of a commendation that it sent in 1958 supporting the 
Yugoslav government's new programme, after the Kremlin criticised the same 
programme. Moreover during the Sino-India border clashes, the Soviet Union 
and hence the CPI supported Indian claims to territory below the McMahon 
line. This was regarded as a betrayal of the communist ideal of a universal 
working class as it put nationalism above communism. As a result of the rising 
tension within the CPI a split occurred in 1964 with the emergence of the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) - CPI(M) - which held itself out to be the 
true Communist Party of India. CPI(M) chose to continue to follow the 
constitutional path of parliamentary democracy. It achieved electoral success in 
West Bengal in 1967, forming an alliance with the United Front coalition to 
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form the State Government. However, some CPI(M) members, mainly youths 
from Calcutta believed additional action was necessary and they directed their 
attention to the countryside supporting a Maoist type insurgence at Naxalbari in 
1967. In order to maintain electoral credibility the CPI(M) parliamentary wing, 
which held the Law and Order portfolio, chose to crush the uprising, 
demonstrating the force of their rajniti character. This led to another split with 
the emergence of the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) - CPI(ML) - 
in 1969. 
V 	THE NAXALITES  
The CPI(ML) argued that by accepting office in the parliamentary set up, the 
CPI(M) could not overcome the fundamental problems that the bureaucracy 
perpetuated. 21 The CPI(ML), or Naxalites, claimed to adopt a Maoist 
philosophy. The movement began in ,Naxalbari, helping the peasants seize 
grain, ,land and weapons from the landlords and plantation owners. They 
received moral support from Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, CCP. 22 
The Maoist path was quite different to that which the CPI and the CPI(M) had 
been following. Mao focused on the rural areas, and central to his thinking was 
the concept of Mass Line which he regarded as the principal instrument for 
transforming the character of the state and of society and transforming the 
relationship between the two. He believed that the masses were the real heroes 
and that the communists had much to learn from them.23 Therefore he 
maintained that it was important to: 
21 cf S Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution The Naxalite Uprising (London: Zed Books, 
1984). 
22 "Spring Thunder Over India", Editorial in the Peking People's Daily of 5 July, 1967, reproduced 
in Samar Sen, Debabrata Panda and Ashish Lahiri (joint eds), Naxalbari and After vol. 2 (Calcutta: 
Kathashilpa, 1978), P.  188. 
23 For example: Mao Tse-Tung, "Preface and Postscript to Rural Surveys", March and 
April, 1941, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, vol.111, p.12. 
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take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas), then 
go to the masses and propagate and explain their ideas until the masses 
embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into 
action. Then once again go to the masses so that the ideas are 
persevered in and carried through and soon, over and over again in an 
endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and 
richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge.24 
Mao's point was that: "communists must never separate themselves from the 
majority of the people or neglect them by leading only a few progressive 
elements and the broad masses".25 This included working with the party's 
class allies for Mao recognised that there were many valuable people outside of 
the party and that they ought not be ignored. 26 
The concept of Mass Line pervaded all his thinking: his strategic, cultural, 
educational and economic ideas. For example it was an integral part of 
People's War which developed as a means to achieving revolution by providing 
the people with a weapon for overthrowing oppression, capturing state power 
and establishing people's government. It was undertaken by politically 
organised masses. Guerilla warfare was based on the force of violence but it 
avoided direct confrontation between the force of the party and of the enemy 
unless its superiority was assured. It involved small peripheral but effective 
24 Mao Tse-Tung, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership", 1.6.1943, written 
for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Reprinted in Mao Tse-Tung, 
Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung,  vol.III (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p.119. 
25 Mao Tse-Tuing, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", 
October 1938. This report was made by Comrade Mao Tse-Tung to the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. The session endorsed the line of the 
Political Bureau headed by Comrade Mao. The plenary session decided on the line of 
persisting in the anti-Japanese united front, but at the same time pointed out that there had to 
be struggle as well as unity within the united front. Reprinted in Mao, Selected Works, 
vol.11, pp. 201 - 202. 
26 Mao, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party", pp. 201 - 202. 
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attacks on the enemy so as to gradually weaken its defences. The establishing 
of base areas involved consolidating any tactical inroads made into enemy 
territory and it was essential to the success of guerilla warfare. The base area 
strategy was pursued before, during and after any direct campaign to eliminate 
the enemy, thus ensuring popular support and preparing people to undertake 
new responsibilities. 
Cultural and educational work were also essential to developing Mass Line, and 
Mao believed that in undertaking this work it was necessary to "adopt forms 
and select contents suited to the existing rural conditions and to the needs and 
wishes of the people in the countryside"." He explained to the party cadres 
that the party's culture was a people's culture and that it was necessary to link 
themselves with the masses. This meant: 
All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from 
the desire of any individual, however well intentioned. It often 
happens that they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or 
determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait 
patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, 
most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing 
and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves 
from the masses. ... There are two principles here: one is the actual 
needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the 
other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds 
instead of our making up their minds for them. 28 
Mao recognised that unless these principles were followed people's 
participation and thus the strength of the movement could not be consolidated. 
Mao envisaged education as serving the process of social transformation by 
increasing the revolutionary consciousness and the understanding of science 
27 Mao Tse-Tung, "On Coalition Government", 24 April 1945, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected 
Works, vol. III, p. 262. 
28 Mao Tse-Tung, "The United Front in Cultural Work", 30 October 1944, Mao Tse-Tung, 
Selected Works, vol. III, pp. 186 - 187. 
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and technology, developing popular understanding and capacity for action in an 
historically given situation. 
However, he was also concerned to make education serve the practical needs of 
the people. Meeting the practical needs of the people was inseparable from all 
revolutionary tasks. 29 Mao pointed out that if the workers and peasants were 
dissatisfied with their living conditions then the expansion of the army would 
be affected adversely as would the mobilisation of the masses for the 
revolutionary war. He explained that it was wrong to think that it was 
impossible to spare time for economic construction because the war keeps 
people busy enough. In the course of a long war the people would be 
exhausted if the economy was not built up and the material prerequisites 
secured. 30 
Mao thought mobilisation, that is political mobilisation, was a continuous and 
all inclusive process. He sought to pursue the mass line throughout. It was 
important to his post-independence economic strategy which was based on 
economic decentralisation, both agricultural and industrial. In the absence of 
large capital resources Mao regarded this as necessary to mobilise man-power 
and industrial resources which would be a step towards a line of rapid 
industrialisation based on the development of heavy and large scale industry. 
In implementing his economic policy and in his enthusiasm to achieve high 
economic objectives during the Great Leap Forward, Mao lost sight of the Mass 
Line but as the economic policy failed, he reviewed his tactics and he was able 
to re-emphasise the role of the Mass Line. 
29 Mao Tse-Tung, Pay Attention to Economic Work", 20.8.1933. This speech was delivered at 
the economic construction conference of 17 counties in Southern Kiangsi in August 1933. 
Reprinted in Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. I (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1975), p.135. 
30 Ibid., p. 189. 
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The Naxalites aimed to follow this strategy and sought to work amongst the 
peasantry, forming party groups and establishing base areas, advancing 
towards the seizure of power through armed struggle. Their influence quickly 
spread throughout rural West Bengal and the neighbouring states, especially 
tribal areas. It seemed that a new political idiom was emerging, that is a Maoist 
one, which included a number of lokniti type of ideals breaking the stranglehold 
of some aspects of the traditional idiom over the modern political power 
structures, allowing for greater participation although still promoting a polity in 
which the centre had ultimate responsibility. However most of the Naxalite 
cadres were "young iconoclasts" 31 from Calcutta who harboured a deep sense 
of frustration and oppression with the dominant power structure. 32 Mostly 
they wanted to establish themselves within that power structure and they saw 
Maoism as a way to attract attention to their cause rather than develop 
something new. This is shown by the cadres' tendency to oversimplify Mao's 
ideas, reducing it to armed struggle which they maintained was "the only 
correct road for the Indian revolution; there is no other road whatsoever." 33 
Moreover class annihilation of political, economic and social authority was 
identified as an integral part of this way. 34 Charu Mazumdar, who emerged as 
the Naxalite leader believed this was the best way to destroy the state machinery 
although he did not advocate this as an end in itself. Rather he saw it as a vital 
stroke releasing the revolutionary momentum of the peasants.35 He believed it 
would be effective only if it was part of a broader and more comprehensive plan 
that educated the peasants about the total Maoist based Naxalite politics. 
31 Banerjeee, Simmering Revolution, p.208. 
32 cf Infra Chapter Four. 
33 "Spring Thunder", p. 190. 
34 Charau Mazumdar, "On the Political-Organisational Report", that is his speech at the first 
congress of the CPI(ML) in 1970, published in Sen et al, Naxalbari, vol.2, pp. 291 - 296. 
35 Bannerjee, Simmering Revolution p.113. 
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Yet even though Mazumdar seemed to have a greater comprehension of the 
Maoist philosophy than most of the cadres, he accepted the inevitability of the 
continued operation of the constitutional framework. He even acknowledged 
the possibility of benefits from some legal changes. 36 He also acknowledged 
the role of class allies, explaining that not everyone who was not a Naxalite was 
an enemy of the cause. 37 However the Naxalite movement largely developed 
into one of terror. Killings appeared indiscriminate and there was no attempt to 
establish real people's courts that could justify the killings. 38 Some landless 
artisans were annihilated also, without any real explanation, creating panic. 
Further it seemed any agrarian programmes that were instituted were not 
properly thought through; for example money-lenders were instructed to return 
all deposits but were inundated with false claims, and there was no provision 
for new sources of credit. 39 Their movement was seen to present the 
government with a Law and Order problem. Thus it was ruthlessly suppressed 
so that many cadres were imprisoned, tortured or even killed. The Naxalites 
soon lost peasant support and were isolated in the countryside. They had not 
understood Mao's advice that "a leading group that is genuinely united and 
linked with the masses can be formed only gradually in the process of mass 
struggle and not in isolation from it."4° The CPI(ML) quickly became a 
truncated party and the Naxalites were ineffective as a revolutionary force. 
36 Ibid., p.76. 
37 B Upadhyay, "On the Thoughts of Charu Majumdar", 7.6.75 in Sen et al, Naxalbari, vol.2, 
p.71. See also Charu Mazumdar, "A Note on Party's Work in Rural Areas", 18.11.1971, reprinted in 
Sen et al, Naxalbari vol.2, pp.319-320. 
38 A Correspondent, "A Report on Birbhum", 26.6.1971, Sen et al, Naxalbari, vol.1, pp. 116 - 
117. 
44 /bid. 
40 Mao, "Methods of Leadershp", p.118. 
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However they had established themselves as a political force, provoking a 
strong reaction from government forces. Moreover they influenced a rethinking 
within the saintly cum voluntarist idiom. That is a rethinking on the relevance 
and role of Gandhi type voluntarist ideas, for in spite of their violent approach 
they raised many lokniti ideas of involving the grass roots at a very basic level, 
mobilising them towards their own solutions, reinforcing the voluntarist ideal 
of the need to go beyond the constitutional framework in order to overcome the 
rajniti phenomenon that it seemed to support. 
VI M N ROY  
The significance of the Naxalites can be highlighted by reference to Manabendra 
Nath Roy who had also thought that a communist style of politics would be the 
most appropriate Roy had been involved with the initial founding of the 
Communist Party of India but had become disillusioned with communism after 
Lenin's death, and during Stalin's rise. He reasoned that concepts of state 
ownership and planned economy would not by themselves end exploitation of 
labour nor necessarily lead to an equal distribution of wealth.'" He explained 
that the basic idea is "that the individual is prior to society, and that freedom can 
be enjoyed by individuals." 42 Thus he supported the thesis that to make 
democracy effective: power must always remain vested in the people and there 
must be ways and means for the people to wield sovereign power effectively, 
not periodically but from day to day."43 He thought this would best be 
41 M N Roy, "New Humanism Principles of Radical Democracy" Thesis 10. These theses 
were adopted by the Third All India Conference of the Radical Democratic Party, held in 
Bombay from 26.12.1946 to 30.12.1946, and are published in Roy & Spratt, Beyond  
Communism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1947). 
42 M N Roy, "Marxism and Radicalism", concluding speech in the discussion on the draft 
theses submitted to the delegates' session of the Third All-India conference of the Radical 
Democratic Party, Bombay, 27.12.1946, in Roy & Spratt, Beyond Communism, p.117. 
43 New Humanism Principles", Thesis 10. 
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achieved by people's committees embracing the entire people. He explained 
that the people's committees would "be small replicas of the state composed of 
them. Being small, they cannot crush the individual. On the other hand, in a 
small corporate unit, the potentialities of man can have greater freedom to 
develop. These units will constitute the pyramidal structure of the state." 44 
He envisaged parliament at the apex of the pyramidal structure, and the political 
organ of society, that is, the state would be under a standing democratic 
contro1.45 Roy saw economic decentralisation as going hand in hand with 
political democracy advancing towards the goal of freedom. Thus he thought 
that the economy should be based on production for use and distribution with 
reference to human needs, and also that it should be based on production for 
use and distribution with reference to human needs, and also that it should be 
based on direct participation of the entire adult population through people's 
committees. 46 There was no place for any political parties for Roy believed 
that they prevented people from exercising their individual sovereignty. His 
ideas were accepted by the Radical Democratic Party that he himself had 
founded. Consequently the party decided to disband itself at its Calcutta 
conference in December 1948. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Clearly, direct parallels can be found between Roy's ideas of a decentralised 
democracy and the abandonment of a legitimate role for political parties and 
Gandhi's ideas on the same. The parallels presented by the Naxalite movement 
with voluntarist thought are not as direct, but they challenged the credibility of 
the dominant power structure and the failure of the institutional framework that 
supported it to bring about social and economic changes. Moreover the 
44 M N Roy, "Marxism and Radicalism", p.126. 
45 New Humanism Principles", Thesis 14. 
46 Ibid., Thesis 18. 
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Naxalites' actions influenced JP's thinking and the thinking of some of the 
organisations, that will be studied in the later chapters,and which had direct 
contact with the Naxalites, such contact they saw as emphasising the immediate 
relevance of their own ideas to the Indian political situation: 47 
Hitherto voluntarist politics in independent India, that is since Gandhi, had 
remained outside constitutional style politics, largely ignoring it as will be seen 
in the next chapter. The state had only accorded the voluntarist sector a very 
limited role. However it would seem from the Gandhian perspective, that the 
voluntarist bottom up approach with initiatives and responsibility being taken 
from below, had the potential to expand both the nature and content of politics. 
It could redefine politics so that it would be relevant at the local level: 
emphasising the needs and demands of the poor such as health issues and 
rights, community resources, raising awareness, engaging in dialogue, 
generating employment opportunities, promoting economic self-reliance, 
responding to prevailing injustices and needs at a far more meaningful, 
immediate and practical level than the legislatures have achieved. The 
voluntarist approach could thus provide new popular links with the political 
process integrating popular demands in an expanded political process rather 
than isolating them. This would not mean immediately abandoning all forms of 
government by gradually transforming and empowering the local communities. 
Nor is it to say that the voluntary sector would succeed where institutions of the 
state failed. 
Gandhi's emphasis was on the voluntarist sector operating in local communities 
developing local solutions and having the power of control at the local level, 
responding to specific and immediate situations, and taking on all facets of life. 
Operating at the local level would have the distinct advantage of flexibility and 
open endedness that the bureaucratic modern power structures could not 
47 See below: particularly Chapter Two and Chapter Five. 
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achieve. Further the voluntarist idiom would not be constricted by narrow or 
short term goals of capturing state power, that preoccupied the political parties. 
To operate effective changes at the local level would require that local people 
recognise a problem and want it to be solved; further that they are conscious of 
the need for change, feeling the oppressiveness of the prevailing system and 
thus a concern to undo it. 
However rural people are not a homogeneous mass. Rather they tend to be 
isolated, dispersed, and conditioned for passivity, resigned to the prevailing 
situation, afraid, indifferent and anxious to avoid responsibility. Passivity is 
closely bound up with ignorance and dependence compounded by illiteracy and 
poor communication networks. 
To be successful the voluntary sector would need to develop education and 
organisation creating a consciousness and mobilising people towards their own 
empowerment, economically, socially and politically, focusing on the exercise 
of free will by the individual requiring a consciousness based on self-restraint 
and mutual cooperation with people thinking in terms of collectively identifying 
themselves with others. Programmes could involve moves to decentralise 
political authority, open access to media: decentralisation of economic structures 
and establishment of cooperatives, as well as extending freedom of thought and 
expression. Such proposals could be put into immediate practice amongst like-
minded people as an alternative to the dominant institutions. It is such practical 
steps that tend to be more the essence of voluntary organisations in this thesis 
than any speculating about an ideal society. 
The central voluntarist concern is to promote the idea of freedom, living and 
working with others towards social institutions that are voluntary, loosening the 
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authority of coercive and authoritarian structures that the government upholds 
or is seen to represent. Roy believed that once sufficiently large numbers of 
men and women were moved by the urge for freedom to educate themselves, 
the process would accelerate under its own momentum. Nevertheless, while 
the government structure was defined in terms of the modern idiom, 
voluntarism would need to be concerned more with an ongoing process not just 
an end product, that is a process of developing self confidence and awareness 
of rights so as to enable people to respond to new situations as they arose. It 
would be a systematic move away from concentrating on the process of the 
state, that is from rajniti towards lokniti. This was what JP was concerned to 
achieve, and the next chapter examines the evolution of his ideas on this 
subject. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EVOLUTION OF JP'S THOUGHT 
I. 	INTRODUCTION 
Jayaprakash Narayan sympathised with the frustration of the Naxalites over the 
existing political system although he did not agree with their means. He hoped 
to help them overcome their frustrations by seeking to revive what he 
considered to be Gandhi's ideas of non-violent struggle and mobilisation for 
social change, towards participatory democracy. 
Actually JP came rather late to Gandhi, becoming fully convinced of the totality 
of Gandhi's philosophy only after Gandhi's death, when he demonstrated his 
faith by joining with Vinoba Bhave and the sarvodaya movement. JP's own 
initiatives in Gandhism began when he broke away from what he perceived as 
Vinoba's more extensive but superficial bhoodan and gramdan programmes and 
began, instead, to concentrate his efforts more intensively on mobilising people 
in Musahari, consolidating the bhoodan and gramdan gains. But the real 
momentum in his thinking became apparent in 1974 when he responded to the 
calls for government accountability by the Bihari students and he decided to join 
their campaign against government inaction and corruption. He brought a new 
light to the Gandhian legacy which had hitherto adopted Vinoba's approach of 
gentle persuasion and avoided direct confrontation with perpetrators of 
injustice. This chapter is essentially descriptive, tracing the evolution of JP's 
thought. 
II. 	JP PRE-INDEPENDENCE 
Nevertheless it is important also to look at his ideological searching during the 
pre-Independence and early post-Independence years, when he was not yet 
convinced of Gandhism, as this throws valuable light on his later years. 
JP first became involved with politics and, indeed, Gandhism in 1921 when he 
rallied to Gandhi's call to students to join the non-cooperation campaign and 
leave their government-sponsored colleges. JP still wished to continue his 
studies though, so he left India for the United States where, he had heard, 
students could find work in order to pay for their educational expenses. While 
studying in the United States JP was introduced to the writings of M N Roy 
who propounded the merits of Marxism. 1 
JP was attracted to these ideas, which he saw as providing the revolutionary 
path to the new society that he desired. In 1929 he returned to India, 
"convinced that the central problem of human society was inequality of wealth, 
property, rank, culture and opportunity." 2 However he did not join the 
Communist Party of India. M N Roy's disillusionment with the Comintern 
influenced this decision and it was reinforced by Lenin's thesis on the role of 
communists in national independence movements of the colonies. 3 Thus he 
disagreed with the CPI's opposition to the Indian National Congress, which it 
denounced as bourgeois. JP agreed that the Congress organisation was 
1 cf Jayaprakash Narayan, "Towards Reconstructing the Polity" based on an inaugural 
address to the All India Radical Humanist Association Conference, Calcutta, December 1973, 
published in Voluntary Action, XVI (March-June, 1974): 1. 
2 Allan & Wendy Scarfe, J.P. His Biography (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd, 1975), 
p.63. 
3 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Towards Reconstructing the Polity," p.1. 
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dominated by bourgeois forces but he recognised it as the main force in the 
struggle for independence and believed that the principal task was to ensure it 
stayed on the right path. Meanwhile it was necessary also to maintain the path 
for socialism. This led to JP's initiative in founding the Congress Socialist 
Party (CSP) in 1934. He explained: 
The party should take only an anti-imperialist stand on Congress 
platforms. We should not make the mistake of placing a full socialist 
programme before the Congress. An anti-imperialist programme should 
be evolved for this purpose suiting the needs of the workers, peasants 
and the lower middle classes. It is necessary for us to be as tactful as 
possible. On no account should we alienate other anti-imperialist 
elements by intolerance and impatience. The Congress constructive 
programme should not be obstructed or interfered with. It should, 
however, be scientifically criticised and exposed.4 
In this manner JP hoped to wean the anti-imperialist forces in the Congress 
away from their current bourgeois leadership, bringing them under the 
leadership of revolutionary socialism. 
After the outbreak of the second world war JP hoped to step up the 
independence movement and he advocated the launching of a struggle against 
the British. He was subsequently imprisoned. During his imprisonment the 
Congress launched the Quit India movement. Thus encouraged, JP escaped 
from prison and joined the underground forces until his rearrest about 12 
months later. This period, and indeed the time up to independence saw his 
open advocacy of the use of violent methods to overthrow the British. 5 Yet 
at the Same time he began to lean increasingly towards Gandhi with regard to 
4 Jayapralcash Narayan in a statement adopted at the second conference of the Congress 
Socialist Party, Meerut, January, 1936, reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total 
Revolution, vol.2, Politics in India, ed. Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1978), 
p.2. 
5 Brimal Prasad, "The Making of JP's Political Philosophy" India Quarterly, 35 (1979): 
491. 
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reconstruction after the achievement of independence; he said: 
The free Indian nationr shall work for peace between nations and total 
rejection of armaments and for the method of a peaceful settlement of 
national disputes ... The law of the land will be based on the will of the 
people freely expressed by them. The ultimate basis of maintenance of 
order shall be the sanction and concurrence of the people.6 
He continued: 
The political and economic organisation of the state shall be based on 
principles of social justice and economic freedom. While the organisation 
shall conduct to the satisfaction of the national requirements of every 
member of society, material satisfaction shall not be its sole objective. It 
shall aim at health, living, and the moral and intellectual development of 
the individual. To this end to secure social justice, the state shall 
endeavour to promote small-scale production carried on by individual or 
cooperative effort for the equal benefit of all concerned. All large-scale 
collective production shall be eventually brought under collective 
ownership and control and in this behalf the state shall begin by 
nationalising heavy transport, shipping, mining and heavy industries. 
The textile industry shall be progressively decentralised. The life of the 
villages shall be reorganised and they shall be made self-governing units, 
self-sufficient in as large a number as possible. 7 
Meanwhile JP was disappointed with the Indian communists and their attitude 
of non-cooperation with the CSP and he was concerned about reports of 
Stalin's purges. 
6 Jayaprakash Narayan, "My Picture of Swaraj", a draft resolution for the Ramgarh 
Congress sent by JP, General Secretary, All India Congress Socialist Party to the Working 
Committee and published by Mahatma Gandhi in the Harijan, 20.4.1940, under the caption 
"Jaya Prakash's Picture", reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution  vol.1: 
Search for an Ideology,  ed Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1978), p.52. 
7 Ibid, p.53. 
III. SARVODAYA PERIOD 
Around Independence time, JP became concerned about the role Congress 
appeared to be adopting, as it began to convert itself from an independence 
movement into a parliamentary party, changing its constitution accordingly. 
Gandhi had advocated the disbandment of Congress after independence and JP 
supported that view. JP thought it ought to change its name so that the great 
traditions associated with Congress "should have been kept unsullied by party 
politics." 8 Moreover he saw Congress as becoming a. party representing 
vested interests concentrating on power and personal advancement. He went so 
far as to say that there was no difference between the British Raj and the 
Congress Raj. 9 For example, JP maintained that Congress was behind the 
formation of the Indian Trade Union Congress (INTUC) and that Congress 
effectively controlled INTUC's attempts to break smaller unions by employing 
violence where necessary. 1° Further, the new Indian Constitution introduced 
in 1950 strengthened the centralist powers of the Union government through 
such provisions as the central government's powers over the states, and the 
government's Emergency powers. Thus JP thought that the Congress 
leadership was becoming more bureaucratic, forgetting its grass roots type of 
constructive work and the people also, concentrating instead on power and 
personal advancement. 11 
8 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Looking Back", Report of the Sixth Annual Conference of the 
Socialist Party, Nasik 1948, Bombay. Published in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total 
Revolution, vol.2: Politics in India, ed. Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1978), 
p.91. 
9 Said to a crowd of 20,000, Lucknow, 23.6.1948. Reported in the Free Press Bulletin, 
and cited in Scarfe(s) 	p.212. 
10 cf Ibid., pp.221-222. 
cf Ajit Bhattacharjea, Jayaprakash Narayan (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975), 
pp.89-90. 
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Consequently JP believed that it was necessary for the Socialist Party to leave 
the Congress. He argued that Congress was not an instrument of socialism, 
and that to convert it to such was "not merely the problem of defining its 
objectives and drawing up a programme but also of converting it structurally 
into a labour or rather a proletarian party embracing both the peasants and 
workers." 12 Thus the CSP changed its name to the Socialist Party, and it 
severed its Congress connections. 
JP emphasised the need for the Socialist party to undertake extra parliamentary 
work for he maintained that state power or parliamentary politics were not the 
only means of developing a socialist society. Rather, struggle also had to be 
activated outside the formal constitution and administrative organs of 
government. This required preparing the masses psychologically for struggle, 
with the follow-up building of mass organisations that would work towards 
developing collective strength and unity. He argued that if a party became 
purely a political party then it was doomed. 13 Consequently JP emphasised: 
organisation, agitation, trade union struggle, constructive work such as 
education and establishing cooperatives. Also JP attempted to institute a 
constructive programme into the party, and this entailed members going into the 
villages for an hour a week. This failed because there were few volunteers. 
Most socialists concentrated on parliamentary style politics. 
Unfortunately the action of severing ties with the Congress served to highlight 
the Socialist Party's own weakness with regard to the parliamentary field. It 
fared very poorly in the 1952 election for although the party gained the second 
12 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Will the Socialists Leave the Congress?" National Herald, 
Lucknow, January 1948, reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.2, 
p.81. 
13 cf Bhattacharjea, Jayaprakash, pp.89-90; also Scarfe(s), Jayaprakash, p.232. 
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largest percentage of votes (10.6%) it won only twelve out of the Lok Sabha's 
489 seats. 14 Needless to say there was disappointment within the party. This 
manifested itself in personal bitterness and policy disagreements. There were 
some moves within the party towards consolidating Marxist elements and 
questioning the viability of democracy. 
Nevertheless JP maintained that "Democratic socialism must become our life's 
mission, we must accept democracy and all that it stands for, thus alone can we 
reach the goal of socialism". 15 He urged the party against turning to Marxist 
ideas of class struggle. The party leadership, particularly in Bihar, criticised his 
policies as leaning towards what they considered to be Vinoba's reactionary 
ideas of conciliation rather than conflict. This dissatisfaction with JP's ideas 
was exacerbated in 1952 when JP embarked on a fast after the Railwaymen's, 
Postmen's and Defence Workers, and the All India Post and Telegraph Unions 
failed to gain the raise they sought. Many socialists had difficulty coming to 
terms with this action as it seemed to contradict Marxist materialism. Moreover 
the fact that JP claimed the fast was for purely personal reasons, and was not to 
try to bring pressure on the government, did not facilitate their 
understanding. 16 
JP's emphasis was increasingly on construction. He was particularly 
conscious of the failure of the Soviet experience to achieve the ideal of a 
people's state for he believed that it had not moved beyond a bureaucratic state 
enforced by dictatorship. He stated in an address to the Socialist Party: 
I do not believe in doctrinaire philosophy. When I talk about the 
14 W H Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India  (London: Hutchinson, 1971), 
p.184. 
15 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Ideological Problems", a paper presented at the Conference of the 
Socialist Party, Patna, March 6 -10, 1949, reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total 
Revolution, von:102. 
16 cf Scarfe(s), Jayaprakash, pp.266-276. 
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principles Gandhiji stood for, his teaching and practice and the lessons 
these have for the socialist movement, I am quite serious. It is a pity that 
you have nothing but ridicule for such a revolution. I feel this had a 
direct bearing on our ideas. There is so much confusion in the socialist 
movement the world over. We are still moving in the old ruts and have 
refused to learn the lessons which experience has taught us. We must not 
forget the tragedy of European social democracy. Do we want to repeat 
the same tragedy in India? 
Gandhiji tried to evolve a new method of social change. He preached a 
new set of values to lift our public life from the morass in which it has 
fallen. We cannot pooh pooh this, by calling it surrender to 
Gandhism. 17 
JP asked: "Why should we not combine the Mandan thought with the thought 
and practice of Mahatma Gandhi and achieve a synthesis of our own"? 18 He 
reasoned: "Let us not forget that Marxist philosophy is incomplete, it will ever 
remain so. For scientific thought ever grows and with every addition it 
becomes richer in content". 19 Marx, JP pointed out, had not faced nor 
visualised the situation faced by the Indian socialists, so what the Indian 
socialists needed was a fresh approach and original thinking. 20 
Part of JP's new thinking was the establishment of Sokhodeora Ashram in 
1954 on a grant given by J R D Tata. The ashram's philosophy was social and 
religious, with its ideal being to form a perfect community. It was deliberately 
established in a relatively inaccessible area so that it would not have the 
advantages of government services. Rather it would have to develop its own 
services, and hopefully thereby become a centre for experimentation from 
which surrounding villages could learn. Unfortunately, in its early years of 
17 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Ideological Problems", p.102. 
18 Jayaprakash Narayan, "New Doctrine", imam, 13.9.1953, reprinted in Jayaprakash 
Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.2: 222-223. 
19 Ibid, p.222. 
20 Ibid, p.220. 
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running the ashram was troubled with bickering amongst the workers, and 
although they looked to JP for direction, he was too much preoccupied with 
Vinoba's social revolution to give the time the ashram workers wanted. 21 
Over the years the ashram undertook a number of local initiatives such as the 
introduction of grainbanks and cooperatives, and it established some important 
services such as a leprosy centre and khadi spinning and weaving centre. 
Meanwhile, within the Socialist Party tensions continued. After the 1952 
elections it effected a merger with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja and became the 
Praja Socialist Party, with a view to strengthening its electoral position. 
However in 1955 its parliamentary role was challenged when the Indian 
Parliament declared that its new object was to establish a socialist state, and it 
purported to adopt a number of the PSP's general platforms such as fixing land 
ceilings, and ensuring equitable distribution. 22 This seemed to take away the 
Socialists' reason for remaining separate from the Congress, and questions 
arose as to whether they should collaborate with the Congress, as well as 
reproaches for having left the Congress in 1948. 
However, for JP it was but a short step to announce that he no longer believed 
in a materialist philosophy as the basis for constructing a new society, robbing 
man "of the means to become truly human", with "no rational incentive to be 
good".23 JP was attracted instead by the "new politics" of sarvodaya which 
Vinoba's bhoodan movement appeared to offer. Vinoba was Gandhi's spiritual 
successor in independent India, and the bhoodan or land's gift movement was a 
movement for voluntary land reform; it aimed to persuade land-owners to 
21 cf Scarfe(s), Jayapralcash, pp.333-342. 
22 Ibid., pp.263-264. 
23 Jayaprakash Narayan, Socialism. Sarvodaya and Democracy, ed Brimal Prasad (Bombay, 
1964) quoted in Brimal Prasad, "The Making of JP's Philosophy", p. 493. 
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voluntarily donate portions of their land to the landless. The strategy was 
pursued by the lok sevaks walking around the countryside approaching the 
landlords. Vinoba hoped to bring about a three-fold revolution: changing 
people's hearts, creating change in their lives and changing the social structure. 
JP saw Vinoba's movement as supplying the means to the social revolution 
towards which he had devoted most of his life. So realising the "inadequacy 
and futility of service through power" 24 JP diverted his attention to the 
bhoodan movement, giving up "politics" - that is conventional parliamentary 
politics - refusing to accept any elective or other office in the Socialist Party. 25 
Later he actually resigned from the PSP, withdrawing completely from old 
politics. 
Bhoodan moved towards gramdan under which land was "villagised". This 
contrasted with bhoodan which involved donations from individuals who 
retained ownership over their remainder while the donated portion benefited 
individuals. Under gramdan land-owners surrendered all their property rights 
to the village. So the emphasis shifted from the individual to the community 
collective. This was seen as a very important step towards a decentralised 
political structure based on economic equality with the community as a whole 
assuming responsibility for decision making with regard to the management of 
the land. 
Through bhoodan and gramdan JP hoped to work towards the establishment of 
a partyless democracy, abolishing all centres of power. This did not mean that 
JP was calling for the immediate abolition of parties but he did believe that "the 
more this new politics grows, the more old politics shrinks". 26 As he pointed 
24 	i JP n a statement issued to Praia Socialist Party members when he left the party in 1957. 
Quoted in A Bhattacharjea, Jayapralcash Narayan, p.176. 
25 Ibid, p. 145. 
26 JP in his statement to PSP members. See A Bhattacharjea, Jayaprakash Naravan, p. 177. 
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out later, Gandhi had been clear about the limitations of the state being the sole 
instrument for creating the India of his dreams, but at the same time Gandhi had 
realised that even if the state had the best men and the best policies it could not 
deliver the goods by itself. The bhoodan and gramdan movements, on the 
other hand seemed particularly appropriate to India's condition. They started 
quite independently of the state forces and they concentrated on land. Land 
symbolised power and power represented violence. By seeking to change the 
hearts of those who held power, persuading them to donate their land, and even 
surrender total ownership, the bhoodan and gramdan movements aimed at 
undermining the violent order. It was reasoned that by distributing land, power 
would be distributed later." 
Bhoodan and gramdan provided ways to mobilise the people, allowing for the 
process of change from the old way of life to a revolutionary one. The "old 
politics" had not been able to achieve this. It passed laws but they were not 
implemented. For example, in 1969 JP explained that: 
. . . even though the ceiling law was passed not one acre of land was 
redistributed as a result of surplus being declared over the ceiling. 
Whereas we have been able to distribute 365,000 acres of land which are 
fit for cultivation. .. . This is the story of bhoodan and this is the social 
and economic change brought about by bhoodan. 28 
In changing people's hearts the sarvodaya movement hoped to work towards 
bringing into effect the aims of these otherwise meaningless laws. 
27 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Face to Face", a pamphlet published in December 1970, reprinted 
in Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.1: 230 - 253. 
28 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Technique of Social Revolution", inaugural address at the National 
Conference of Voluntary Agencies, New Delhi, June 1969, reprinted in Jayapralcash Narayan, 
Towards Revolution, ed., G S Bhargava and U N Phadnis (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 
1975), p.106-107. 
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However, much of the bhoodan land was uncultivable and some land was 
subject to legal dispute. 29 Gramdan encountered difficulties such as 
opposition from moneylenders to grant peasants credit without land as security 
once a village had opted for gramdan. 30 Also many larger land-owners were 
reluctant to join gramdan when the majority of villages had done so. 3 1 
Vinoba's response was to attempt to revitalise the movement by watering it 
down into a sulabh gramdan, or gramdan made simple, which involved a major 
concession to the principle of private ownership as hereditary rights were to 
maintain over 95% of the donor's lands. The process of sulabh gramdan  
involved three stages. Firstly there was prapti which meant ensuring village 
commitment to sulabh gramdan. Secondly was pushti which involved the 
implementation of the primary conditions of gramdan with the establishment of 
a gram sabha and a village fund, with land gifts verified, legal titles transferred 
and one twentieth part of land distributed amongst the landless. Thirdly was 
nirman which meant the mobilisation of resources through the gram sabha and 
beginning a programme of reconstruction and development. Vinoba launched a 
toofan (whirlwind) campaign to promote sulabh gramdan, but the campaign 
only related to prapti and the emphasis was on achieving targets not fulfilling 
the concept of gramdan. It was thought that the implementation of pushti and 
nirman would be most effective if undertaken in an organised manner once the 
whole state had opted for gramdan. 32 Yet nirman was surely the precondition 
for statewide gramdan as it involved developing the necessary consciousness 
required to take on the responsibilities of gramdan? JP was concerned by this 
29 Geoffrey Ostergaard, Nonviolent Revolution in India  (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace 
Foundation, 1985), p.17 
30 Geoffrey Ostergaard, Nonviolent Revolution,  p. 21. 
31 Ibid, p. 23. 
32 Ibid, p. 25. 
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apparent backing down but accepted it. Nevertheless he was disappointed with 
the turn the movement was taking. It appeared weak, failing to take a firm 
stand, making the conflict so easy as to be rendered useless. The movement 
did not seem to really change hearts. Instead of mobilising people the 
sarvodaya workers were more concerned with fulfilling targets than achieving 
any qualitative change and when the target was reached they would move on, 
allowing the area that they had just left to return to the old ways. 
IV. IDEAS ABOUT LINKING VILLAGE LEVEL VOLUNTARY  
ACTION TO WIDER STRUCTURES  
During the period with the bhoodan and gramdan movements JP did not isolate 
himself. He remained actively in touch with other voluntary action groups. He 
recognised the value of their work, of sharing their knowledge and of pooling 
resources. This was reflected in the Association of Voluntary Agencies for 
Rural Development (AVARD). JP had been a driving force behind the setting 
up of AVARD in 1958, and he served as its president from 1960 to 1979. The 
main aims of AVARD included: developing areas of mutual cooperation and 
understanding amongst those individuals or groups who are contributing to the 
welfare of the rural community; to strengthen existing agencies and foster new 
ones where necessary and possible; to work as a clearing house of information 
and knowledge on the work of organisations and government departments 
engaged in rural development; to aid and assist all activities connected with 
rural development; to arrange seminars and conferences; to discuss and study 
problems facing its members in research and evaluation; to promote publicly 
the work of rural development; to act as a channel for the interchange of ideas 
and experience; to diffuse useful knowledge regarding rural development and 
the activities of its members; to establish contacts with affiliates, or affiliate 
with other organisations with similar goals, both national and international.33 
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JP also remained in touch with the wider politics. He remained informed about 
and commented on the politics that he had officially left. He proposed 
institutional and other reforms that required "political" or government initiative. 
In particular, he encouraged the State government instituted system of local 
government, panchayati raj, as an important measure in reconstructing the 
Indian polity by broadening the base of democracy. Panchayati raj was 
established between 1959 and 1962 and generally consisted of three levels of 
representative bodies: gram panchayat (village), panchayat samiti (block), and 
zilla parishad (district). The village level committees were elected directly and 
the two higher levels were elected indirectly through the lower tiers. 
JP proposed a number of amendments to the panchayati raj scheme. He 
envisaged a non-party democracy built from below, centred on people's 
committees, along the ideas of Gandhi and M N Roy. Firstly, he believed that 
the base ought not to rest on the gram panchayat but on the gram sabha, that is, 
the entire adult membership of the village community. 34 He thought the 
panchayat could function as an executive of the gram sabha which should have 
the power to set up other committees and teams for specific purposes. 35 He 
also believed that "Panchayati Raj must not be terminated at the district level but 
extended forward up to New Delhi". 36 JP explained that there was a need for 
government to be near the people and that this required political and economic 
decentralisation with less and less functions and powers the higher up the level 
of government one went. 37 He envisaged each level from bottom up doing all 
33 Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development, Twentythree Eventful Years 
(New Delhi: AVARD, 1981), pp.2 - 3. 
34 Jayaprakash Narayan, Swaraj for the People, (Varanasi: Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 
1977). pp.16 - 17. First published in 1963. 
35 Ibid, p.17. 
36 Ibid, p.40. 
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that it was competent to do and when there are tasks that lie beyond its 
competence it had to federate with other authorities of the same level to create a 
higher authority, that is, the block or district or state or union levels. 38 He did 
not see this as making the central government weak but "strong, powerful, 
streamlined and effective". 39 JP thought: "a top heavy sprawling centre 
poking its finger into every pie might have the appearance of strength and 
power, but in fact, it would be weak, flabby, slow-moving and ineffective". 40 
When JP initially proposed his version of panchayati raj, he suggested that 
representatives at the state level be elected from the district and then 
representatives at the union level be elected from the state level. However, he 
recognised that the individual citizen might feel this was too great a distance for 
him to have any control over his representative. Also he realised that as the 
number of electors at each level became smaller there would be greater 
opportunity for monied interests to corrupt them. Thus he put forward the 
suggestion that the state and union sabhas' representatives be elected by the 
gram sabhas with the assistance of electoral colleges, one college for each 
constituency. Each gram sabha should select two delegates to its electoral 
college. They could be selected by calling for nominations and then voting by 
show of hands. If there were more than two nominations, then the candidate 
with the least number of votes should be eliminated. The balloting procedure 
should be repeated until only two names remain. JP maintained: "This would 
be a simple inexpensive procedure and, as the gram sabhas gather experience in 
conducting meetings, passing budgets and making other collective decisions as 
a result of their vital role in Panchayati Raj, this electoral procedure should 
become one of their simpler jobs".41 
37 Ibid, p. 5. 
38 Ibid. p. 8. 
39 Ibid, p. 9. 
40 Ibid. 
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The next step would be for the electoral council to be convened with a call for 
nominations and then have the nominations put to the vote. Anyone receiving 
more than a given minimum of votes should be declared candidates for that 
constituency. JP emphasised the importance of the process not being divisive 
and he urged that the electoral councils set up only one candidate per seat for he 
believed that competition between them created an unnecessary excitement and 
was a waste of energy. Moreover, each representative would represent his 
whole constituency even those who opposed him. So if the representative was 
to develop an affinity with the whole electorate it was better that he was not 
opposed. Once the electoral councils chose their candidates the names would 
be sent to the gram sabhas who would vote. JP had not decided whether it was 
preferable to count individual citizen votes or just the overall gram sabha 
votes.42 He hoped that eventually all elections throughout the panchayati raj  
scheme would be without contest and he cautioned: "self-government through 
faction fighting will not be self-government but self-ruination". 43 
JP put forward a number of conditions that he saw as necessary for achieving 
the potential of panchayati rai. Firstly, it was important to educate people. 
However, the type of education he envisaged was radically different from 
conventional Western-type education." It was predominantly non-bookish, 
emphasising practical and technical education with emphasis on training in 
agricultural techniques. It included large scale practical adult education. There 
was a role for schools but JP saw self-education as the core, reinforced by a 
41 Ibid, p. 43. 
42 Ibid. pp. 43 - 45. 
43 Ibid, p. 19. 
44 Ibid, p. 35. 
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sharing of knowledge through cooperative societies and access to resource 
facilities such as libraries. Self-education was the basis of his search for self-
government. 
Secondly he urged that political parties refrain from interfering with and trying 
to convertanclp a* into wings of their own organisations. He believed 
that parties pause before acting in order to consider the possible consequence of 
that action for their party and party interest was not necessarily the same as 
people's interest.45 Also JP said that the practice of parties setting up 
candidates limited the choice of voters and vitiated democracy. 46 He thought 
that in that sort of system it was natural for would-be candidates to look up 
towards party leadership and try to win its favour in order to obtain a party 
ticket, thus strengthening the forces of centralisation and the concentration of 
power. JP wanted power pulled downwards to the people and his third 
condition was that there be real devolution of power. He understood that there 
might be a hesitation to pass on responsibility either on account of lack of 
confidence in the people or of reluctance to surrender power but he thought that 
withholding responsibility would lead: "to an attitude of irresponsibility in the 
people who will forever be on the lookout for heroes and miracle makers to 
solve their problems".47 
Fourthly he urged that each level of government be given its own minimum 
resources, explaining that it should not be the prerogative of the state 
government to advocate sums to these bodies. He specifically recommended 
45 Ibid, p. 25. 
46 Ibid, p. 476. 
47 Ibid. pp. 13 - 14. 
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that land revenue be in the hands of panchayati raj and any other revenues as 
necessary for autonomy. However, JP added that this did not mean that they 
should not receive funding from the state and central governments too." 
JP's fifth condition was that the local panchayats should be able to exert 
authority over civil servants under its charge although he also remarked that 
civil servants should be able to discharge their duties without improper 
interference.° 
Sixthly he re-emphasised the importance of fullest participation being at the 
village level in the gram sabha which should meet as often as possible and that 
all important matters should be placed before it. 5° 
Finally, he gave this idea further support by stating that the working of 
panchayati raj should be outside the purview of State government. He was 
concerned that State government was tied up with party politics and that this 
would influence government decisions. So he urged that any job of assisting, 
guiding and supervising the establishment, working and development of 
panchayati raj should be with a non-political, autonomous body, that is a body 
not rooted in party politics and the civil service, and not subject to undue 
influence from them. JP envisaged something akin to the Election Commission 
or Universities Grant Commission. This body would ensure the allotment of 
funds toancip a . were properly paid out and utilised, making sure also 
that the higher tiers did not unduly interfere with the lower ones.51 
Ibid, pp. 14 - 15. 
49 Ibid. p. 15. 
50 Ibid, pp. 15 - 24. 
51 Ibid, pp. 24 - 27. 
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JP believed that self-government through panchayati raj based along the lines he 
suggested was essential to democracy for through the dispersal of power, 
communities and communal representative bodies would be able to exert a 
decisive influence. He warned that the system resting on individual 
unorganised voters has a tendency towards the concentration of power at the 
top with organised parties run from above by small and powerful elites playing 
the decisive role. 52 He did not think that elected representatives of 
unorganised voters were or could be brought under popular control whereas 
where there was direct participation there was close contact. At the same time 
he held it was important to realise that the economic and political structures 
were not separate from each other and that if political decentralisation was to be 
effective it was necessary to effectively decentralise the economy too. JP 
explained that a decentralised economy was important because it was 
democratic and because it would yield immediate benefits to the masses offering 
employment on a mass scale.53 
JP said first the economy "must be a small machine and labour intensive 
economy" but it also had to be efficient and productive, and that cost, 
production, consumption and employment had to be balanced. 54 Second he 
said a decentralised economy had to aim at the full utilisation of local and 
regional resources, both human and material, relating this to the satisfaction of 
local and regional needs. 55 He was not saying that surpluses in one area could 
not be exchanged for surpluses in another. Thus he thought that considering 
the land:man ratio and the rate of population growth it would be necessary to 
integrate some industrialisation immediately with agriculture, that is, "agro- 
52 Ibid, p. 37. 
53 Ibid, pp. 34 - 35. 
54 Ibid, p. 32. 
55 Ibid, pp. 32 - 33. 
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industrial" which did not only refer to the processing of agricultural products 
but also radios, electrical goods, cycle parts etc as were needed in the 
region.56 
His fourth suggestion was that the organisational pattern of decentralised 
industry and trade had to be different from that in the centralised sector, 
whether private or public. It should not be bureaucratic or exploitative. He 
thought it should be of the owner-worker cooperative type. 57 Fifthly, he 
thought the political institutions of panchayati raj should play an important role 
in this economic development, although he did not know quite how this would 
be done. 58 
JP concluded: 
The real issue is that of devolution of power and decentralisation of 
administration. Power . . . cannot be devolved, nor administration 
decentralised if (a) there were no institutions and centres of self-
government below the present state level, and (b) all the different levels 
of government were not organically or structurally integrated together, so 
that the higher level drew its support and authority from the lower ones 
and the whole structure rested ultimately upon the broad base of the gram  
sabha, comprising the entire adult population of the country. 59 
JP realised though, that the restricted aim of panchayati raj was to obtain full 
public cooperation in the execution of development programmes. 6° Basically 
this was how panchayati raj was utilised. It was never given the opportunity to 
take up planning or implementation. It was not given an adequate resource base 
and in practice party politics played an active role in the panchayats.61 JP's 
56 Ibid, p. 33. 
57 Ibid. pp. 33 - 34. 
58 Ibid, p. 46. 
59 Ibid, p. 41. 
60 Ibid, p. 11. 
61 cf Dilip Him, Inside India Today (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp.50-51; 
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electoral reforms were not followed through nor were the panchayats linked to 
the state and central government in any other form. 
JP worried increasingly about the state of the wider politics and in 1966 he 
expressed this concern, telling students in Patna that it would be in the interest 
of democracy if the Congress suffered electoral losses at the 1967 polls for he 
felt that the ruling party needed shock treatment. 62 
V. 	POSITIVE ACTION 
In December 1970 JP published a pamphlet entitled "Face to Face" in which he 
flagged his moving into a more active phase. 63 JP had become disappointed 
with the direction of the bhoodan movement and he was able to sympathise 
with the impatience of the Naxalites though he would not condone their 
methods. He recognised that "Naxalism was 'primarily a social, economic 
political and administrative problem' and 'only secondarily a law and order 
question'."64 So when the Naxalites threatened some of his fellow sarvodaya  
workers in Musahari, an area where Naxalites had been active, he said: 
The emergence of such danger to our lives appeared to me as a God-
send. I had been feeling for quite some time past that our movement was 
losing its fire, and we, its workers, were becoming stale and flabby of 
spirit. One of the reasons this seemed to be was that our work was so 
bland that it involved no personal danger to us, nor demanded any great 
sacrifice.65 
also T K N Unnilhan, "Panchayat Raj, Planning and the Gandhian Ideal", published in M V 
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JP regarded the Naxalites as a challenge that had to be met by speeding up the 
process of non-violent social change. It was a call for "positive action" 66 on 
the part of the sarvodaya movement and thus JP returned to Musahari in order 
to evaluate the situation and consolidate the gramdan work at the very ground 
level through intensive work rather than the extensive and widespread strategy 
previously pursued. 
JP's retreat to Musahari brought him very close to the people as he followed up 
the gramdan programme, implementing it at the grass roots level. He 
concentrated his efforts on the single block, withdrawing from a much wider 
territorial range as well as from other fields of activity. As he said, he changed 
"from being extensive and wide-spreading to becoming intensive and 
penetrating". 67 He became aware of the deficiencies of the gramdan  
movement as he discovered much of the apparent prapti work was bogus and 
had to be done again. 68 It brought him face to face with the realities of 
people's day-to-day lives and a gradual change could be seen in his attitude. JP 
explained: 
To find the way we will have to go back to Gandhiji. We will find then 
that Gandhiji was already aware of the futility of violence and the inherent 
limitations of the democratic state. 
Therefore his plan was to create alongside the power of the state the 
power of the people. . . . His means were going to be, as before, 
service, constructive work, conversion by gentle persuasion and when 
the situation required non-violent, non-cooperation or resistance. 69 
66 Ibid, p. 232. 
67 Ibid, p. 233. 
68 Geoffrey Ostergaard, Nonviolent Revolution, p. 38. 
69 Jayaprilash Narayan, "Face to Face", p. 245. 
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Gandhi had warned that once the British left India and the alien rule had been 
replaced by a responsible government with proper channels for the expression 
of grievances then civil disobedience would no longer be an appropriate 
technique." Yet the point JP was beginning to realise was that proper 
channels for the expression of grievances were not working as was evidenced 
by the Namlite frustration, which vented itself in violence. The very fact that it 
had arisen brought home the need to shift from non-violent assistance to non-
violent resistance. Indeed for the Naxalites to express their grievances in Bihar 
represented something of a failure for the 5arvod4ya movement to date because 
Bihar had been the centre of the gramdan and bhoodan movements with about 
50% of the total land donated throughout India. 71 It became clear to JP that 
any solution would have to come from the grass roots, the people. It could not 
depend simply on the changing of hearts by rich land-owners and other 
powerful figures as the bhoodan movement had sought to achieve. 
JP thought that "conditions seem to be ripening in the context of our present 
programme that may necessitate larger-scale satyagrahas". 72 Thus JP was 
concerned to revise Vinoba's programmes of "conversion by gentle 
persuasion". Like Gandhi, JP believed that his actions ought to be appropriate 
according to the prevailing circumstances of each situation that he faced. This 
did not mean that JP regarded himself as rejecting Vinoba but he thought that 
the apparent rise of dacoity, communal tension and violent social movements 
such as Naxalism necessitated a reappraisal of the current strategy. 
70 H W Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India  (London: Hutchinson 
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JP's actions and writings focused more on rajniti as he became more concerned 
with the future of democracy in India. In July 1972 JP and a number of other 
leading sarvodaya, workers and sympathisers met in Bangalore to discuss ways 
to broaden the sarvodaya movement and make it more effective. Following this 
meeting, JP published an article: "Can a Nation Survive Without Moral 
Fibre"73 which highlighted his perception of growing corruption, increasing 
bureaucratisation and the general resultant deterioration of Indian democracy 
under Mrs Gandhi. In September 1972 the League of Democrats was set up 
largely as a result of the Bangalore meeting. It was established as a non-
partisan pressure group and it appealed mainly to middle class intellectuals and 
professional people. Unfortunately it did not provide the dynamic impetus that 
JP sought for the sarvodaya movement. 
When Biju Patnaik (Orissa) approached JP in February 1973 and asked if he 
would take the lead in new efforts to unite the opposition parties, JP declined. 
However, he said that he would lend them moral support and be available for 
consultation and advice. He put forward a number of propositions that he 
regarded as necessary to a viable opposition party including the following 
points: firstly, that it must represent forces of radical even revolutionary 
change; secondly, the consolidation of opposition parties must be principled 
not opportunistic, and thirdly, that it must place before the people a positive 
policy and programme and not be consumed by negative aims such as "Indira 
ha=" - get rid of Indira. 74 
JP believed that the state sector had become a "bottomless pit from which little 
is retrieved as compared with the vast amounts sunk into (it)". 75 Of course, 
73 cf Ostergaard, Nonviolent Revolution, p. 48. 
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JP did not accept that the state, by itself, could deliver democracy ensuring true 
freedom for each individual, but it was important "to see that the state was in 
the best hands available and that it followed the right policies, programmes and 
plans".76 So he called out to every individual to join in and struggle for the 
assertion of those rights. In particular he urged the youth, especially the 
students, to march towards a "real people's Democracy" 77 as a better 
alternative to the party democracy which he held was "democracy based on and 
manipulated by political parties . . . a most unsatisfactory and defective system 
of democracy". 78 
JP's "real people's Democracy" was along the lines of the panchayati raj system 
that he had previously proposed, based on active functioning, partyless 
people's committees that would discuss common problems and evolve 
cooperative and collective forms of action. However, he realised that 
establishing this type of political order would be an evolutionary process, and 
that the prevailing political structure would continue to dominate for a period of 
time. He hoped that as the committees gradually strengthened, they might 
group together horizontally and vertically to form secondary institutions of 
people's democracy, selecting delegates by unanimous decision (general 
consensus or nem con). He saw the Delegates' Council role as selecting 
people's candidates for election to parliament, and then liasing between gram 
sabhas and the representatives. 79 Thus he thought to operate within the 
existing constitutional parliamentary structure, while gradually eroding the role 
of parties within that structure, developing instead a more direct means by 
which people could participate in government. The viability of these ideas 
presupposes a strong cadre movement able to encourage and support laying the 
76 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Face to Face", p. 245. 
77 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Reconstructing the Polity", p. 5. 
78 Ibid, p. 2. 
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foundations for such an organisation and its subsequent development. JP 
recognised this and envisaged it as a role that the youth - in particular the 
students - could fulfill. The suitability of the students to assume this role will 
be examined shortly, but first there is a need to understand the totality of the 
changes that JP anticipated through the people's committees. They were not 
simply political but spiritual, economic, social, cultural, educational and 
ideological. 
JP did not formulate a comprehensive blue print that he presented in one go; 
rather his ideas were the accumulation of many issues with which he had been 
concerned at various times throughout his period with the sarvodaya 
movement. As regards the spiritual framework, JP believed that man is both 
matter and spirit and that both his material and spiritual needs have to be 
fulfilled. Materially this means food, clothing, dwelling etc but whilst this 
should be adequate, in good taste, pleasing and practical as the case may be, JP 
urged that it should not be excessive, that there be no wastefulness and no craze 
for fashion. 8° His ideas implied limitation on consumption and seemed to 
have spiritual connotations in line with the saintly idiom, for JP regarded 
craving, excess and bad means together with wealth as anti-spiritual. 81 
Economically he emphasised the importance of agriculture. For industry he 
urged: medium industry, small industry, and rural industrial development. He 
thought ownership patterns should be based on: the individual (family) as self-
employed producers; the community (village) ownership; the cooperative 
ownership; and the private profit-based small entrepreneur ownership 
employing a moderate number of workers. JP envisaged public corporation 
patterns as more prevalent amongst larger enterprises. He hoped workers' 
80 Jayaprakash Narayan, Prison Diary (Bombay: Popular Pralcashan, 1977), 9.9.1975, p. 62. 
81 Ibid. 
64 
participation in management would be tried but recognised that without proper 
training they might not be effective. Nevertheless he saw a role for the workers 
in influencing their own welfare. 82 
Further, JP was concerned that "all productive units, including agriculture, 
must be keenly sensitive to ecological considerations, as well as considerations 
of beauty and cleanliness".83 In this regard JP was very interested in E F 
Schumacher's ideas on economics and his concept of intermediate and 
appropriate technology. JP invited Schumacher to India in the early 1960s. In 
1972 under JP's initiative the Appropriate Technology Development 
Association began under the wing of the Gandhian Institute of Studies, 
Varanasi. It later moved to Lucknow, where it promoted the concept and 
practice of appropriate technology in India within technical colleges, 
universities, government and industry. It aimed to bring industry that could be 
locally owned and managed into rural communities so as to create new and 
more productive employment. 
Socially and culturally, JP wanted to see all barriers to equality broken down, 
in particular, the caste system, the dowry system, superstitions etc. He wanted 
an equal role accorded to all people irrespective of caste, race or gender. 
JP thought that education should be essentially practical. Specifically, he 
wanted a rural school to be developed with courses in science, language, 
literature, economics (emphasising cooperatives and cooperation), gram sabha 
and decision making and enforcement, accounts and book keeping, agriculture, 
rural industry, hygiene, sanitation, bacteria and biology, horticulture, zoology, 
food and nutrition, gas plants, compost and manure. Overall he emphasised 
82 Ibid, p. 64. 
83 ibid . 
65 
that special emphasis be given to details relevant to the particular geographical 
areas in which courses were conducted. 84 
JP also wanted to see a change in higher education because he wanted a 
revision of Gandhian thought not only at the practical field work level but at an 
academic level, reorienting social sciences, developing Marxism and other 
theories and practices in order to bring about a no poverty society". He was a 
joint director of the Gandhian Institute of Studies in Varanasi for a number of 
years. and then he initiated the establishment of the Institute of Social Change 
and Social Welfare in Calcutta, 1971, with the Gandhi Peace Foundation and 
the Gandhian Institute of Studies as joint sponsors.85 
The Institute of Social Change and Social Welfare was to be an interdisciplinary 
research cum social change centre aiming to solve problems through 
experimentation and research based on the principles and practices of non-
violence. The Institute's primary tasks were to reorient the social sciences 
towards a new concept of development and to seek the pathways to reach out to 
a "no poverty, no affluence society". 86 The founding of the Institute in 
Calcutta, the capital of West Bengal, is significant for it represented a real 
attempt to introduce a Gandhian influence in the wake of the Naxalite 
upheavals, offering an alternative to both the conventional form of higher 
education the Naxalites apparently rejected, and the terrorism they seemed to 
embrace. JP pointed out that Marx also had envisaged a society in which the 
state would wither away, that is, a partyless democracy. Thus JP implied that 
his ideas were not inconsistent with Marx. 87 He reinforced this by saying: 
84 Ibid. 
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"The Marxist task . . . is to try to alter the world. In my humble way I am 
trying to alter the world". 88 
The Institute of Social Change and Social Welfare began by making extensive 
studies on the problems of the Naxalite movement and the uprooted people in 
Bangladesh. It was involved with programmes of relief and rehabilitation 
which included voicing its concern over the treatment of the Naxalites in the 
Bengali jails as well as seeking constructive ways in which to channel the 
Naxalites' energies after their release from prison. Also the Institute sought to 
establish contact with non-violent voluntary groups. In addition, the Institute 
started undertaking a number of private and government sponsored training 
programmes such as: job training courses on methods of working with people 
for the staff of voluntary organisations, and, training for the government's 
ICDS programme, that is mother and child primary health care scheme. These 
contacts and programmes enabled the Institute to explore, share and evaluate 
new ideas. 
When students in Gujarat and Bihar began to protest in 1973 and 1974 their 
main concerns were with campus amenities such as hostel accommodation and 
cheap text books, as well as with the growing numbers of educated 
unemployed. Their claims were indicative of the defective and outdated 
education system, and it could be suggested that their plight epitomised that of 
the nation for the education system did not meet their needs or prepare them for 
their role in society. JP thought that the universities had been corrupted; 
cheating was apparently commonplace, making a sham of the whole system. 89 
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Thus JP held that it was in the students' interest to change it, and he responded 
to their plight by urging them to take the year off from their studies and devote 
their time and energies to the movement. 
He called on them to: 
take non-partisan and constructive action and give a lead to the people and 
help create a climate of public opinion which could be a deterrent to 
unethical conduct of politicians or businessmen or any other section or 
group whose action degrades national life and saps the foundations of our 
democracy. 9° 
JP seemed to regard the students as the Gandhian alternative to the 
revolutionary working class. He reasoned that they had no apparent vested 
interest in the continuance of the prevailing system, and at the same time they 
had the necessary leadership to the movement for "total revolution". However, 
his appraisal of the students' potential was not realistic. They were largely 
from the upper and middle classes and they were rooted to the social and 
economic structures that those classes represented.91 Moreover JP did not 
seem to take into account the fact that students are not a stable class but a 
transitionary force, with many of each year's students being different to the 
last. 
VI. BIHAR MOVEMENT 
It was the student protest in Bihar that finally led JP to break away formally 
from Vinoba and his "positive satyagraha". He turned instead to struggle. The 
Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol. 4: 82. 
90 Jayaprakash Narayan, "First Things First", p. 11. 
91 Shah, Protest Movements, p. 161. 
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students themselves sought out JP on 19 March 1974, the day after a large 
student demonstration that had been fired upon, apparently by Bihar 
government forces. JP agreed to provide the guidance they wanted so long as 
they gave the movement priority over political parties etc. He called for the 
dismissal of the Bihar government and legislature, and urged the students to 
seize upon the moment so that they could organise themselves into student 
struggle committees and set about mobilising people towards a "total 
revolution". 
JP maintained that it was up to the students to play a decisive role if the primacy 
of the people was to be established, and their victory over money, falsehood 
and brute force was to be secured.92 This was the revolutionary path. They 
were: "to fight corruption and misgovernment and blacicmarketing, profiteering 
and hoarding, for the overhaul of the education system, and for a real people's 
democracy".93 The purpose of the movement was both "internal and external 
change, changing the entire social frame from within and also from the outside, 
individuals as well as institutions". 94 However, the students were from a 
fairly narrow social base with a fairly limited perspective, and were generally 
accepting of the caste system and the economic structure. They were not 
prepared to sacrifice their education, and as such, did not boycott the 
universities in significant numbers in spite of JP's urgings. 95 
Nevertheless, the students' initial enthusiasm appeared great. They circulated a 
petition demanding the resignation of the Bihar assembly, and collected about a 
92 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Youth and Democracy", Everyman's, 22.12.1973. Reprinted in 
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crore of signatures and thumb prints. 96 All over the state public meetings 
were held and resolutions passed in support of the demand. 
A five week programme was initiated on 24 April 1974. Of itself it would not 
achieve a "total revolution" but it was hoped that it would awaken the whole of 
Bihar. All the while JP emphasised its non-violent nature and, moreover, its 
non-coercive character for its aim was to be "demonstrative, propagative and 
educative". 97 He said it was only if occasions should arise that in order to 
ensure the availability of essential commodities a peaceful saoragraha might be 
launched. The five week programme then began with a Jana Jagaran week, 
during which it was sought to explain the movement's objectives that is, the 
students' original demands plus the subsequent ones, in particular the 
dissolution of the government and the Legislative Assembly. On May Day they 
aimed to rally the support of all workers, both rural and urban, through their 
sabhas, unions, etc. The following week was to concentrate on developing 
organs of struggle. After that they were to focus on the resignations of the 
ministry and the dissolution of the assembly, organising meetings in each 
electorate. During the week, 16 - 22 May, the importance and responsibility of 
everyone tackling problems of corruption, especially in government and the 
black market were to be highlighted. This week included a twelve hour fast by 
the children of corrupt persons so as to impress on the offenders the need to 
mend their anti-social ways. Finally, the last week was geared towards the 
need to reform the education system, drawing this to the attention of parents 
and guardians.98 
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JP chaired a committee that was established by the Bihar Movement on 6 
August 1974 in order to prepare a statement of policy on new higher 
education.99 The statement presented a tentative scheme for the beginning of a 
parallel stream of higher education in Bihar. Basically it envisaged a 
decentralised university system. There would be a central organisation, that 
would train teachers, and serve as a clearing house to: examine policies and 
practices in education in other parts of the world; to coordinate, guide and 
supervise study centres; and to house a central library that would serve as a 
feeder to the libraries in the study centres. Most work would evolve around the 
study centres which would be regionally based according to population density. 
Each study centre would accommodate about 300 students who would be 
involved in the planning of curricula as well as many of the jobs in the study 
centres. All the teaching would be interdisciplinary and the curricula would 
include: instruction in theory or knowledge drawn from books, practical work 
in villages and training in productive work such as crafts, rural industry and 
immediate technologies. The students would be required to do some specific 
assignments with suggested topics including the nature of polity and the need 
for electoral reform, corruption, price rise and inflation, unemployment, study 
of land reforms in Bihar, a survey of health needs, and processes relevant in 
specific areas. 
It was thought that examinations would take the form of open book and/or take 
home exams. The bulk of the teaching would be through correspondence with 
some specific courses at weekends or in the form of summer schools. Thus it 
was thought the students would be free to join any employment, constructive 
programme or productive self-employed activities. Side by side with their 
99 Committee chaired by Jayapralcash Narayan on 6 8 1974, "Statement of Policy on New 
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course work the students were to be expected to continue the work of the Bihar 
movement in the towns and villages. However, the students generally were not 
really interested in these changes. They were career-minded. 1°° 
The movement's first priority was the purification of government. JP claimed 
this did not in any way reduce the importance of broader social, economic, 
political, spiritual and ideological, cultural and educational change for the 
revolution was a continuing process. The struggle for the election was only a 
part of the struggle for "total revolution". Nevertheless, it was necessary 
because the government was obstructing the movement. Therefore, the 
progress of the movement required that the government was removed. The 
election could serve as a rallying point to launch the movement as it would 
involve the people in ensuring that the elections were free and fair and that the 
electorate were aware of just how they were casting their votes. JP maintained: 
To make the people shed their fear and stand up to any tyrant or unjust 
ruler is one of the more important tasks of nation building. Unless we, 
as a people, acquire the capacity to stand up to injustice, oppression and 
corruption we would remain a weak nation. 101 
JP believed that this step would lead to the uplift of all. In support of this step 
the intellectual and professional dominated League of Democrats was 
relaunched in April 1974 as Citizens for Democracy. It was concerned to 
protest against government corruption but it was not a radical organisation. 
Ostensibly it was independent from the Bihar movement, and at this stage it 
was not committed to "total revolution". Citizens for Democracy reported on a 
lack of public confidence in the conduct of elections and recommended 
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moderate electoral reform. Although this was important it did not represent a 
popular movement for struggle. 
Meanwhile, Vinoba was concerned by the blatant antagonism of the movement 
towards the government. He argued that it was not the job of the sarvodaya 
movement to oppose the government. On the other hand, JP was saying that if 
the government was suppressing democracy then they ought to oppose the 
government. Vinoba patiently expressed his disapproval, explaining: 
nothing is going to come out of this agitation. Men may come and men may 
go, problems will remain forever". 102 However, JP said that whilst he agreed 
that of itself the resignation would not solve the problems, in view of the 
government's misdeeds and its failure to correct these, then its resignation was 
justified. He said that speaking for himself he felt that he would have betrayed 
his responsibilities as a citizen had he not fully supported the demand for the 
resignation of such a minority; and the dissolution of such an assembly. He 
continued by saying that if the sarvodaya philosophy stood in the way of his 
acting in this manner, then he would repudiate such an understanding of that 
philosophy. In fact his understanding of his responsibilities as a sarvodaya  
worker was that he ought to raise his voice as strongly, and act as effectively as 
possible, to condemn and fight against such abuse of democratic power and 
democratic institutions. After all, the people gave the government their mandate 
in good faith. If that mandate was abused then it was their right, indeed duty, 
to withdraw that mandate. 103  So when Vinoba was reported to have responded 
to the government firing of a student procession on 5 June 1974, saying that he 
left it to God for his verdict, JP retorted that he wished Vinoba would leave it to 
102 Vinoba Bhave, quoted in V Nargollcar, JP's Crusade for Revolution  (New Delhi: S 
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God to judge the movement in Bihar and its calling for the resignation of the 
Bihar ministry. 1°4 
JP believed people were "no longer prepared to remain helpless spectators of 
wrongs and evils and suffer patiently like dumb driven cattle". 105 As JP 
understood it: "the very foundation of democracy is belief in man - individual 
man - not as a means but as an end. It is this faith in man, in his dignity, in his 
rights and responsibilities, that distinguishes democracy from non-
democracy". 1°6 
Through Vinoba's bhoodan and gramdan programmes, JP had tried 
concentrating on changing the heart of the stronger members of the community 
towards the weaker ones but he had found this had little effect on the situation. 
Therefore he decided that he should advise the weaker sections to organise 
themselves and to become strong enough not necessarily to fight against the 
stronger sections but certainly to claim their rights, enjoy the privileges which 
the law had given them in regard to the land reform, the housing and similar 
other benefits bestowed on them by law. 107 For too long they had depended 
entirely on legislation, administration and planning but to no avail. Caught up 
in a corrupt hierarchy with no people's participation, these institutions had 
failed to implement the reforms. Now JP advocated that it was for people to 
organise themselves in order to ensure that they would be able to move towards 
a partyless democracy along the lines of Janata Sarkar. 
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Nevertheless he did not talk about this in connection with the struggle in 
Bihar. 108 Rather partyless democracy was the ultimate aim for he recognised it 
was something that could be realised only in a casteless and classless society, 
and that would take years to realise. 109  Meanwhile JP hoped that people's 
struggle committees would grow by taking up popular issues, putting forward 
non-party candidates and gradually taking the place of the parties below. 
At the same time JP hoped that people would work towards self-government 
and self-management by doing without any wing of the administration that was 
not necessary to the management of their own affairs, 110 such as the law 
courts. JP believed that as the movement progressed it would spread 
throughout the country. With the devolution of political power, there would be 
a decentralisation of economic power as land would be distributed and people 
would work for themselves instead of being dependent on rich land-owners. 
JP encouraged Gandhi's constructive programme as the basic means to 
mobilise people towards the construction of a new society by enabling them to 
become conscious of their individual and combined strength. JP's idea of 
constructive work was a very broad one for he believed that what was required 
was: "the atmosphere of struggle". He continued: 
It seems to me that in such an atmosphere psychological forces are 
created that attract men and drive them to accept challenges to change 
themselves and change others. In the placid atmosphere in which gram 
swaraiya was working such psychological forces remained dormant. 
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Spiritual and moral appeals, the saintly influence of Vinobaji, did bring 
about some remarkable moral changes in some individuals. But they 
never became a social or psychological force.'" 
This approach shows some similarity to Mao's ideas on revolutionary 
consciousness. JP's idea of constructive work was adapted according to the 
prevailing situation. It extended from meeting people's basic needs such as 
promoting village industries and village sanitation to moral and social aspects, 
for example, removing untouchability. He also encouraged the resolution of 
local conflicts by mutual adjustments and raising electorate awareness. Where 
necessary he urged that active struggle be undertaken, in order to check 
profiteering and hoarding and to eradicate corruption, to implement ceiling and 
other progressive laws relating to land and to prevent evictions. To JP, 
constructive work involved a struggle against external injustices and also 
internal decay such as drunkenness and it served to generate some ideal of what 
to put in their place as well as some experience of what a new society would be 
like. 112 
JP wanted to raise people's awareness so that they might act. This could be 
done through village struggle committees and delegates' councils. They could 
mobilise public opinion to protest against or lend support to certain government 
candidates, serving as watch dog organisations against abuse by the people's 
representative's positions. If abuse occurred then public action could be 
mobilised against the offender. However, the role of the committees was 
envisaged as far more than that of a watch dog for it was thought they could 
participate in wider programmes such as land distribution and ending the dowry 
system. They would be all encompassing moving against corruption in public 
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office, blackmarketeers, and against socio-economic injustices such as benami 
transfers. The committees could take up these questions. People in each 
village would be aware of what frauds were being perpetrated. What was 
needed was united action. Some particular groups could be mobilised within 
themselves, such as agricultural labourers, Hari'ans, Adivsasis, Muslims, 
industrial labour and the unemployed. However, JP foresaw difficulties in 
involving breadwinners, who had family responsibilities. Besides JP warned 
against their becoming so involved as to disrupt production because so much 
depended on that. Thus he voiced his opposition against too frequent resort to 
bandhs for they upset production and served no purpose. 113 
The central organisation of the movement was the Bihar Chhatra Sangharsh 
Samiti, which was based in Patna. It coordinated local chhatra sangharsh 
samitis throughout the state. Under JP's leadership the Bihar jana sangharsh 
samiti was developed also; this served as a non-student central organisation. 
Similarly it coordinated local jana sangharsh samitis. The movement mobilised 
through bandhs, gheraos, meetings, processions, distribution of literature, 
hartals, and dharnas, fasts and non-cooperation. Of course, JP stressed the 
need always to bear in mind the purpose of what they were doing and not to 
yield to sensationalism just for its own sake. A Bihar bandh was organised 
between 3 - 5 October, 1974, paralysing normal life all over the state. This 
involved bringing trains to a halt by squatting on railway tracks. Some 
supporters did try to take short cuts by removing rails and cutting 
telecommunication lines. However, JP remained firm, emphasising that only 
peaceful means should be employed and that railway and other property should 
not be tampered with, stating that "people think of short-cuts only when they 
lack mass support". 114  
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These programmes though focused on political issues and did not 
comprehensively take up the full scope of JP's vision for people's government. 
Moreover, interest was not sustained; for example, major processions were 
held on 5 June and 4 November 1974 and 18 March 1975, but each successive 
demonstration was smaller than the last. The 18 March procession was only 
half the size of the one in November. 115 Further, attempts to popularise the 
movement were opposed. 116 
The movement's main emphasis was the purification of democracy. This 
extended to the national level in June 1975, when the Supreme Court handed 
down its ruling against Mrs Gandhi, declaring her 1971 election invalid and 
barring her from elective office for a period of six years. For her part, Mrs 
Gandhi appealed against the judgement which was eventually overturned. In 
the meantime JP joined with other opposition groups in a call for her 
resignation, organising a mass rally and urging people to join nationally to 
resist corruption and illegitimate government. 
Mrs Gandhi reacted by declaring an Emergency but even before its issuance, 
she had JP imprisoned. Nevertheless he continued his campaign for 
democracy. One aspect with which he was particularly concerned was the 
ignorance of the people for, had they been aware of their rights, and also of 
their duties, they would never have accepted the situation. The CFD rallied to 
his call and promoted itself as a forum for civil liberties against the Emergency. 
It organised local committees throughout the country to provide legal assistance 
to secure the release of political detainees and improvements in conditions of 
detention, creating public opinion against inhuman treatment of detainees and 
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helping (if necessary) families of detainees. It condemned Mrs Gandhi's 
proposed changes to further centralise power within the constitution in 1976, 
and it demanded the release of political prisoners, early elections and the 
restoration of press freedom. The CFD was at the forefront of non-violent 
protest against the Emergency but it was not an action-oriented group. JP 
believed that action was necessary too. He said: "Therefore our present task is 
to go to the people: (a) to educate them about the fundamentals of democracy 
and their relevance to their life; and (b) to organise them in appropriate organs 
of struggle." 117 
Writing to Mrs Gandhi from prison JP said he believed that in a democracy, 
where government comes from the people, the people have the right to recall the 
government and the legislature if they have been corrupted and have abused 
their mandate. He had reflected upon the situation and come to the conclusion 
that the main explanation for the government's actions was corruption which 
had dried up all the normal channels of redress or reform so that it was 
necessary to turn to satyagraha. 118 A democracy, he believed, was about 
lokniti not rajniti and Mrs Gandhi represented the latter. It was not a question 
of choice between democracy and the nation as Mrs Gandhi was reported to 
have claimed. 119 Rather it was a choice between democracy and 
authoritarianism, and Mrs Gandhi had chosen the latter. 
VII.  ELECTION OF THE JANATA PARTY 
Consequently, after the Emergency was lifted it was on this platform that JP 
spearheaded the opposition forces as they campaigned for the forthcoming 
117 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Future", p. 179. 
118 In a letter written by JP to Mrs Gandhi, in late July 1975, from prison. Reprinted in 
Jayaprakash Narayan, Prison Diary, pp. 101 - 109. 
119 Ibid. 
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elections. As far as JP was concerned, India was at the crossroads and the path 
that the people should follow was that of the Janata or people's party; but this 
did not represent people's government, only good government. 
The Janata party was an amalgam of forces that joined together in the wake of 
the Emergency representing a "residium of shared opposition" against the 
Emergency. 120  It included the Congress (0), the Jana Sangh, the Socialist 
Party and the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD). Congress (0) was the product of the 
1962 Congress split. The Janata party had no strong ideology but leaned 
towards Gandhian and conservative views and tended to be bound by personal 
association. On the other hand, the Jana Sangh had a strong philosophy, 
representing Bharatiya or Indian culture through which it sought to unify all 
India. Also, it had ties with the Rashtriya Swayemsevak Sangh (RSS), which 
was recognised largely as an extremist Hindu organisation. Both the Congress 
(0) and the Jana Sangh were mainly urban-based parties. 
In contrast was the Socialist Party. Most of its support base was rural, young 
and poor. It was particularly strong in the North. The BLD was born 
specifically for a Janata-type merger in the pre-Emergency days, and it received 
support from the JP movement. Its rural support tended to represent land-
owners and peasants from the middle castes and it also received support from 
the business community. Just before the election the Janata was joined by the 
newly formed Congress for Democracy which split away from Mrs Gandhi's 
Congress (R) after the Emergency was lifted and the polls had been announced. 
In addition, an electoral alliance was formed with the CPI (M) and with two 
regional parties, the Akali Dal and the Dravidia Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
based in Punjab and Tamil Nadu respectively. 
120 H c Hart, "The Indian Constitution: Political Development and Decay", Asian Survey 
XX (1980): 449. 
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Despite its diverse character, the Janata Party claimed not to be a mere alliance 
of parties but a new national party seeking to restore democracy. Moreover it 
emphasised decentralisation - social, economic and political - which JP saw as 
the very essence of democracy. Indeed Moraji Desai, as Prime Minister, was to 
explain: 
We have to create a culture that is egalitarian, not exploitative - and we 
can no longer tolerate dual societies - rich and poor, city and village. We 
must not think of town and country as separate and rival entities or 
cultures but as integrated and independent settlements within finite 
regions. 121 
Throughout the election campaign the party argued that centralisation was 
inconsistent with democracy. It presented a Gandhian philosophy of 
development for the benefit of the poor, with employment seen as the greatest 
antidote to poverty to be achieved by the creation of a society based largely on 
self-employment. Self-employment, it was claimed, would ensure equality 
with freedom of the individual from exploitation of a political, economic or 
social nature. 122 The performance of the Janata government will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
JP's active support for the Janata presents an apparent contradiction with his 
concepts of people's candidates and of partyless democracy generally. JP did 
not actually join the party but he publicly chose to support that party over the 
Congress. In the absence of a robust grass roots organisation, JP had seen this 
as the necessary and immediate means to ensure the purification of government. 
That was the pressing concern. Yet in so far as JP sought to be a follower of 
Gandhi, this was inconsistent with Gandhi's idea that means and ends needed 
121 Statesman, (Calcutta), 9.4.1977. 
122 C T Kurien, "Economic Decentralisation", Seminar, No. 233 (1979), p. 38. 
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to be interchangeable for it is difficult to reconcile his association with party 
politics with the notions of a partyless democracy, and people's candidates. 
VIII. JP'S LAST STEPS  
After the election JP took an oath not to say anything for a full year about 
Janata's performance. He re-emphasised that "a people's movement is much 
more important than (the) formation of a new political party. 123 Consequently 
JP revived his concept of Janata Sarkar in the form of Lok Samiti for he saw 
this as the vehicle to organise a peaceful class struggle. However, it was not to 
be a Marxist type of class struggle although it clearly presupposed the support 
of the depressed classes. Rather JP envisaged a much wider movement, aiming 
as far as possible for a classless society. 124 In support of Lok Samiti JP also 
relaunched the student struggle movement, the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh  
Vahini, whose members vowed not to join power politics but to work 
continuously towards a "total revolution", which represented the essence of 
voluntarist politics. Unfortunately, JP was not well, having suffered serious 
complaints and so he was no longer able to provide leadership to this "total 
revolution". He died on 8 October 1979. 
IX 	CONCLUSION 
JP left no blueprint for "total revolution" for he thought permanent social and 
political institutions would become outdated. He explained previously: "that 
everything in the world is changing ceaselessly". 125 Like Gandhi his was an 
ideological search for the truth. In that search he raised the question as to 
whether there is any alternative to the present political nexus other than forming 
123 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Future", p. 182. 
124 Statesman (Calcutta Weekly Overseas version), 17.9.1977. 
125 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Future", p. 187. 
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a new party or bringing together some of the existing parties, although he 
allowed attention to be diverted to, and in support of, party politics. 
Nevertheless JP succeeded in inducing some rethinking on patterns of 
development and democracy and the socio-economic balance. In particular, he 
sought to mobilise the masses by educating and organising them through the 
youth. In this respect he was concerned with both socio-economic type 
constructive work and struggle. Struggle as he saw it, involved positive action 
for the purification of government and society generally. Thus he hoped people 
would be able to ensure an effective devolution of power so that they might be 
involved, effectively in nation building. This rethinking was found in the 
ideology, organisation and work of a number of voluntary agencies that have 
operated largely outside the conventional political sphere. Its strengths and 
weaknesses will be tested against their practice. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LIMITATIONS OF JP'S IDEAS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS POLITICAL ACTION 
Before examining any other organisations which would appear to have taken up 
some of the voluntarist political type ideas expressed by JP, it may be useful to 
examine the limitations that some of JP's modern political actions placed on the 
consistency and practicality of his voluntarist ideas; specifically his involvement 
with the Janata movement. Of course it must be acknowledged that the Janata 
was not itself a product of JP's voluntarist ideas, nor were the Janata's 
operations. However JP's association gave both the Janata and its activities a 
certain legitimacy. This chapter is not concerned with measuring JP's ideas in 
terms of his actions but with attempting to understand the limitations that may 
be imposed on his voluntarist ideas in the context of the real world. In 
demonstrating this, the essence of JP's voluntarist ideas that social and political 
institutions should not be seen as "permanent and immutable" is re-
emphasised. 1 
I. 	JANATA 
The Janata was supposed to symbolise the "total revolution" although JP 
always maintained that the "total revolution" went far beyond the ousting of 
Congress. It held itself out as offering a new way, promising not only to 
purify the government but to ensure social, economic and political 
decentralisation, suggesting a radical overhaul of the existing system. The 
1 Allan and Wendy Seade,J.P. His Biography (New Delhi: Oricnttongman Ltd, 1975), 
p.413. 
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Janata failed. It proved to be caught up in self-interest so it was unable to 
present a new national party and it did not institute any revolutionary changes. 
During the pre-Emergency period there were attempts at a merger of the 
opposition parties but they failed because the parties refused to forget their 
separate identities, ideologies and self-interests. The common experience under 
Mrs Gandhi enabled them to put aside their differences temporarily, uniting for 
the purpose of overthrowing Mrs Gandhi's regime. However, this was only an 
election arrangement and after the election the differences became apparent, in 
particular, between the Jana Sangh and the Congress (0). The Jana San gh was 
largely a party of militant Hindus who faced something of a dilemma in the 
early days of the Janata victory, when it became necessary to decide how to 
approach the merger issue. They did not want to abandon their ideology nor 
lose face in the public eye. Eventually they decided to merge with the Janata 
but also to function separately as a cohesive unit. 2 Meanwhile the Congress 
(0) was one of the smaller Janata parties although it boasted some of its most 
powerful men, that is, ex-Congress men who occupied important positions in 
the party and the government. These two parties continued to function as 
separate parties within the Janata with a view to taking control of it. The 
Socialist Party also maintained its own line while the two regional parties, the 
Akali Dal (from the Punjab) and the DMK (Tamil Nadu) could never pretend to 
operate as national parties. 
The fact was that the Janata did not represent a new party. This maintenance of 
separate identities was indicative of the Janata leaders' refusal to view the party 
as "a child of the revolution". 3 Instead their main concern seemed to be with 
2  This decision was never recorded officially but an unofficial report is related in J A Naik, 
From Total Revolution to Total Failure, (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1979), 
p.41. 
3 Ibid., p.34. 
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providing an alternative to the Congress and their main aim in government (that 
is besides capturing power within the party) was to get rid of corruption. The 
Janata did not overhaul the administration or the education system. Instead it 
demonstrated itself as almost as repressive a force as the Congress (I). It 
resorted to banning public gatherings in New Delhi, where Mrs Gandhi was 
scheduled to speak.4 Then when many students in the universities in Bihar 
and UP became restless, Prime Minister Moraji Desai threatened to close them 
down forever. 5 In making this threat Desai had no thought of building up a 
new education system and in the meantime engaging the students and teachers 
in productive work in the rural areas. Rather, the Prime Minister saw it simply 
as a law and order solution, and he was quite prepared to abandon both the 
students and the education system. 
Furthermore, looking at the Sixth Plan and its policies of radical change, few 
new ideas actually emerged. The main thrust of the new industrial policy was 
to register and demarcate technology in mode and scale of operations in 
industry towards self-employment, that is, the effective promotion of cottage 
and small industries, widely dispersed in rural areas and small towns. Yet this 
was no real departure from past policies. For example, the 1956 Industrial 
Policy Resolution emphasised the need for a prominent position to be given to 
village and small industry. However, the Sixth Plan also involved specific 
measures of change such as requiring whatever could be produced by cottage 
industry to be so produced. In so far as these products were being produced by 
the larger sector their reservation for production by the cottage industry sector 
would promote cottage industry. On the other hand if the larger sector was not 
interested in the production of such goods then their reserved status would be 
4 AAP Reuter, "119 held by police in rallies for Mrs Gandhi" Sydney Morning Herald, 
10.10.1977. 
5 The Times of India 17.4.1978, reported in Naik, From Total Revolution,  p. 51. 
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quite otiose, doing nothing to contribute to decentralisation. Also some of the 
reserved products such as spare parts were dependent upon the demand from 
the large manufacturing sector. Other measures involved controls and licences 
in order to regulate industry. Although such regulation might be in the interest 
of industrial health, such as the prevention of monopolies and restrictive trade 
practices, it tends to concentrate power in the state rather than the individual. 
The Janata government sought to compensate any centralisation by developing 
block planning, that is, shifting from the Central Planning Commission level to 
the block level. Of course the effectiveness of this device depended on those 
who were responsible at that level. If it was to be the powerful landlords using 
their position to their own advantage by diverting resources from the weaker 
sections to themselves then any real decentralisation was hardly likely to take 
place. This is what tended to happen in practice. 
The concept of antyodava employed in the Sixth Plan epitomised the superficial 
nature of decentralisation under the Janata Party. It involved the identification 
of the five poorest families in selected villages each year. They were to be 
given grants such as land, food for work, loans, livestock, depending on their 
economic needs. This idea illustrated the ideal of economic resources reaching 
all, but by its very selective nature it could not bring about any real change to 
the situation of the masses. It was a symbolic rather than a fundamental 
approach and would seem to have been very typical of the Janata. 
The Janata party's approach aimed for the benefits of decentralisation such as 
the protection of small industries. However, effective decentralisation requires 
an analysis of the forces responsible for the concentration of power that can be 
analysed with a view to combating them so that any attempts at decentralisation 
may be realised. The Janata was unable to do this. The basic reason was that it 
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lacked the political will. Its support base rested with the middle sectors of 
society - the urban middle class and the prosperous farmers 6 who had vested 
interests in maintaining the status quo, both economically and socially. 
Perhaps this was most apparent in the caste-ridden society of Bihar, where 
Janata support came from middle or backward castes who, hitherto, had 
perceived their own position as one of political neglect and were disgruntled 
with the Congress, which they regarded as an upper caste party that looked 
after its own interests, and through the concept of Reservation, those of the 
Hari'ans and tribals. Thus they lent their support to the JP movement and used 
it until they had achieved what they wanted, that is, a backward caste leader, 
heading the new Janata government. The Janata supporters then sought to 
channel the political rewards home, meeting any alternative government action 
with fierce opposition. This was demonstrated by the issue of Reservation 
which the central Janata government introduced. It was met by considerable 
agitation throughout India but especially in Bihar. 
Reservation of seats in Parliament, government posts and places in colleges did 
not make a significant difference to most Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes and it ignored their essential problems in the villages, doing nothing to 
help their general improvement or relieve them from the brutal atrocities to 
which they were increasingly subjected. In fact much of the violence was 
seemingly inflicted to prevent laws favouring the most disadvantaged groups 
from being implemented. 7 The debate over Reservation bore little if any 
6 cf A Vaidyanathan, "New Deal for the Poor?", Seminar, No.228, (1978): 51. Also, 
Ghanshyam Shah, Protest Movements in Two Indian States (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 
1977), pp. 128 - 133. 
7 eg "Belchi incident", which occurred on 27 May 1977 when a number of Harijans were 
attacked and killed at Belchi near Patna. cf infra Chapter Four, also "Belchi incident "Clear 
Case of Class Hatred— , The Statesman, Calcutta the weekly overseas version) 23.7.1977, p.9. 
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relation to structural changes. Instead it served to divert attention from the real 
issues of altering the economic and political basis of power. 
II. 	REASONS FOR JANATA FAILURE 
The Janata appeared as a party of opportunism and not as a people's party. 
Kuldip Nayar explained the situation in the Indian Express: 
The sluggishness in taking decisions apart, there appears to be less effort 
to weigh decisions in the scales of values; there is more belief in the ends 
than the means. Opening the floodgates to defectors is only one example. 
The result is that all the unwanted and undesirable elements are now 
switching their loyalty to Janata overnight. The same sycophants and 
turncoats are beginning to surround the Janata leaders. 8 
The failure of Janata though cannot be explained simply in terms of its own 
weaknesses. It was seen as a part of the JP movement and in many ways the 
failure of the Janata helps to explain the apparent failure of the JP movement. 
So long as JP was the spiritual leader of the movement he was also the 
conscience of the Janata party, but after the 1977 election JP withdrew and left 
that party to its task and it lost any conscience in the subsequent factional 
politics. It was bound to disintegrate after JP left it for he represented the only 
focus of agreement between the parties. 
It may be argued that JP's reliance on the political parties damaged the 
credibility of his movement. However if JP was to organise the movement 
against Mrs Gandhi and the growing statism and centralisation that she 
represented, he had no choice but to rely on opposition parties for 
8 Cited in M R Masani, "India's Second Revolution", Asian Affairs, 5 (1977): 37. 
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organisational support. He acknowledged early on that the opposition parties 
were trying to take advantage of the movement in order to expand their own 
influence and reduce that of the Congress, accepting the phenomena as 
characteristic of the party system. Nevertheless in May 1974 he proudly 
believed that what was important was the fact that: 
the leadership of the movement never passed into the hands of any party 
or combination of parties. Both the movements (that is, in Gujarat and 
Bihar) have been largely non-partisan in nature. Neither of them has 
been anti-Congress as such.9 
Yet JP's own political position has always been something of a reaction to the 
Congress hegemony. Firstly, after returning to India in 1929, he formed the 
Congress Socialist Party, that it might seek to keep the bourgeois forces within 
the Congress in check. Later he was instrumental in severing ties with the 
Congress because he was not happy with the path that it was operating. Then 
he left "politics", that is the Congress style of politics, as he did not believe it 
was appropriate. He joined Vinoba instead. Finally he chose to re-enter 
politics when he realised that the Congress was frustrating his progress towards 
a new social order. This re-entry however did not involve joining any party or 
accepting any political office although it did lead to his becoming the guiding 
force behind the Janata party. 
The fact is that many forces in Bihar, in particular rich farmers, joined the 
movement after it called for the dismissal of the Bihar ministry, precisely 
because they saw it as anti-Congress; similarly other anti-Congress forces 
joined on a national scale as JP began to focus his attention on Mrs Gandhi. 
Initially JP may not have regarded his movement as anti-Congress as such, but 
9 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Role of People's Movement", Fveryman's, 25.5.1974, reprinted in 
Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution vol.4: Total Revolution, ed Brahmanand 
(Bombay: Popular Pralcashan, 1978), pp.66-67.. 
90 
more of a response to the students' call. Nevertheless it was not long before JP 
accepted Mrs Gandhi's challenge to test his movement's strength. Their 
positions polarised quickly. On the one hand Mrs Gandhi accused JP of trying 
to paralyse the government and of trying to spread disaffection amongst the 
civil and military forces. She would ask: what right has anyone to ask an 
elected government and an elected legislature to go? JP would reply that in a 
democracy the people have the right to ask for the resignation of an elected 
government if it has become corrupt and starts to misrule. He supported the 
adoption of regular mechanisms for the recall of representatives. By the end of 
1974 JP was telling crowds that he wanted them "to see to it that the regime and 
the centre headed by Shrimati Indira Gandhi is ... dislodged". 10 This was 
what interested many of the movement's supporters. They were not concerned 
with such ideals as partyless democracy, or any revolution, but in the practical 
politics of the day. They saw revolution as a slogan and the movement was a 
vent for their dissatisfaction. 
Indeed the students involved with the movement were largely a reactionary 
force, who were more against the Congress party than they were against the 
political system. 11 They were not interested in programmes to picket liquor 
shops, to disband the sacred thread or form people's committees. 12 Certainly 
the power struggle within the BCSS suggested they hardly shared JP's ideals. 
Most of the BCSS members belonged to different non-Congress parties, and 
they struggled to achieve power within the samiti. When they were not fighting 
it would seem that they were preoccupied with press publicity that the 
centralised demonstrative programmes provided and which the decentralised 
10 Statement to crowds at Kurukshetra, 27.11.1974, quoted in D Selbourne, "JP Narayan A 
Political Morality Re-examined", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 13(1981): 48. 
11 cf Shah, Protest Movements especially pp.125 - 129, and pp. 159-166. 
12 Ibid. also, Rajiv Vora, "The Dilemma of the Bihar Movement", Youth Affairs (March 
1980): 21 - 25. 
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constructive type programmes did not.I 3 Many of the leaders ran up lavish 
expense accounts until JP restricted their spending. There was no doubt that JP 
was disappointed with the BCSS and sought to reorganise it though this task 
was not completed. Instead he concentrated on forming an alternative non-
party organisation, the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, whose members 
vowed not to join any political party or associated body. The Chhatra Yuva 
Sangharsh Vahini  will be examined in the following chapters. 
JP had put much faith in the students as a revolutionary force. However, in the 
post-Emergency period JP realised that they were a transitional force and that: 
"These students today are not the students tomorrow. The new ones who come 
to take the place of the old ones do not have the same kind of spirit, enthusiasm 
and the same attitude". 14 It was not simply their transitional nature that 
reduced the students' involvement. Many had not been involved effectively 
from the beginning; they continued their enrollments and paid their college fees. 
JP's theory had not allowed for their sociological backgrounds and their 
consequent unwillingness to change themselves. Nevertheless in late 1977 JP 
said that he still had great hope for the students' movement although he 
admitted it was "not a very effective force at the present moment" but at the 
same time he did not think it dead. 15 
Initially, JP's movement may have been regarded as a people's movement as it 
received support from the urban poor over issues dealing with basic daily life 
such as price rises. However, the poor were not bothered with more abstract 
issues such as democracy, nor even with forms of government. Nevertheless 
13 Ibid. 
14 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Some Clarifications", interview with JP by 
Brahmanand, Patna, December 1977, in Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, 
vol.4: 199. 
15 Ibid. 
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there can be little doubt that JP's national appeal, before, during and after the 
Emergency brought response from a wide variety of people - all creeds and 
castes and every walk of life. However, this itself created problems as one of 
JP's biographers explained: 
Jayaprakash's appeal cannot be as clear-cut as would be that of a leader 
of a political party who appeals only to the like minded. It is something 
in the nature of a national crusade and it suffers from the diffusiveness of 
appeal of such a crusade. It is often said of Gandhiji that 'he was all 
things to all men'. A similar charge of vagueness in regard to JP's 
objectives and programmes is made in certain quarters. I6 
Often, of course, Gandhi had appeared contradictory and had owned to such; 
what was consistent, Gandhi maintained, was that he always acted according to 
the truth as he saw it at that moment. It has been suggested though that: 
The evolution of JP's political thought is marked less by a Gandhian 
grappling with the truth than by a tortured quest for truths with which to 
grapple. Narayan acted, and he acted with conviction. But his acting 
was rarely free of subsequent hesitation, of suppressed doubt and self-
criticism giving way eventually to new convictions and new loyalties.I 7 
Certainly the JP movement seemed to become more and more diluted as it 
developed from its original Bihar context to an all India movement, and in many 
ways it was contradictory. On the one hand JP declared that he was not against 
Mrs Gandhi and then he said he wanted to see Mrs Gandhi's government 
removed. Also he had said, in February 1974, that the Congress (0) and the 
Jana Sangh were no different from the Congress (I) but two months later he 
accepted their support. 18 Then with regard to his policy of decentralisation he 
16 Minoo Masani, "Jayapralcash Narayan - a Personal Portrait of Indira Gandhi's Prisoner", 
Encounter, 45 (1975): 29. 
17 Gordon Fellman, "Leaf in a Storm: Jayaprakash Narayan as a Politician and as Saint", 
The Psychohistory Review, (USA) 9 (1981): 86. 
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was opposed, on the one hand, to the capitalist system with its centralisation 
and profiteering, but on the other hand he favoured many of the freedoms 
associated with capitalism such as minimum interference by the government and 
individual freedoms. The contradictions seem apparent. A society of self-
employed persons suggests a capitalist base, and allowing uninhibited 
competition implies an inevitable concentration of ownership and economic 
power. However, JP did not agree with this conclusion. What must be 
realised is that JP's position was a moral one. He had moved beyond 
materialism and his janata sarkars were not so much a political objective as a 
spiritual one. They implied self-restraint and self-control. As he had explained 
earlier: 
In a materialist civilisation man has no rational incentive to be good. . . . 
I feel convinced therefore, that man must go beyond the material to find 
the incentives to goodness. As a corollary, I feel further that the task of a 
social reconstruction cannot succeed under the inspiration of a materialist 
philosophy. 19 
His point was: 
this is not a political party that it should have been a policy statement and 
a detailed blueprint of all the steps leading to revolution. That sort of 
criticism is meaningless and impractical. This is a people's movement. . 
. . A really revolutionary movement involving the people has to go step 
by step. The next step has to be formulated according to the situation as 
it develops with each step. 20 
18 Shah, Protest Movements, p.103. 
19 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Social and Human Reconstruction" in D M Brown (ed), The 
Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1970) p.176. 
20 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Important Changes", Everyman's, 3.8.1974, reprinted in 
Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4: 97. 
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Nevertheless it really was to put the cart before the horse advocating any 
decentralisation before a revolutionary transformation in the balance of this 
political power had taken place. The Janata would not and could not provide 
this transformation, and when JP left the Janata after the election he took with 
him his moral persuasion and any idea of real policy change. 
Moreover JP's ideas were confused by the compulsion of the political 
mechanism. For example, JP asked high caste boys to give up the practice of 
wearing the sacred thread. Some resentment emerged and some sarvodaya  
workers attempted a compromise explaining that JP did not mean they discard 
the thread forever, only until the Assembly was dissolved, and so even this 
most basic measure of social reform was made a "political issue" in that it was 
linked to the government and the governing party rather than the "total 
revolution". Moreover when JP came to know of this he did not try to clarify 
publicly his position. 21 Confusion extended throughout the movement and 
many supporters, including sarvodava workers, failed to understand what JP 
required of them. 22 In many ways this confusion can be attributed to JP's 
belief that they ought to be concerned with what was happening on the political 
field. This concern led to his support for agitational activity against the 
government. Also, it led to a split within the Sarva Seva Sangh. 
III. 	SARVODAYA AND POLITICS  
Vinoba did not understand JP's reasoning. He believed sarvodaya workers 
ought to shun all politics. Often he had said that politics only disintegrates and 
it is spirituality that unites.23 Thus Vinoba believed that instead of politics 
21 Shah, Protest Movements p.122. 
22 Ibid., p.104. 
23 Kanti Shah, Vinoba: Life and Mission (Varanasi: Sarva Seva Sangh, 1979), p.135. 
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there was a need to find a new path and on 22 January 1971 he wrote in his 
weekly "Swarajya": 
We cannot improve politics: so we have to find out an alternative for 
turning the present painful reality to an optimistic outlook. In quite a few 
years dharma should become our politics. As democracy has replaced 
autocracy, religion has to replace politics. 
Throw aside politics; if we do not add fuel to his fire, it will extinguish 
by itself. . . . 
My suggestion is the only non-violent course to come out of the rut of 
our so called self-rule, which has no moral self-restraint and is _ 
irretrievable. When an epidemic of plague starts, all have to leave their 
homes and cities. In the same way we should now give up politics and 
not return to it until it becomes fit for us.24 
In contrast, JP's former secretary, Sri Sachchidanand, thought that JP's 
mistake was in leaving modern politics during the 1950s to join Vinoba's 
movement. 25 In saying this Sachchidanand was not downplaying the 
significance of gramdan. On the contrary he believed it was a most important 
experiment. However, he thought that JP's talents would'have been employed 
better in developing a "political" opposition to the Congress. Indeed JP's 
departure from the modern political scene left something of a vacuum. It 
enabled power to be increasingly centralised within the Congress and also 
forced the Congress to assume greater responsibility for power. More 
importantly, in leaving aside politics JP left aside the task of organising the 
people. 
24 Ibid, pp.146 - 148. 
25  Interview conducted by myself, 4 October 1985 at Sri Sachhiclanand's home, 13-4 
Karkasbagh Colony, Patna. 
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Vinoba seemed to associate organisation with hierarchy and power which he 
believed diverted attention away from his cause of spirituality. However, this 
does not mean that he was totally opposed to organisation in people's lives. He 
envisaged gram swaraiya as the ideal encompassing the whole of people's lives 
releasing them from their dependence on government. But Vinoba seemed to 
think that it might come about spontaneously as a result of "total revolution", 
that is "total revolution" as he saw it - carried out along the lines of the 
constructive programme with which he was experimenting. Vinoba believed 
that only with such a socio-economic constructive programme of social change 
could people's strength be aroused. It was morality not organisation that he 
stressed. It became apparent to JP though that organisation also needed to be 
emphasised. As he explained, from his prison cell during the Emergency: 
Here was I trying to widen the horizons of our democracy. Trying to do 
it mainly by involving the people more intimately and continuously in the 
processes of democracy. This in two ways: One by creating some kind 
of machinery with the people in the setting up of candidates. Two, by 
providing a machinery - the same machinery as in One above would have 
done - through which the people could keep a watch on their 
representatives and demand good and honest performance from them.26 
This was a departure from Vinoba for here was JP saying that it was necessary 
to make politics fit for the people, not as Vinoba had advised to leave it until it 
was no more. Vinoba anticipated that government authority would decline 
eventually and people's authority would be established instead. However, JP 
thought this was no longer possible as the politics of the centre seemed to be 
getting stronger not weaker. Kanti Shah suggested that this does not mean that 
JP lost his course for the 20 years that he was with Vinoba for during that time 
he had always emphasised gram swarajya. 27 Indeed JP said, in December 
1978: 
26 Jayapralcash Narayan, Prison Diary, p.1. 
27 Shah, Vinoba, p.143. 
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In my concept of total revolution, the idea of gram swarajva was, and is 
still implied. In my view, the objective of total revolution and of 
sarvodaya is one and the same. There may be some procedural 
differences even that would be in respect of emphasis only. The word 
"revolution" is indicative of fundamental change only; hence the term 
"total revolution" is more attractive. 28 
Thus he did not disregard his previous 20 years so much as he built on that 
experience. JP believed in a two-pronged approach; like Vinoba he was 
concerned to raise a new system from the ground but simultaneously JP was 
concerned to raze the old system to the ground too. 
This two-pronged approach involved a combination of immediate and ultimate 
goals, that is, of good government and self-government, a combination which 
presented many contradictions. On the one hand, it was trying to make the 
existing political system more representative, and on the other it was trying to 
erode it. The existing system that JP wanted to erode consisted of parties, 
government, parliament and the bureaucracy, and voting. JP did not seem - to 
have wanted to erode it all, only that which was irrelevant to the electorate. He 
seemed to have assumed the continuation of the parliaments at both the state and 
national levels. What he wanted was a change in character of the 
representatives. He wanted them to be people's representatives, not party 
representatives. JP did not think that parties were the appropriate bodies to 
choose representatives. He preferred the idea of people directly involved in the 
selection process and subsequent direction of the representative's policies. 
Under the party system JP maintained that the people's role was limited to 
voting, and that even the exercise of their vote was irrelevant for they had no 
control over the policies and behaviour of their representatives once elected. He 
believed that the putting forward of people's candidates to a stand against party 
28 Ibid. 
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candidates would give the electorate a real choice and make the exercise of their 
voting relevant. Yet, presumably, as people increasingly voted for people's 
candidates over party candidates, the role of the parties would decline to such 
an extent that they would no longer put forward candidates. Only people's 
candidates would stand - one in each electorate, making the vote a mere 
formality. Perhaps the next step would be to do away with the vote, for the 
elected representative would not be controlled through the ballot box but by 
people through the delegate's council. Although JP did not appear to actually 
suggest this, this would seem to be the logical extension of JP's ideas. The 
vote demonstrates on the one hand how it could be made into a useful tool of 
democracy and at the same time gradually rendered irrelevant. 
JP's attitude towards the political parties is more difficult to rationalise. He 
advocated a partyless democracy and demanded that party politics be kept out of 
the L,ok Samiti and CYSV. He regarded CYSV members as revolutionaries and 
they were required not to hold membership with any party or political wing of 
their trade union or student movement. The Lok Samiti rules were not so strict. 
Ordinary party members could belong to Lok Samiti but party office holders 
could not. In addition, those members of Lok Samiti who were also members 
of political parties could not hold any Lok Samiti office or be representatives of 
people's committees at higher levels. This was done to prevent party politics 
from entering people's committees. It may seem contradictory to allow even 
ordinary party members to join Lok Samiti but perhaps JP regarded this as a 
way to show those ordinary party members that there was an alternative to party 
politics while making it very clear that it was quite separate from party politics. 
When JP, himself, left politics to join the bhoodan movement in the 1950s, he 
did not immediately resign completely from the CSP. He only refused any 
office. It was later when he resigned from the party and much later when he 
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suggested that he had been wrong in ever having given the Congress Socialist 
movement the name and a structure of a party. 29 Given JP's background and 
the evolution of his thinking one can understand his sympathy with ordinary 
party members who tried to seek an alternative political way. 
However, JP's attitude towards the party system becomes even more complex 
when one tries to evaluate what he did in practice with regard to his role in 
ousting Mrs Gandhi's government, JP openly supported the defeat of Mrs 
Gandhi and the victory of the Janata Party. He was never under any illusion 
that the Janata party was the ultimate alternative to the Congress(I) and he 
always maintained the need to continue work outside the party system and build 
people's committees from below. Yet he allowed himself to be identified with 
Janata and thus with the party system. JP was concerned to purge the party 
system of the corruption that Congress(I) appeared to represent. He wanted to 
see the promise of good government in its stead. While JP may have been able 
to rationalise his involvement and stay aloof from party politics the campaign 
was geared towards the selection of one party over another. The campaign to 
rid government of Mrs Gandhi became very personalised, targeted against Mrs 
Gandhi. This would seem to have gone against JP's ideas yet he was at the 
forefront of the campaign. 
After the Janata victory JP stepped back out of parliamentary party politics and 
concentrated on the grass roots level. It is not clear just what he hoped to 
achieve or what he hoped would be achieved in the post-election period. 
Perhaps the main aim was to demonstrate to the parties the potential power of 
the people and thus persuade them of their need to be more accountable to their 
29 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Towards Reconstructing the Polity", based on an inaugural address 
to all India Radical Humanist Association Conference, Calcutta, December 1973, published in 
Voluntary Action, XVI (March-June 1974) p.3. 
100 
electorate. Perhaps also JP saw it as an issue around which to generate the 
psychological force he saw as necessary to challenge the people to change 
themselves and their situation. Certainly it had served as an important rallying 
point and it had presented a challenge to JP to determine what alternatives he 
had in mind and how he was going to achieve them but as he himself 
acknowledged, the momentum passed. It served also to demonstrate the 
potential of the people but at the same time demonstrated the limitations of the 
people's role under the prevailing system, that is, that the people's role did not 
go beyond the election. It suggested that if sustained action to raise awareness 
and bring about change is to be undertaken, then it really needs to be 
undertaken at the local level where it can be consolidated. 
However, Sachchidanand's point about politics needing someone such as JP is 
pertinent. JP's re-entry into politics was so fast and events moved so quickly 
with the disaffected opposition groups who had been in disarray for so long 
finally having a cause around which they could unite. They overwhelmed the 
JP movement, so although JP never let go of sarvodaya the fact was that the 
5arvodaya philosophy did not represent any tangible core of the movement. 
Rather it was more of an agitational movement that tended to be preoccupied 
with immediate economic and political issues. The strength of the movement 
actually evolved around an anti-Congress campaign. Thus it had no sound base 
for it failed to attract the masses. The movement was not seeking so much the 
uplift of all as the ousting of the Congress. In fact there was considerable 
resistance within the movement against mobilising the masses, both peasants 
and workers.3° Programmes were not geared towards solving the problems 
of the poor. Instead they were concerned with corruption, adequate vocational 
training at the tertiary level and the dissolution of the Assembly. Most of the 
programmes were issue-oriented directed against particular grievances 
30 Shah, Protest Movements, 028. 
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involving the fixing of prices on essential commodities and protesting against 
taxes. These issues interested the students far more than the sarvodaya ideals, 
the relevance of which they failed to understand. As for the masses, there was 
some initial support for the movement in regard to causes such as land reform 
and lower prices but their sympathy was soon lost because JP's movement 
came to be dominated by power politics. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are a number of lessons that can be drawn out of the JP movement. It 
demonstrated the difficulty of trying to reconcile JP's ultimate goal of "total 
revolution" or voluntarist politics with the immediate modern political concerns, 
in this case, displacing Mrs Gandhi's government, In practical terms the JP 
movement was trying to mobilise disaggregated grass roots groups at the 
strong, centralised macro-political level, but it lacked a strong organisational 
base and a well-trained cadre who were able to prepare a base that would be 
capable of resisting the compulsions of political opportunism that operated in 
the current structure. The Janata party may have meant people's party but it 
was actually a very limited party consisting basically of urban upper and middle 
classes, landlords and neo-rich farmers, whose main concern was to capture 
political power. The Janata period demonstrated the inability of the current 
parliamentary system to bring about any real social change. What needs to be 
recognised is that the Bihar movement was not an attempt to apply JP's 
voluntarist idiom, rather it was an attempt to confront the prevailing modern 
political situation. 
JP's ideal system focused on decentralised grass roots groups who would 
gradually strengthen, extending horizontally - to build up solidarity - and 
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vertically - in order to actively participate in the wider political field. However 
JP did not see this as occurring spontaneously, and he recognised the need for 
some structure and organisation through which people at the grass roots could 
be educated to take on the responsibilities that lokniti entailed. He thought that 
there was a role for trained cadres to educate and mobilise people to this end. 
The CYSV was launched with this role in mind. Moreover, he believed that to 
be effective the local groups needed some sort of operational guidelines, which 
would provide stability as well as facilitate their communications with each 
other, thus strengthening each others' existence by sharing experiences, 
resources and expertiuse, and generally supporting each other. Lok Samiti was 
promoted as the type of structure that might provde an environment conducive 
to the nurturing of lokniti. The Lok Samiti model was that of an inverted 
pyramid, so the idea was to ensure that power was not only vested with the 
people but that it remained with the people. The local lok samitis were to be 
largely self-reliant, responsible, for example, for their own funding. It was not 
a bureaucratic structure. Rather, JP envisaged that it would be a continuing 
process, in which ongoing constructive work would be essential. People 
would be educated and involved through constructive work, thereby ensuring 
that Lok Samiti did not become removed from their situation. At the same time 
JP did not suggest that this structure would operate in isolation from other 
forces. JP, himself, was always interested in networking, forming coalitions 
to further community links and strengthen the grass roots position. In addition, 
JP understood that any efforts in the direction of lokniti still had to contend with 
the prevailing rajniti structure. It could not be ignored. Power could be 
devolved only gradually and this process would require a vigilant role by the 
peoples' committees. The consequent involvement in the dominant political 
sphere was clearly a contradictiory postition. However, JP believed that if a 
total approach was adopted towards achieving lokniti then these contradictions 
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would be minimised, as it would result in a gradual restructuring of the 
prevailing modern economic, political and social framework into a flexible 
model able to respond to prevailing needs and circumstances. 
To assess the relevance of JP's lokniti type ideals it is necessary to examine 
them in the context in which JP envisaged them occurring, that is, extra-
constitutionally, at the grass roots level. Thus it may be determined as to the 
extent that his ideas converge with the ideas by which voluntary organisations 
active in this field operate. The following chapters seek to establish this 
convergence, although before they are introduced into the text, the next chapter, 
Chapter Four, is concerned to set the scene in which they operate. 
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CHAFFER FOUR 
BIHAR AND WEST BENGAL BACKGROUND 
In exploring the voluntarist political ideas of Jayaprakash Narayan and the 
relevance of these ideas to four organisations actively working towards lokniti, 
this thesis focuses on two neighbouring states, Bihar and West Bengal. This 
chapter is basically one of background information to set the scene. It reviews 
the prevailing political order in these states. They are based on the modern 
political idiom but some traditional idiom type influences are clearly present. 
Essentially they are rajniti in character. The British legacy is looked at first. 
Both states shared this history. Then the two states are dealt with separately 
having regard to the particular characteristics and experiences of each, especially 
the effect of their respective traditional idioms on the modern one. 
I. 	BRITISH LEGACY 
The dislocation suffered by modern India's states of Bihar and West Bengal 
under the British was, perhaps, greater than anywhere else in India for they 
were a part of the British administrative province of Bengal, which came under 
European influence half a century before the rest of India. As a result it suffered 
most from the effects of British rule for it was there that the foreign masters 
experimented most with fundamental social and economic changes based on the 
notion of extraction. After all the British origins in India were commercial, 
affecting the British administrative approach accordingly. The East India 
company's commercial policy ensured the production of raw materials in India 
for British industry, and the consumption of British manufactured goods in 
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India. Thus they boosted the production of raw materials with the establishment 
of indigo, jute and cotton plantations. 
Bengal was well suited to both the task of production and market for it 
supported a large population with the rich alluvial soils of the North and South 
Bihar plains on either side of the Ganga and (what is now) West Bengal's fertile 
deltic expanse into which the Ganga flows. The new centres of production in 
British Bengal were linked up with Calcutta, which was 'developed primarily as 
a port of export. It was a centre of commerce and industry, with, for example, 
cotton textile and jute manufacturing. This new industrial stimulation 
transformed the social structure in Bengal enormously and Calcutta became a 
giant metropolitan agglomeration recognised today as the seventh largest in the 
world. 1 
Beyond Calcutta, however, the rest of Bengal was left relatively underdeveloped 
with limited transport and other infrastructure. The urbanisation rate was very 
low. Meanwhile traditional manufacturing in the Bengali hinterland was 
restricted and crushed by various measures and internal duties. These were 
imposed by the British and prevented the flow of Indian goods within the 
country itself. On the other hand British goods enjoyed free entry. 
Consequently the Indian textile industry collapsed, displacing vast numbers of 
weavers and other artisans. This process was particularly rapid in British 
Bengal whereas other areas were affected more gradually as the British 
expanded and the railways developed. It led to both the monetisation and 
impoverishment of the villages as they became increasingly dependent on the 
wider economy, largely losing their self-sufficient character and suffering an 
overall drain from the villages through this unequal exchange that the British 
promoted. 
1 A Das, "Development Blockage and Unemployment in West Bengal", in D Bhattacharyya 
(ed), Focus on West Bengal (Calcutta: Samatat Pralcashan, 1972), p.20. 
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Also at this time the whole nature of agriculture was changed by the British in 
Bengal as they introduced property rights in land with the Cornwallis Permanent 
Settlement, 1773. Basically this was an administrative measure designed as a 
source of revenue to ensure the punctual receipt of land revenue. At the same 
time it conformed with the prevailing Whig philosophy that the State's role was 
to administer justice by securing the interests of private property and 
consequently it ensured that there was a class of loyal landholders. So the 
British conferred title on the zamindars, who had been responsible for collecting 
taxes over particular areas since the Mughal times. The zamindars were given 
only circumscribed proprietary rights for theoretically they were not allowed to 
dispossess the primary producers. Thus their rights were not so much in land 
but rather the revenue from the land. They were expected to act as "improving 
landlords" so as to maximise their capital. However, with neither effective 
control of the means of production or the production process and faced with 
heavy demands by the British revenue collection, many zamindars actually 
divided their land and sold it. The new land-owners tended to be urban-based 
Bengali elite, the bhadralok, who further drained capital from the countryside 
and were not concerned with reinvesting their profits. 
Consequently effective control of the land, labour and capital or credit on the 
rural scene was left in the hands of local power-holders, zotdars, that is, village 
headmen, and substantial peasants. It was the zotdars who took advantage of 
the rise of international trade as they gained access to greater credit and 
commodity markets, commercialising Bengali agriculture. 
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The position of the peasants was completely changed as the settlement "struck at 
the whole Indian conception of a cooperative group social structure", 2 which 
is the basis of any idea of lokniti. Superior rights to land were granted to non-
cultivators, whose main business was to collect land revenue for the British, so 
it is not surprising that agrarian relations were structured in their favour. The 
security of the tenants was no longer ensured by custom, rather by the 
settlement, which required written documentation of which the peasant tended to 
be ignorant. Moreover, the traditional taxes paid by the plattas had been fixed 
by custom at a fairly constant level, that is, a fixed portion of their produce. 
This system was conducive to the variable nature of agricultural production, for 
in lean years whilst the proportion payable might remain the same, the actual 
amount payable would be less than in bumper years. However after Permanent 
Settlement the ground rents were likely to be changed at will by the landlords. 
For their part the zamindars were required to pay cash revenue, regulated 
according to scales established in the Permanent Settlement, and they faced 
penalties for late or non-payment of this revenue. The demand for cash rents of 
course required the sale of grain to raise cash thus encouraging the process of 
monetisation at the village level. The ramifications of this process were 
immense. For example Das records that in the village of Changel better rates for 
the sale of grain could be obtained from a market village a few kilometers 
away. 3 This led to a number of families acquiring bullock carts which meant 
that they needed new bullocks as the local bullocks were not suitable. The carts 
required better wheel craft than the local blacksmith cum carpenter could 
produce thus resulting in a drain of resources away from the local village 
economy. 
2 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), 
p.304. 
3 Arvind N Das, "Changel: Three Centuries of an Indian Village," Journal of Peasant 
Studies, vol.15 (1987), p.17. 
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Permanent Settlement also led to a change in prevalent land use patterns with the 
acquisition of waste lands traditionally used for customary grazing as well as 
other activities such as salt and soap making according to soil types etc. Thus 
these occupations were closed to those who had traditionally undertaken them. 
Furthermore it meant a decline in the local availability of meat and other animal 
products, salt, soap etc so that they had to be imported into the village, and 
became more expensive. The new usage of the lands often contributed further 
to this overall impoverishment. In Changel, for instance, absentee landlords 
grew mangos for export from the village. Thus mangos which had hitherto 
been a free food, in season, acquired exchange value. Moreover the growing of 
mangos was at the expense of other traditionally available trees such as bamboo 
which had been an important local building material. Consequently the cost of 
building increased.4 
Thus the effects of Permanent Settlement at the village level were far reaching. 
However, the British found that as a revenue raiser the system was not as 
advantageous as they had hoped. Therefore it was never applied with such 
extreme rigour elsewhere in India. The Bengali society though was 
characterised by "depeasantisation" as political and economic power on the rural 
scene passed to the zotdars. "Depeasantisation" involved a three-fold process: a 
rise in rural indebtedness; extension of sharecropping and labouring; and the 
escalation of land transfers, all of which are inter-related. The land transfers 
meant greater insecurity for the tenants - an insecurity that was characterised by 
increased indebtedness, and a general change in relationships between those 
who held the land and those who worked it with greater emphasis on 
sharecropping and agricultural labour rather than peasants; this meant a much 
greater dependence by the sharecroppers and labourers on the land-owners. A 
sharecropper was a tenant farmer who worked for himself and paid a share of 
4 Ibid., p.16. 
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his crop as rental. Theoretically the sharecropper held a secure title but in 
practice the sharecropper's status was unprotected as the relationship between 
the sharecropper and land-owners was based on submission. The landlords 
held the balance of social and economic power and could replace one 
sharecropper with another, or even substitute wage labour. 5 The agricultural 
labourer's situation was also unequal. Agricultural labourers were often 
indebted to the land-owners who subsequently demanded total obedience and 
were prepared to use whatever means of intimidation were necessary to ensure 
it. This situation has continued. 6 In general tensions have been further 
fuelled by the fact that there seemed to be less and less work available, and what 
there was paid less than before. 7 It is this inequality of power that is true 
essence of rajniti; and it was against this background that the modern political 
structure was imposed. 
BIHAR 
Bihar was created as a political unit in 1912 by the British. It is now a 
landlocked state of about 174,083 square kilometers, which is about 5.71% of 
the total area of the Indian union. 8  Geographically it is divided into: the 
Gangetic plains of the North through which the Ganga flows from East to West 
dividing the North Bihar Plain from the South Bihar Plain; and the highlands of 
5 The Land Reform Amendment Act 1970 (West Bengal) was enacted with the intention of 
securing the interests of the bargadar or sharecropper seeking to make the sharecroppers' rights 
legally enforceable but generally sharecroppers titles were not registered and therefore not 
protected. At law ten years tenancy,sufficed instead of registration but the inequality between 
the bargadars and landlords effectively rendered the legislation otiose. 
6 cf Prasad, Rural Violence in India (Varansi: Gandhian Institute of Studies, 1985), 
especially Chapter Three, detailing social, economic and sexual intimidation and even murder. 
7 cf Willem Van Schendel and Aminul Hague, Faraizi, Rural Labourers in Bengal 1880-  
1980 (Rotterdam: Casp 12), 1984. 
8 Ram Chandra Prasad, Bihar (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1983), p.2. 
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the Chota Nagpur Plateau in the South. The North Bihar plain is very fertile and 
extensive, stretching up to the foothills of the Himalayas. The South Bihar 
Plain is narrower and the depth of alluvium is thinner. This area becomes quite 
hilly and barren. There is flooding on both plains. Chota Nagpur has suffered 
from considerable deforestation. It has scanty rainfall, poor irrigation and is 
subject to droughts. On the other hand, Chota Nagpur is the richest mineral belt 
in India. It contains the world's largest resources of mica, as well as large 
quantities of copper, bauxite and limestone. Most of the mineralised areas are 
forest covered and relatively remote. There are many unexplored reserves. 
From the point of view of mineral wealth Bihar is the richest state in India, 
producing 41% of the nation's net weight in mineral production and achieving 
just over 30% of its value. 9 The proximity of mineral wealth has resulted in 
the establishment of a number of giant capital-intensive complexes, including the 
Tata Iron and Steel Company which boasts the largest steel plant in India at 
Sakchi, Singhbhum district. There are some engineering projects such as the 
Heavy Machine Building Plant which produces equipment for the iron and steel 
industries. In addition Bihar has a number of non-metallic industries such as 
cement, fertiliser and chemical plants. 
However, it is agriculture that is central to Bihar's economy with more than 
80% of the population drawing sustenance from it. 10 Clearly the distribution 
of rights in land is very important to the economic system, and helps to 
determine and reflect the structure of power in the society. About half of those 
dependent on agriculture are cultivators, 11 amongst whom the most important 
land-owning castes are the former zamindars, mainly from the Brahman, Rajput 
9 Mid, p.96 
10 Ibid, p.112. 
11 Ghanshyam Shah, Protest Movements in Two Indian States, (New Delhi: Ajanta 
Publications, 1977), p.68. 
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and Bhumihar castes. Under them are various categories of tenants and 
agricultural labourers and farm servants. Among the tenants are those 
permanent tenants who, after the abolition of the zamindar system emerged as a 
new category of land-owners and came to dominate the contemporary political 
scene along with the former zamindars. These are Yadava and Kurmi castes. 
Land-ownership tends to be concentrated with about five and a half percent of 
land-owning households owning 33% of the land.I 2 Just over 70% of the total 
cultivating households have less than five acres of land each.I 3 
The other half directly engaged in agriculture are labourers although the numbers 
of agricultural labourers is swelling as increasing numbers of small cultivators 
are forced to sell their land.I 4 The labourers include both sharecroppers and 
agricultural labourers although there is increasing reliance on the direct hiring of 
labour especially since the Green Revolution which changed the nature of 
agriculture and resulted in the eviction of many sharecroppers who had neither 
the documentation nor the economic resources to assert their legal rights. 
Labourers' wages are generally below the fixed statutory minimum and 
demands for increased wages and more favourable conditions of work are 
generally taken by the land-owning castes as threats to the entire framework of 
the labourers' dependence and the landlords' authority. Thus such claims often 
are met with brutal suppression by the land-owners. 1 5 Moreover the 
agricultural system is such that the agricultural labourers tend not to be 
employed for the whole year. Consequently, the landless labourers tend to be 
impoverished. Bihar is very poor in terms of income distribution with almost 
75% of the population below the poverty line.16 Furthermore, the Bihari 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 People's Union for Democratic Rights, "Bihar Behind the Curtain", A R Desai (ed), 
Democratic Rights in India, vol.I (Bombay Popular Pralcashan, 1986), p.441. 
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agricultural scene is characterised by an informal system of bondage, which is 
forced on poor peasants who need to take consumption loans from larger land-
holders. Generally these loans far exceed the poor peasants' assets and thus the 
creditors are able to control the debtors through tied or bonded labour. 17 So 
"for all practical purposes they (the money-lenders cum large land-holders) are 
the law in their areas." 18 Meanwhile the number of landless has been growing. 
It was in this environment that Vinoba launched his bhoodan and gramdan  
campaigns, hoping to achieve voluntary based land reforms. Generally, 
however, those controlling the land were not interested in surrendering it, nor 
were there any modern political government initiatives to curtail the problem. 
Rather there has been a failure on the part of the state government to effectively 
implement agrarian reforms and provide for a more equitable distribution of land 
or change in the traditional agricultural structure. Indeed the passing of modern 
land reform legislation involved long, difficult legal and political struggles. For 
example land ceilings bills were mooted for many years before legislation was 
finally enacted in Bihar in 1961. These years gave traditional large land-holders 
time to devise ways to circumvent legislation through fictitious transfers. Also it , 
made the position of long occupancy tenants very insecure as many land-holders 
evicted them before their rights could be entrenched at law. In spite of the 
enactment of modern land reform legislation, the government took very little 
action to implement it. This is partly because it presented an immense 
administrative undertaking, particularly in view of the fact that there is no up to 
date survey of land holdings. However it is also a fact that those in political 
power have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. 
16 R C Prasad, Bihar, p.114. 
17 Pradhan H Prasad, "Semi-Feudalism: The Basic Constraint of Indian Agriculture," A N 
Das & V Nilalcant (ed.$) Agrarian Relations in India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1979), p.35. 
18 Ibid., p.36. 
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Only a small proportion of Bihar's population live in the towns (about ten per 
cent) 19 but it is the third most densely populated state in India. 20 It has 402 
people per square kilometer and the national average is 221. 21 The traditional 
social structure is predominantly (80%) Hindu.22 In conventional varna 
categories they can be divided hierarchically into upper, middle, lower and 
Scheduled castes. The upper or forward castes include the Brahmans, 
Bhumihars, Rajputs, Kayasthas  and Banias, who collectively comprise about 
13-1/2% of the population. The Brahmans, Bhumihars and Raiputs are all 
major land-owning castes. The Brahmans are socially and ritually the most 
superior but throughout this century the Bhumihars have sought to assert their 
superiority by reading the Vedas and performing religious rituals unaided by the 
Brahmans.23 The Kayasthas  and Banias are the important caste groups in the 
towns and cities. The Kayasthas are the most advanced caste educationally and 
are prominent in all modern professional occupations, whereas the Banias 
predominate in trade and commerce. 
The major middle castes are the Kurmis, Yadavas and Koiris who make up 
about 18-1/2% of the population24 and are often ascribed the title "backward 
castes" together with the lower castes. The middle castes are far behind the 
19 This statistic and the ones that follow were taken from the Times of India's Directory and 
Year Book 1982 (Bombay: Times of India Press, 1982), p.272. The population density 
figures were based on the 1981 census. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 R C Prasad, Bihar, p.24. 
24 H W Blair, "Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India", Comparative Politics, 5 (1972): 
111. Except with respect to the data relating to Scheduled castes and tribes and to the 
Muslims these figures are based on 1931 census figures as subsequent census have not 
reported caste information. However, Blair believes that with some caution the figures may 
still be used as it is such a largely rural population, which means that large numbers of 
migrants are unlikely to distort the balance. Moreover, figures relating to Harfans have 
remained fairly consistent over time. 
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upper castes in terms of education. Nevertheless they are important land-
owning castes in Northern Bihar, where they were formerly tenants of the 
zamindars. The Yadavas' hereditary occupation is that of herdsmen. 
Numerically they are the largest single caste in Bihar with about 11% of the 
population.25 The Koiris traditionally are agriculturalists particularly skilled in 
growing special crops such as tobacco and opium rather than staple crops. The 
Kurmis are purely cultivating castes. 
The lower castes comprise about 32% of the population, the Scheduled castes 
about 14%. The Muslims make up about 12-1/2% and the Scheduled tribes 
about nine per cent. 26 They form the majority of the population but they do not 
have much power within the prevailing political order. 
The upper and middle castes are the most significant on the modern political 
scene. Modern politics was slow to emerge within the Bihari society for it 
tended to be dominated by the bhadralok, the Bengali elite. After the separation 
of Bihar from British Bengal it was the Kayastha caste who entered modern 
politics in the most advantageous position, being the most educated caste. The 
Brahmans quickly recognised education as the path to advancement, and with 
falling agricultural prices these traditional land-holders sought to enter the 
tertiary and professional sectors, competing with the Kayasthas for government 
positions. Meanwhile the other upper castes were able to consolidate their land-
holdings in the rural areas. Also some sections of the middle castes who were 
larger tenants were able to convert their tenancies into ownership. This all led to 
a rising of cake consciousness, especially amongst the upper castes as they 
became politically mobilised and gradually aimed to further advance themselves 
through education in order to compete for their share of power. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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After independence the middle castes began to assert themselves in the dominant 
power structure. The middle castes succeeded in defeating the Congress party 
in 1967. On the one hand opportunities presented themselves with the 
penetration of government institutions and local government, firstly through the 
community development programme and later through panchayat raj. This gave 
motivated castes both a channel to air their grievances, and a means to enhance 
their political and economic power through their participation in local 
government and their consequent access to economic resources through the 
power to issue government permits or grant government contracts etc. On the 
other hand post independence India also brought greater opportunities for the 
raising of consciousness again with the establishment of government institutions 
as well as the touring of politicians at election time and the promise of legislative 
reforms towards a more equitable social and economic structure thus raising 
expectations. 
As their political awareness increased, the middle castes perceived the state 
government as neglecting their welfare. For example as land-owning castes 
they felt their traditional positions were threatened by proposed and actual state 
government enactment of land reforms for a more equitable distribution of land 
and a change in the agricultural structure. At the same time the state 
government's failure to effectively implement such reforms ensured the 
continued dominance of the upper castes, curbing their own advancement. 
Meanwhile, the union government was seen to be advancing the position of 
lower castes by their "scheduling" in order to ensure safeguards and benefits to 
promote their position in society. This was carried out at the union level but 
extended to the state levels, and included special favours in education, 
government, employment and political representation. It was a system of 
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reverse or protective discrimination, and caused anxieties amongst the middle 
castes that their own situation might be adversely affected by such policies. 
Thus they sought to advance their own position in modern government electoral 
politics, and claimed similar preferential treatment by identifying themselves as 
"backward" castes, while exercising their social and economic power at the local 
level to try and maintain the subservience of the lower castes. This resulted in a 
very volatile political environment as the traditional and modern idioms came 
together producing a rajniti scenario. 
However, the middle castes' assertion on the political scene did not make for 
stable politics in Bihar. In the five years following the 1967 defeat of Congress, 
a total of nine governments were formed, seven of which were led by men from 
the backward castes. Congress was returned in 1972. With the support of Mrs 
Gandhi's Emergency it remained in power until 1977 when the middle castes 
lent their support to Janata, which won office. The Janata government was 
headed by Chief Minister Thakur, a backward caste leader. 
The Janata took office at both the national level and the state level in Bihar. At 
the central level it raised the issue of Reservation, reserving a new bloc of jobs 
and tertiary education positions for other "backward" castes in addition to those 
places already reserved for Scheduled castes and tribes. The primary 
beneficiaries of this move were the middle castes, especially the Yadavas and 
Kurmis. It made very little difference to the lower castes and indeed the 
Scheduled castes and tribes, most of whom were illiterate and not in a position 
to compete for the vacancies. Thus the decision to reserve 26% of the vacancies 
to the backward castes was not one of altruism to help the underprivileged. 
Rather it was a \recognition of the considerable power commanded by these so-
called backward castes. 
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However, Thakur's decision raised fresh controversy from the forward castes 
who were disturbed by the prospect of half the vacancies being closed to them. 
It was argued that more than 50% of the backward castes, consisting of the 
Yadavas and Kurmis were richer than the upper caste people. 27 As a result 
Thakur announced modifications to the Reservations policy on 21 March 1978. 
Reservation was not to affect promotions, only appointments and only those 
whose income was less than one thousand rupees per month would be entitled 
to benefit. Nevertheless the unrest continued. Both the upper and middle castes 
were dissatisfied. The atmosphere on university and college campuses where 
the students were primarily upper caste was explosive. 28 The situation 
deteriorated to such an extent that on 8 April 1978 the Bihar government decided 
to close all the universities and colleges until 23 April 1978. Examinations had 
to be postponed and students were asked to vacate their hostels. Then agitation 
spread beyond the campuses with buses being overturned and trains being 
brought to a halt. Atrocities against Hari'ans continued. Although agitations 
began to die down there was a further outbreak of violence in November, after 
the Chief Minister announced a revision of the Reservation formula. This time 
20% of vacancies were to be reserved for backward castes and three per cent 
each for women and economically backward communities. 
Clearly Bihar's modern political idiom of parliamentary politics was strongly 
influenced by the persistence of feudal social relations dominated by the upper 
and middle castes whose attention focused on their competing power struggle 
which did not make for a stable modern polity. The state governments in Bihar 
in independent India came and went in quick succession, seeming to avoid any 
real attempt at performance \through legislation, operating instead through 
27 Blair, "Ethnicity and Democratic Politics", p.111. 
28 Shah, Protest Movements, pp.74-76. 
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ordinances. Between 1967 and 1980 the most number of days that the Bihar 
Assembly sat in any one year was 64, in 1973. In 1981 there were 60 
ordinances that had operated for more than a decade. 29 
The upper and middle castes were concerned with consolidating their power 
within the modern political idiom This was demonstrated by the reaction over 
the Reservation issue, and by the use of private armies whose functioning is 
unrestrained and whose actions are often assisted by the police. 30 There have 
been a series of violent onslaughts against Hari'ans, sharecroppers and landless 
labourers. In most cases the attackers were the middle caste Yadvas and 
Kurmis, who had been enraged by the growing organisation and assertion of 
political and economic rights by Hat -Fans, such as demands for higher wages, 
occupancy rights, strikes etc. 31 Information about the number and extent of 
such incidents was not reliable, and the lack of information was a part of the 
scheme of repression. 32 One such incident occurred on 6 May 1982 in 
Jehanabad Gaya, where an armed struggle took place between landlords and 
landless labourers after the latter demanded higher wages in accordance with the 
minimum wages act. 33 Generally the landed castes were supported by the 
police against whom many excesses were alleged; however, the state 
government refused to allow independent enquiries as it claimed that this would 
demoralise the force. 34 The scene presented was very much one of rajniti  
characterised by exploitation and violence. It was this scene that JP wanted to 
change by raising the poorest elements, in particular the Scheduled castes and 
tribes, through lokniti type processes. So it was against this background that he 
29 "60 Ordinances Operating in Bihar", The Statesman (Weekly 14.3.1981), p.13. 
30 PUDR, "Bihar Behind the Curtain", p.439. 
31 D L Sheth, "Politics of Caste Conflict", Seminar, 233 (1979): 30. 
32 PUDR "Bihar Behind the Curtain", pp.440-441. 
33 "Rural Situation in Bihar Explosive",The Statesman  (Weekly) 15 May 1982, 
P. 5 . 
34 "The Threat in Bihar", The Statesman (Weekly), 14 November 1985, p.8 
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launched the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini and Lok Samiti, directing their 
attention to this end. Some of the work that these organisations have undertaken 
will be studied in the next chapter. 
III. 	WEST BENGAL 
The modem state of West Bengal is the Western portion of the larger Bengal 
which was partitioned at independence. Many problems have developed within 
West Bengal as a result of partition. Firstly the geographical distortions have 
created many difficulties in administering the state as a unified whole. West 
Bengal consists of three distinct portions. The largest area is in the South, and 
the smallest in the middle. Each portion is connected only by a narrow neck of 
land. The narrowest neck connects the North and middle portions and is a 
particularly sensitive strategic concern for the Indian nation as it is bordered by 
Nepal on the one side and Bangladesh on the other. The other major problem 
with which West Bengal has been confronted by its partition from East Bengal 
has been the influx of refugees immediately after partition, and secondly there 
was a'large influx during and after the civil war that culminated in the formation 
of Bangladesh. 
West Bengal is generally a flat alluvial plain, much of which is part of the delta 
of the River Ganga. However, the far North is mountainous, where there is a 
wide variety of minerals but little of any significant value. It is the second most 
densely populated state with 614 people per square kilometer. 35 The alluvial 
plains support a large agricultural population. However, West Bengal also has a 
comparatively large urban population of just under 25% compared with an all 
India average of about 20%. 36 The urban population is centred around 
35 Times of India's Directory and Year Book 1982, p.272. 
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Calcutta, which was established by the British as an important commercial and 
administrative centre. It served as the capital of British India until 1905 when 
the British shifted to Delhi. The British also developed many industries there 
and it was an important port for the rest of British Bengal, including modem day 
Bihar, which continues to serve as its hinterland. It is to Calcutta where most 
people in rural Bihar and Orissa flock nowadays when they can no longer make 
a living from the land. Thus Calcutta is a relatively cosmopolitan city, which is 
reinforced by the fact that most of the business people are non-Bengalis. 
The traditional Bengali society is different from that in Bihar. It is from Bengal 
that members of the elite group, the bhadralok are drawn. 37 The bhadralok 
represent a status group rather than a class or caste, and are characterised by 
their orientation towards education, intellectual and literary pursuits. Thus they 
have provided a pool of social and economic leadership. Their numbers are 
drawn mainly from the Brahmans and two other castes: Vaidya (physicians) 
and Kayastha (writers). The Brahmans were the principal land-holding caste in 
Bengal but they never enjoyed the unchallenged ritual social status that they 
were afforded in the rest of India. The Vaidya and Kayastha were ritually 
inferior to the Brahmans but had considerable economic and social status. 
Together these three castes always enjoyed a privileged position in Bengali 
society. 
They had a tradition of being drawn upon for the administrative core of 
successive Bengali Mogul governments because their mastery of foreign 
languages was always invaluable for the mediation between the foreign rulers 
and their subjects. Thus they became a class of collaborators which enabled 
36 Ibid. 
37 J H Bloomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, Twentieth Century Bengal 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 
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them to maintain a dominant and indispensable position that was strengthened 
under the British and they shared an attitude of superiority that distanced them 
from the Bengali masses. The lower castes demonstrated their resentment by 
lending their support to all other religious influences such as Buddhism and 
Islam. Under the British the bhadralok rose to a position of supremacy as they 
became a source of recruitment by the British for all non-British Indian colonial 
posts. They were able to take advantage of their position by buying up the old 
zamindari land-holdings. However it was in Calcutta, the capital of Bengal (and 
all British India) that the bhadralok actually established themselves, remitting 
their profits there. They developed the city as a centre of learning and the 
bhadralok classes were drawn to the city by opportunities in education, the 
public service, professions and by the general excitement associated with the 
intellectual fervour of the times. 
The European influence brought many new ideas to the bhadralok, including 
science, social reform, philosophy, and Western education, generating a new 
intellectual awareness that manifested itself in the "Bengal Renaissance". 38 A 
number of prominent Bengali thinkers emerged including Ramakrishna, 
Rammohan Roy, Rabindranath Tagore39 and M N Roy40 . Rammohan Roy 
founded the Brahmo Samaj which sought to rationalise Hinduism in modern 
terms and attempted to reform a number of archaic social practices such as child 
marriage and sati. He defended the rights of women and promoted freedom of 
the press which he believed would help diffuse knowledge, liberating and 
improving the mind so as to ensure that the people would familarise the 
38 cf Atulchandra Gupta, Studies in the Bengal Renaissance  (Calcutta: National 
Council of Education, Bengal, 1977); revised and enlarged edition edited by Jagannath 
Chalcravorty. Also David Kopf, Bengal Regional Identity (Michigan: Asian Studies Center - 
Michigan State University, 1969). 
39 cf chapter 5. 
40 cf. chapter 1. 
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government with any errors and injustices it might be committing. Ramalcrishna 
supported this outlook: "By the mind one is bound; by the mind one is 
freed".41 Meanwhile the Bengali vernacular press developed in Calcutta and in 
many obscure places. Newspapers became common place. In 1905 there were 
fifty seven Bengali weeklies, only eighteen of which were from Calcutta. 42 
The practice of community gatherings at which one person might read the paper 
to a large number was widespread. At the same time popular songs and dramas 
depicting exploitation developed throughout the countryside. 43 Also gymnastic 
clubs for physical education were established and used to promote a new 
consciousness. Thus new ideas were spread. 
Consequently the Renaissance brought with it a new or modern political 
consciousness. Initially it was a very loyal consciousness supportive of British 
rule. The British, of course, were the link with the humanitarian and liberalism 
ideals that were being adopted. There was a faith in the "generosity of the 
English race" believing that the British would themselves "pave the path to 
freedom" for the Indians. 44 England was seen to provide shelter to all those 
who fled from persecution in their own countries, It was against this 
background that the Indian National Congress was founded and originally 
operated with the bhadralok playing a prominent role. The Indian National 
Congress was not established as a political party but as a gathering of leaders 
41 Ramakrishna was advising the Brahmas to cultivate the liberating powers of 
the mind during one of his visits with Keshut Chunder Sen; cited in W M 
Theodore De Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition vol.II (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1958), p.90. 
42 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908 (New Delhi: 
People's Publishing House, 1974) p,256. 
43 Reverend James Long in his testimony to the Indigo Commission appointed 
in Calcutta 1860; cited in John R McLane (ed) The Political Awakening in India 
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp.30-36 
44 Rabindranath Tagore on his eightieth birthday, May 1941, cited in Jawaharlal 
Nehru, The Discovery of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 321. 
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who represented various organisations, communities and regions. Basically 
they operated at an annual session held over Christmas although there were 
provincial conferences too. The annual gatherings were themselves important in 
promoting feelings of nationalism for they included representatives of all major 
communities throughout India although it was chiefly educated Indians who 
were involved. The bhadralok, in particular, played a very strong role. 
Initially the Congress accepted the continuation of British rule but lobbied for 
greater Indian involvement in the administrative process believing that an Indian 
input into Indian questions would make for a more efficient administration. The 
proposed reforms were of a constitutional nature and would further their own 
position as educated Indians. However there developed "a painful feeling of 
disillusion" with the British as the bhadralok and other Western educated leaders 
"began increasingly to discover how easily those who accepted the highest 
truths of civilization disowned them with impunity whenever questions of 
national self-interest were involved." 45 The bhadralok were particularly hurt 
by Lord Curzon's proposed division of Bengal in the early 1900s. Basically 
this was for administrative purposes, although it was recognised that this would 
weaken the bhadralok's political stronghold as partition gave a majority to the 
Muslims in the Eastern sector and the Biharis and Oriyas in the West. 46 For 
their part the bhadralok saw it as an attack on their position. 
The bhadralok's elite position of influence was a vulnerable one at that time. 
Many non-Bengali Indians had begun to receive English education, and thus 
competed for administrative positions. Moreover Lord Curzon's university bill 
(early 1900s) was designed to limit the number of Indians educated in English in 
order to curb the growth of nationalism; and the bhadralok saw themselves as 
45 Ibid., p.322. 
46 cf Bloomfield, Elite Conflict, p.28. 
124 
the chief group who would be affected. Meanwhile the nineteenth century had 
also seen the increased sub-infeudation of bhadralok landed rent holdings which 
meant that their agricultural income declined correspondingly. Further they did 
not secure an economic base grounded in the control of capital through 
commerce. It was against the bhadralok code to sully themselves with trade. 
Rather it was the British and non-Bengali Indians, especially the Mawaris 47 , 
Gujaratis and Sindhis who accumulated capital and established themselves as a 
powerful commercial class. The bhadralok strongly opposed the proposed 
division of Bengal through press and public meetings, petitions and deputations. 
Nevertheless Curzon's planned partition was implemented in 1905, and the 
bhadralok were stirred to find a more direct form of opposition, that of 
swadeshi. Swadeshi involved the boycott of the British manufactured goods 
and aimed to thus draw Britain's attention to the Bengali's grievances. 
Consequently it also promoted indigenous industries. For some though, such 
as Rabindranath Tagore and Bipinchandra Pal, the significance of the movement 
went beyond mere economic arguments. The self-help and self-reliance and 
passive resistance that it generated were part of a larger voluntarist idiom type of 
consciousness that it was hoped would emerge. Certainly it brought about 
debate on many practical issues through popular songs, newspapers and 
pamphlets, although the British clamped down on what was considered 
subversive press.48 S wadeshi emphasised the use of the vernacular language 
and it involved some boycott of government schools and colleges and of the 
judiciary and administration. The aim was to make it impossible to administer 
the country although this was short lived. Also swadeshi promoted constructive 
47 This term is used by Bengalis to denote a rich Hindi speaking businessman. 
It means to be from the land of the deserts. 
48 cf Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908 (New Delhi: 
People's Publishing House, 1973), p.268. 
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work in the villages through the establishment of the samitis, and through 
volunteer brigades, trade unions and gymnasiums. 
Yet the vast majority of villagers remained indifferent to swadeshi. 49 It seemed 
"swadeshi-thought, so rich in other directions was indeed amazingly meagre and 
timid when it approached questions of landlord-peasant relationships." 50 The 
bhadralok were the vanguard of the movement, and many of them were 
landowners. A significant comment on the social character of the movement can 
be seen from early successes in the movement which were in boots, shoes and 
cigarettes. 51 However the movement was not confined to the bhadralok. 
Some barbers and servants played an active role withdrawing their services from 
those who continued to support British goods. 52 In general though, the 
involvement of the labour movement tended to be concentrated in the Calcutta 
industrial areas and the railways. Further, economically swadeshi was not such 
a success for really it "required patient work and technical lcnowhow rather than 
religious enthusiasm."53 The Bengalis were entrepreneurially backward and 
held business in contempt. In fact whilst nationalism encouraged Bengali 
entrepreneurship, Kling records that business men were considered unpatriotic 
if they were purposeful. 54 The bhadralok took pride in the fact that the 
swadeshi movement ignored costs, prices, markets etc. Thus most of the new 
swadeshi industries failed. If swadeshi was to be viable it would have needed • 
to revive traditional handicrafts and initiate modern industry in India. However 
with regard to cotton piece, for example, hardly a dent was made for the 
49 Ibid., p.284. 
5° Ibid., p.333. 
51 Ibid. 
52 cf Ibid., p. 316. 
53 Ibid., p.62. 
54 Blair B Kling, "Entrepreneurship and Regional Identity in Bengal," in Kopf, 
Bengal Regional Identity, p.81. 
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indigenous substitute was simply not available in quality or quantity and it was 
usually more expensive. 55 
In addition to the passive resistance of boycotts, the partitioning of Bengal in 
1905 saw the bhadralok's militancy expressed in other ways with the emergence 
of revolutionary terrorism throughout the state. Acts included the derailing of 
the Lieutenant-Governor's train in December 1907, near Midnapore. Also a 
Mrs and Miss Kennedy were murdered at Muzaffarpur, 30 April 1908 when a 
bomb was thrown in the carriage that they were driving. Presumably the bomb 
was intended for the Judge of Muzaffarpur outside whose home the killing 
occurred. The terrorist activity gave the British justification to meet force with 
force. Thus they imposed a strict press; extended the secret police; imprisoned 
without trial and deported offenders; and so effectively suppressed the anti-
partition as well as other political activity. 
Bengal was reunited in 1912 but the British resolve to reduce bhadralok power 
was strengthened. Thus the British administrative capital was moved from 
Calcutta to Delhi, which severely affected general bhadralok opportunities. 
Moreover it struck at the Bengali ego which prided itself as representing the 
heart of cultural and intellectual awareness in India. Yet at the same time it 
provided greater opportunities for the bhadralok elite for the British expanded 
Indian participation in the administrative processes and it was this Western 
educated group that was most able to take advantage of these reforms.56 
Meanwhile the lower class, poor and semi-educated bhadralok who were not so 
Anglicised had to increasingly compete with non Bengalis for the teaching, 
clerical and subordinate government positions that they had previously 
55 cf Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movemeni, p.147. 
56 Bloomfield, Elite Conflict, p.34. 
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monopolised. 57 The lower class bhadralok were generally ignored by the elite 
except when the elite needed "mass" support such as during swadeshi. They 
felt betrayed as the elite adopted a moderate position supporting the British 
administrative reforms. 
Geographically isolated from the political centre and without any mass support 
base the bhadralok were unable to afford any real challenge to British rule. In 
addition it saw a shift in power within the nationalist movement from the 
Bengalis to the belt of Hindi speaking states which provided the core of 
Congress leadership particularly with the emergence of Gandhi. Gandhi's 
independence movement demanded loyalty and a strong central leadership 
leaving no room for the maintenance of a separate Bengali identity and his 
simplistic outlook seemed somewhat philistine. 58 However the lower class 
bhadralok were gradually attracted to Gandhi's leadership as both a means of 
struggle against the British and as a means to advance their own position 
politically. However, for the elite bhadralok the voluntarist style of satyagraha 
did not offer any exalted social and political role such as they thought they 
deserved. So it was with reluctance that the Bengal Congress Committee was 
persuaded to support Gandhi's nationalist leadership. 
Other bhadralok rejected the Congress and were attracted instead to Marxism. 
In the wake of the Russian revolution it promised the overthrow of the British; 
but also Marxism assured them of a modern society in which intellectuals would 
enjoy a more prominent position; it denied the usefulness of traders and 
merchants; and it denigrated orthodox Hindu ideas that Gandhi's Congress 
seemed to promote. 
■ 
57 cf Ibid., p.325. 
58 Ibid., p.149. 
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The Communist Party of India (CPI) was founded by Bengalis, firstly in 1921 
and then after the arrest of most of its members it was founded again in 1925. 
Whilst it was an all Indian organisation, Bengalis always played a prominent 
role. They were largely at the forefront of its split in 1964. Although the split 
divided communists fairly evenly over India as a whole it was clear that the new 
party, CPI(M), emerged the stronger in West Bengal where it was dominated by 
the bhadralok. After that the chief concern of the CPI(M) in West Bengal 
seemed to be with modem political power, which it perceived as best achieved 
through parliamentary politics, competing with the Hindi dominated Congress to 
achieve electoral power. The CPI(M) had no mass support base and it soon 
became apparent that this was essential in order to achieve electorally. It looked 
first to the proletariat, who in Marxist terms are seen as the key to the class 
struggle. So they concentrated their work in Calcutta, somewhat isolated from 
the rest of Bengal, in particular the Bengali peasantry. Furthermore, the 
industrial workers in Calcutta tended to be immigrants from other parts of India. 
The Congress party on the other hand gained access to the mass electorate 
through lines of patronage extending from local power holder in the rural areas, 
that is the large land owners, while in the cities it had support from the 
industrialists and bourgeois classes. 
The early state Congress governments were slow to institute land reform 
measures, and when they were introduced they did not make any significant 
changes to the organisational structure. Initially the West Bengal government 
was elected in by a restricted electorate, that is restricted to property holders, so 
in spite of Central government pressure there was no great incentive to tackle 
state land reform at the state level, although it was an easier task in West Bengal 
than many other states as there was both a large volume of information and 
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experience gained by previous land reform efforts (new legislation and 
amendments) under the British, the latest being in 1940 with the Bengal Land 
Revenue (Floud) Commission which undertook an elaborate survey of the 
agricultural structure. In 1948 the West Bengal government undertook to 
prepare elaborate records of land rights and an analysis of village records in the 
Sundarbans. Thus it was decided to postpone any land reform legislation until 
the evidence of these records was available. It was 1953 before legislation was 
undertaken. This was the Estates Acquisition Act which introduced an 
ownership ceiling. However it was still possible to hold in excess of the ceiling 
through benami transfers. Whilst benami transfers were illegal the Act restricted 
enquiries of benami transfers to those made after the introduction of the bill. 
The five year delay in introducing the bill of course resulted in many benami 
transfers anticipating some land ceiling. 
The high incidence of absentee landlordism and the numerous intermediaries 
made reform of the agrarian structure difficult. Moreover there were difficulties 
in achieving zamindari abolition. Firstly in so far as this involved constitutional 
and other legal issues it was necessary to ensure the legislation was properly 
worded. Secondly the issue of compensation was quite complicated with the 
state government having to determine formula to work the amount out as well as 
actually find the revenue to make the payment. 
In 1967 the Congress was defeated at the state polls. No one party was able to 
govern in its own right. It was the CPI(M) that held the balance of power, thus 
it entered an alliance with Left Front parties and formed a United Front 
government. Thereafter the significance of this step was seen its electoral 
progress. This depended largely on the cultivation of electoral alliances but it 
involved building up mass electoral support too. 
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During its first period in government the CPI(M) organised a "land grab" 
movement for properties illegally held above the land ceiling. It was an extra-
legally based self-help movement. Unfortunately it became more of a "land 
rush" than a land grab as various parties within the United Front wanted to join 
in. About 300,000 acres were recovered.59 However, it was the middle rather 
than the poor peasants who supported and benefited from the movement. 613 
Moreover tensions were aggravated amongst the peasantry as many of the 
bargadar, or sharecroppers, were evicted as a result of the confiscation of excess 
lands. The West Bengal Land Reform Amendment Act, 1970 was supposed to 
protect the rights of the bargadar creating a quasi title to the land. However, it 
was quite ineffective as the government failed to appreciate the vulnerability of 
the bardagar who were not in a position to enforce their rights. The landlords 
who were also the sharecroppers' moneylenders still held the balance of power. 
They could replace one sharecropper with another or substitute wage labour. 
The legislation illustrated a lack of understanding as to the situation of the 
bargadar, and the whole of the peasantry. Thus it was that the Naxalites, with 
their promises of social, political and economic change, received initial support 
in the rural areas. 
On the parliamentary front considerable tension emerged within the United Front 
Government, caused chiefly by the CPI(M) which wished to dominate the 
government. Attention was diverted from the rural scene to clashes between the 
parties culminating with the imposition of President's Rule in March 1970. 
Elections were held in 1971 but no single party or alliance emerged as victor. 
The Congress formed a minority government with the backing of the central 
59 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry", Problems of 
Communism, 21(1) (1972): 14. 
60 Donald S Zagoria, "Kerala and West Bengal", Problems of Communism, 22(1) 
(1973): 22. 
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Congress government's troops. These troops were employed to crackdown on 
the CPI(M). The government did not last long and President's Rule had to be 
imposed again, with fresh elections being called in 1972, during which the 
CPI(M) charged the Congress with: acts of terrorism; removing names from the 
electoral list and the forging of other names. The Congress won that election 
and dominated the scene with support from the centre until the next polls in 
1977. 
During that time the electorally decimated CPI(M) turned its attention more 
towards the countryside, where there lay considerable political potential as 
demonstrated by the Naxalites. The CPI(M) tried to build up its rural support 
base by establishing local reform committees in the villages and organising itself 
into three tiers, operating at the village, block and district levels. At the village 
level the party worked through kisan and trade union fronts seeking to mobilise 
the peasants and workers gaining valuable feedback for the party. It sought to 
expose benami transfers and redistribute surplus land. 
It was a much stronger CPI(M) that contested the 1977 elections allied with the 
Left Front. It did not join forces with the JP led Janata Party even though 
elsewhere in India the CPI(M) was doing just that, thus demonstrating both the 
strength of the Left Front electoral alliance in West Bengal and its electoral 
support. The CPI(M) won office and remained in government. The elections 
demonstrated that the electoral forces in West Bengal were quite clearly 
polarised between the Left and non-Left, led by the CPI(M), albeit dependent on 
a strong electoral alliance and the Congress respectively. This is significant 
because it indicates that the JP movement did not secure any stronghold in West 
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Bengal. The implication is that whilst students in Bihar and elsewhere in India 
served as the original vanguard to JP's "total revolution", the Bengali students 
continued to resist Gandhian type of influences. 
In government the CPI(M) continued to cultivate its rural base by trying to 
protect the barg,adar through legislation and through its organisational arm as 
village committees worked to assist the bargadar in registering their barga rights 
and with each registration issuing 600 rupees in agricultural credit to the 
respective title holder. Not only did this sum represent an incentive but it 
protected the bargadar against the withdrawal of credit by the landlord cum 
moneylender as punishment for the registration of their rights. A procurement 
programme was instituted - procuring rice for public distribution by way of a 
procurement levy on peasants. It required peasants to sell a percentage of their 
produce to official agents at a fixed rate. Small and middle peasants were 
exempted; thus they were able to keep what they wanted for their own needs 
and sell their surplus at the best possible prices. Moreover small and middle 
peasants were paid a good subsidy if they were forced to sell when market 
prices were low. Peasants with more than seven acres were levied according to 
a rising scale, which was designed to prevent them from hoarding their paddy 
and selling at inflated prices when stocks on the market were low. 
Unfortunately the CPI(M) did not seem to be able to help the agricultural 
labourer and the small farmer who depended on supplementary labour. The 
government fixed a comparatively high minimum wage for rural labour: 14 
rupees and 95 paise compared with eight rupees in neighbouring Bihar (1985) 
yet the CPI(M) party machinery only tried to ensure minimum payment of 12 
rupees. 61 The small peasants' and labourers' major problems were 
61 Interview with Comrade M A Rasul, Kisan Sabha leader at the CPI(M) offices, 
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unemployment. The government introduced food for relief, and work 
programmes such as roads and the renovation of water tanks. These 
programmes were of immediate value to participants who were often 
unemployed for most of the year and would otherwise be dependent on the 
moneylender for their income. Not everyone was able to participate and this led 
to resentment amongst those who failed to benefit. 62 Further, such 
programmes offered no long-term solutions and so whilst the poor peasants 
received some immediate material benefit from CPI(M), their overall position of 
insecurity did not appear to change. 
The Bengal voluntary organisatiuons, which will be introduced in the following 
chapters, have sought to work in this vacuum. The CPI(M) has adopted a 
hostile attitude towards them implying that the CPI(M) regards its position as 
being challenged by the voluntary organisations. The sort of organisations that 
the CPI(M) criticised had activities ranging from "education, training, 
developmental work to setting up organisations of sections of the people to 
intervene in the socio-economic and political spheres." 63 These are the same 
type of activities that JP advocated, although the CPI(M) did not draw any links. 
The CPI(M) accused these agencies of having "petty bourgeois anarchic 
ideology" 64 with pretensions of being a new revolutionary core in India. 65 
Further it alleged that their presence is an imperialist strategy designed to 
penetrate the rural areas in order to counter Marxist work, citing both the 
organisations' use of funds from Western capitalist countries and their 
Alimuddin Street, Calcutta, 28.8.85. 
62 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Politics and the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist)", Problems of Communism 27(5) (1978); 14. 
63  Pralcash Karat, "Action Groups/Voluntary Organisations: A Factor in 
Imperialist Strategy," The Marxist (New Delhi) (April-June 1984), pp.37-38. 
64 Ibid., p.49. 
65 Ibid. 
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denunciation of left parties as evidence for its claims. 66 Moreover, the CPI(M) 
specifically identified IMSE, which is one of the organisations that will be 
studied in the next chapters, as the type of foreign funded action group with 
which it was concerned. The ideology of the organisations, the funding they 
receive and the problems raised by this type of funding will be discussed in later 
chapters. What is important now is the significance CPI(M) attributed to such 
organisations, suggesting that the potential scope of voluntary organisation 
could influence the course of development in Indian society. 67 
IV. 	CONCLUSION 
The inadequacies of the modern political states in Bihar and West Bengal are 
demonstrated clearly by the failure to achieve effective mobilisation at the grass 
roots level within the power structure. This seems to flag the need to explore 
alternatives. The focus in these political environments has been on 
parliamentary political parties which would not seem to have grasped the full 
significance of the grass roots situation. There has not been a halt to 
impoverishment of the rural masses, nor have social, economic and political 
freedoms been achieved. Instead there would seem to have been growing 
social, economic and political oppression although this has appeared more 
extreme in Bihar than West Bengal. Reforms that were carried out, such as 
some land distribution and related laws tended to be party based, favouring the 
middle peasants rather than the landless labourer. The political parties and 
interest groups that supported them were inadequate as vehicles for base level 
participation, that is lokniti. It is at this base level that the following chapters 
will examine JP's ideas through the work of a number of voluntary 
66 Especially p.42 & p.49. 
67 Ibid., p.20. 
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organisations in order to determine whether they have a place in helping to fill 
this vaccuum. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BACKGROUND AND IDEOLOGY OF THE VOLUNTARY 
ORGANISATIONS 
I. 	INTRODUCTION 
The main concern of this chapter is to introduce a number of organisations that 
either have sought to follow JP's ideas specifically, or at least appear to have 
shared some of his voluntarist type ideas and have tried to put them into 
practice. These are the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini (CYSV), Nay Bharat  
Jagriti Kendra (NBJK) in association with Lok Samiti, the Institute for 
Motivating Self Employment (IMSE) and the Society for the Advancement of 
Rural Economy and Kultur (SAREEK). These organisations recognised that 
development must come from outside the formal political structure and they 
hoped to serve as catalysts to an alternative form of development. 
JP believed that to the extent that "voluntary people's action through their 
voluntary agencies, is developed to that extent is democracy strengthened and 
meaningful to the people as a whole". 1 The strength of voluntary 
organisations lies in their flexibility as they are able to take into account specific 
local factors regarding the nature of poverty in a given socio-economic 
environment. Discovery of their goals is a matter of experiment but they can 
consider the prevailing conditions and plan from the primary community 
outwards. The Indian government recognised the value of voluntary agencies 
1 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Statement of Policy" (1974), written for the journal Today and 
Tomorrow, published in Continuum (October 1981), vol. 1:55. 
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being able to reach target groups and it involved them in the fulfillment of some 
of its programmes such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(IRDP) in which voluntary agencies were actively involved in identifying 
suitable recipients for government subsidised loans. However, the dominant 
power structure . did not accord voluntary organisations with any pivotal role, 
and planning remained centralised with the government. 
The point is that voluntary organisations seem to have the potential to mobilise 
popular energies into strong social forces, and by extending participation this 
force may be channelled to achieve optimum results. Through mobilisation all 
these organisations could have the potential to increase the bargaining power of 
the poor who,, without organisation, present a disunited collection with 
apparently conflicting loyalties. By encouraging mobilisation and participation 
the intention is that the diverse interests of a community can be solidified so as 
to intensify commitment and identification of the community, developing a 
structure through which they may be heard, that is lokniti. Thus any 
oppressive social structure regarded as inhibiting the development processes 
may be overcome. JP urged voluntary organisations to develop this strength by 
raising the consciousness of the poor in order to enable and encourage them to 
play an active role in their own development and the change of society. In other 
words JP effectively urged them to bring the voluntarist idiom from the margin 
to the fore of politics. 
The Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini and Lok Samiti directly manifested JP's 
legacy and they represented an attempt to systematise many of his ideas into an 
organised form. It is quite clear from JP's practical political experiences that if 
an alternative political order is to be developed then it requires some form of 
structured organisation, that is, an organisation that will unite people and 
develop their consciousness and general awareness. The Chhatra Yuva 
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Sangharsh Vahini and Lok Samiti sought to work in the spirit of JP whom they 
still regarded as their leader. They aimed to keep alive his ideas while waiting 
for a new opportunity to realise their goals. 
However, the CYSV and Lok Samiti pursued clearly different ideas. On the 
one hand JP envisaged the Vahini  as the vanguard of the revolution raising 
issues of injustice, bringing them to public attention and seeking to mobilise the 
people to remedy the situations. On the other hand, Lok Samiti, which means 
people's committee, perhaps represented the key to the "total revolution" 
envisaged by JP. He regarded these independent village-based people's 
committees as the foundation of decentralisation and democracy, and saw them 
as agents of "total revolution". Thus Lok Sami i sought to promote a concrete 
model of decentralised self-government or lokniti, whereas the CYSV seemed 
concerned more to raise awareness in readiness to take on this responsibility of 
people's government. Given this situation it might be useful to concentrate the 
study of Lok Sami i on some village committees and the work that they were 
doing both within their respective villages and as a part of a broader popular 
movement. The work of Nay Bharat Jagriti Kendra (NBJK) which decided to 
promote Lok Samiti both as a concept and as an organisation within its 
particular region, could be a useful focus for studying the theory and practice of 
Lok Samiti. 
Both the CYSV and Lok Samiti organised on a national level but their work 
tended to be concentrated in Bihar. Meanwhile in neighbouring West Bengal, 
the birth place of the Naxalites, other organisations emerged, including 
SAREEK and IMSE. They were independent of JP and his movement, which 
historically found few roots in Bengal. However, these groups developed at 
the same time as the upheavals of the early to mid-1970s in Bihar. The reasons 
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for their emergence, and the conditions in which they arose were largely similar 
to those that confronted the JP movement, although the ideological basis for 
their search was not the same as that which JP underwent. 
SAREEK aimed to strengthen village people through organisation. It focused 
on the youth as the leaders in any social change. At the same time SAREEK 
aimed at the establishment of a co-ordinated series of village committees 
concerned very much with the welfare of their communities and anxious to 
increase their consciousness with respect to both their local situation and the 
world at large. 
IMSE was concerned also with creating awareness but more than that it wanted 
to channel that awareness in the direction of its own ideology with the aim of 
building up a Mass support base and demonstrating a much stronger sense of 
purpose than any of the other contemporary movements. That is, IMSE wanted 
to strengthen its own organisation by generating grass roots support. 
Moreover, IMSE is interesting because it made a deliberate move to spread its 
activities to Bihar, where it found it faced a different situation. 
Neither IMSE nor SAREEK ever presented themselves on such a scale as the 
JP movement, but they developed in the context of the Naxalite upheavals in 
West Bengal, around the same time that JP began to work with the concepts of 
youth struggle and people's government. Moreover, both organisations were 
encouraged and.their work was closely monitored by the Jayaprakash Institute 
of Social Change, formerly the Institute of Social Change and Social Welfare, 
which as we have seen was established by JP in order to promote an 
examination of the problems of social change from the perspectives provided by 
Gandhi and his sympathisers. Therefore, IMSE and SAREEK provided a 
useful comparison to the study of CYSV, NBJK and Lok Samiti. 
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II. 	CYSV 
Some reference has been made to the history of the CYSV, its background and 
philosophy. It was formed in 1974 at the initiative of JP who believed that 
young people's potential was being wasted as they appeared to be faced with 
only two choices. On the one hand they could succumb to Mrs Gandhi's 
regime, which JP argued would make them into sycophants and cowards, 
bowing down to an order of corruption. 2 
Their other option appeared to be Naxalism. The Naxalites clearly 
demonstrated the great potential of the youth as many able young people 
committed, even sacrificed, their lives to the Naxalite cause. Consequently JP 
was concerned that the energies of the youth be harnessed in a constructive 
manner, along an alternative path. Naturally such a course required 
organisation and direction. This was demonstrated by the failure of the Gujarati 
students who had begun a struggle against corruption in government in 1973 
but whose movement had lacked organisation and had come to an end. 3 
So when the Bihari students began to agitate JP called on them to organise in 
the name of 'Youth for Democracy',4 for youth power, he argued, could 
"play a decisive role in establishing the primacy of the people and securing their 
victory over the power of money, falsehood and brute force". 5 The students 
appeared to be aware of the fundamental problems from which society suffered 
2 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Future", 27.6.1976, interview with 
Brahmanand, reprinted in Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4, Total 
Revolution, ed Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Pralcashan, 1978), p.188. 
3 cf Ghanshyam Shah, Protest Movements in Two Indian States (Delhi: Ajanta 
Publications, 1977). 
4 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Youth for Democracy", Everyman's, 22.12.1973, reprinted in 
Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol. 4, 43 - 45. 
5 Ibid, p. 45. 
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and strongly desired the bringing about of basic social changes. Thus when 
they called on him for direction, he accepted their challenge and sought to 
provide the alternative path they wanted. However, during the course of the 
Bihar movement it became apparent to JP that there was no suitable 
organisation in existence. Thus he sought to establish one that would cater to 
the vast majority of non-partisan students and youth, providing them with the 
organisation and direction that they required. 
The organisation that he established was open to those between the ages of 14 - 
30 years. Members were required to commit themselves: to achieve the aim of 
"total revolution"; to rise above caste, creed and party; and not to accept 
membership of any political party. Their call was for a class struggle of the 
poor, bringing pressure to change on the upper class through non-violent 
means. 
JP had come to the belief that one could not simply rely on changing the heart 
of the rich. Rather if change was to be ensured, the rich had to be forced to 
change and it was the pressure of popular organisation which could force them. 
By generating political pressure, the people would serve as tools of the 
revolution. It was the Vahini's job to mobilise them towards this goal. The 
movement grew, very rapidly in the period immediately prior to the Emergency. 
However it was forced into a period of inactivity during the Emergency. 
The Vahini was relaunched on 1 May 1977 as a national organisation but the 
response was not as enthusiastic as that previously experienced. It was a time 
when democracy apparently had been restored and there did not seem to be any 
issue around which the youths could rally as there had in the period that led up 
to the Emergency. The youths needed direction and they had to decide upon a 
long-term strategy for their "total revolution". Like Vinoba they recognised 
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land as the central issue, believing that it had "the potential to shake the social 
system to its roots". 6 However, the Vahini's approach was not of gentle 
persuasion such as Vinoba pursued. Rather it was based on class struggle. 
The Vahini members maintained that those who worked the land, that is, the 
productive labour, should have rights over it. Thus they took up the cause of 
land redistribution and decided to approach the question by taking up situations 
that manifested gross injustice. The directness of their approach would seem to 
have been in keeping with JP's later ideas, particularly his ideas about the 
vanguard role of the youth. 
The Vahini began by concentrating its work in Bodh Gaya and aimed to force 
the redistribution of the Shankara Matt's surplus lands. The Matt was believed 
to be in possession of over 10,000 acres and this situation represented an ideal 
setting for their experiment. Indeed, the Matt's apparent possession of all this 
property presented a model of gross injustice that was symbolic of the feudal 
land relations through Bihar. The scale of the Matt's domination enabled the 
CYSV to concentrate their efforts on this one issue. They were able to mobilise 
many labourers for the one cause. Their task would have been much more 
difficult had the CYSV directed their attentions to a number of smaller landlords 
whose circumstances combined to present a situation of injustice on the scale of 
the Matt. Clearly to organise against a number of land-owners would make 
mobilising the people a much harder task. Perhaps issues would have been 
confused as different labourers working for different land-owners might have 
experienced different conditions; consequently they might not have been able to 
make the necessary linkages between their own and their peers' positions. So 
the Vahini focus . on the Matt appeared both morally and logistically sound. 
6 Manimala, "Zameen Kenkar? Jote Onkar", Manushi, (1983) vol. 3:2. 
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During the late 1970s the Vahini claimed a very high membership7 but by the 
late 1980s it was suggested that the number of active workers in Bihar was only 
between 50 and 100.8 However, the membership had been turning over 
continuously because of the age limit. Bihar remained the stronghold 
accounting for perhaps a quarter of the members. 9 
In fact there was no Vahini in West Bengal, although it formerly existed. It 
broke with the national body in 1979, and in 1980 it registered itself as a 
separate organisation, Sarbik Gram Bikash Kendra (Total Village Development 
Centre). The main reason for the split was an ideological difference as the 
youth in West Bengal did not agree with the approach that was being adopted 
by the Vahini. They thought that it necessarily provoked confrontation and this 
was not appropriate for a group committed to non-violence. It seemed to them 
that the Vahini had become preoccupied with directly challenging the existing 
order, wherever there was injustice, and that its priority was negative rather 
than positive, targeting against injustice and exploitation rather than striving for 
the uplift of the downtrodden. Consequently they saw this approach as almost 
one of hatred. The West Bengal branch's point was that non-violence was not 
just a matter of peaceful outward action but also of inward thought. However, 
the main body of the Vahini disagreed with the West Bengal branch. It 
regarded non-violence in terms of physical or outward action for it did not 
profess to be non-violent as a matter of spirituality but rather as a matter of 
strategy. 
7  Twenty thousand members in 1979 according to Kumar Shubamoorty, former national 
convenor of CYSV in an interview with Geoffrey Ostergaard, Patna, 7.1.1979, cited in 
Geoffrey Ostergaard, Non-violent Revolution in India, (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 
1985), p.294. 
8 Philip Eldridge and Nil Ratan, "Voluntary Organisations and Popular Movements in 
Bihar", Lokayan Bulletin 6:4 (1988), p.12. 
9 Kumar Schubamoorty, cited in Ostergaard, Non-violent Revolution, p.294. 
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On the other hand JP saw non-violence as a moral position. He understood 
that: "if the soul of non-violence is love, non-violent action, non-violent 
resistance or disobedience must be infused with love." Also he recognised that 
"this is not easy to practice " but he accepted it as an ideal to be practised, 
acknowledging that he had tried to practice it and had not found it easy to do 
so. 10 His desire was to change man as well as society for he wanted to create 
an order based on self restraint and self control, and so bring out the essential 
goodness of man. In this JP supported Gandhi's teaching that the means are 
the ends. Thus although JP encouraged the negative confrontationist strategies 
that the Vahini adopted, he had seen that as only one part of his non-violent 
"total revolution". It was not something that could be isolated. 
Nevertheless, even the interpretation of physical non-violence was questioned 
within the main body of the CYSV. The Vahini's conviction about the strategy 
of non-violence was based on the rationalised argument that violence 
concentrates power by its very nature. The members believed that violence 
would not bring about any fundamental change in the structure of society or in 
the moral values of the people, for whatever the situation the social order was 
maintained by forces of power. At the same time they believed that accepting 
non-violence meant accepting mutual responsibility for the ordering of society. 
It was up to each individual to take responsibility and by this sharing, power 
would be decentralised. By contrast, the former Vahini members in West 
Bengal tended to be committed more as a question of spirituality. They 
regarded love and truth as the essential components of non-violence and did not 
see the confrontationist methods used by the Vahini as having any role. This 
10 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Future." Exclusive interview with 
Brahmanand, 27.6.1976. Reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution vo1,4: 
Total Revolution, ed. Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Pralcashan, 1978), p.187. 
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concern with the truth at any one time is central to Gandhian philosophy. It is 
something for which JP seemed to strive despite his confrontation with the 
Governments of Bihar and India, for in joining the sarvodaya movement JP had 
not merely looked upon non-violence as a strategy. 
The West Bengal branch did not represent a large force but they were strong 
enough to break away from the CYSV and form the Sarbik Gram Bikash 
Kendra. The SGBK was still concerned with organising people to mobilise 
against injustice, taking up local and national struggles such as dowry, the 
Prime Minister's handloom and education policies. But it also directed its 
attention to popular mobilisation, undertaking relief work in times of disaster 
and engaging in constructive work with the establishment of kindergartens, 
support to cultural teams and forming cooperatives. 
The main body of CYSV maintained its policy of physical non-violence 
although even that was called into question, climaxing in 1985 when some 
members suggested retaliatory violence was acceptable. This line led to a major 
debate within the Vahini, with a confrontation taking place in August of that 
year. The moderates who were the majority in Bihar decided that retaliatory 
violence was not acceptable for as soon as any form of physical violence was 
allowed it was very difficult to draw any line of demarcation. Their argument 
continued: violence means power concentrated in the hands of those who hold 
the means of violence, for example, whoever has the most goondas and guns. 
So they concluded the power rivals are likely to seek more and more power 
while the struggle becomes more and more removed from the people. However 
the radical faction controlled the national organisation. There was no evidence 
that either militant or moderate Vahini members had been personally involved in 
any act of violence. 11 Nevertheless the clash resulted in a split with the 
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moderates being expelled. In spite of this the moderates continued their 
struggle for "total revolution", often in cooperation with the radicals. There 
seem to have been many cross currents and lines of division between the two 
factions have not been clear. 12 
The Vahini aimed, on the one hand, to develop a popular non-political pressure 
group for change; on the other it saw change in terms of a continuous or 
permanent revolution. As JP had explained, the point was that "everything in 
the world is changing ceaselessly". 13 JP had continued: change may be both 
conscious, for example, material changes or unconscious such as the human 
cycle of childhood to adulthood. The fact is, though, that nothing stays the 
same. Consequently JP cautioned that it was necessary to be aware of change 
for: 
change might be either revolutionary or reactionary. The motive force for 
changes of the former kind naturally comes from the deprived and 
underprivileged sections of society. The task of the revolutionary 
leadership is to channelise the revolutionary urges of the people and to 
give them direction, an objective and an ideal. 14 
Bearing in mind his advice, the Vahini sought not to become complacent about 
the goals that were achieved because the situations constantly change and 
therefore they had to be alert, working for popular pressure that was attuned to 
the needs of changing circumstances. These were their basic aims. In order to 
strive towards these basic aims the Vahini set itself some immediate goals, 
including: redistribution of land, an issue which is central to the agrarian class 
struggle; bringing women into society because any straggle for justice must 
11 cf Eldridge and Ratan, "Voluntary Organisations in Bihar," , p.15. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Future", p.187. 
14 Ibid. p.188. 
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involve the whole and not just the male half of the population; the removal of 
untouchability, the continuance of which serves to legitimise an unequal 
society; a relevant or appropriate education that was universal reaching 
everyone and also functional, preparing people for their role in society; and 
decentralised forces of production that enabled participation with the focus 
being on man not capital-intensive centralised industry in which the only part, if 
any, that man plays is wage labour, quite alienated from the industry for which 
he works. 
III. NBJK AND LOK SAMM 
JP regarded the CYSV as the vanguard of the revolution. He did not see it as 
representing the actual revolution nor did the Vahini hold itself out as such. 
Rather it was to provide leadership. Meanwhile, JP envisaged the real 
revolution occurring in the villages with the establishment of decentralise(' self-
government through people's government or people's committees, a concept 
that was embodied in the Lok Samiti movement which he launched in 1978. 
One organisation that took up this idea and actively promoted it, and sought to 
give concrete expression to its stated aims at the grass roots level was Nay 
Bharat Jagriti Kendra. 
Based in Hazaribagh district, Bihar, NBJK was established in 1971 with the 
object of aiming to achieve equality for all people based on a belief in 
fundamental rights. It believed that this could best be achieved in a Gandhian 
type of decentralised society. Initially NBJK aimed to promote this by adapting 
and implementing improved agricultural techniques to the local environment so 
as to boost the local economy and work towards releasing people from their 
multi-faceted dependence on land-owners cum moneylenders. These were low 
148 
technology type of projects and included levelling the land, irrigation and the 
promotion of plant varieties best suited to the region. 
Ostensibly NBJK was established along Gandhian ashram lines, and no meat 
or eggs were consumed there. However, Bahera Ashram really took the form 
of an institution based around its experimental farms and it developed contact 
with neighbouring villages. Workers such as a cook and farm labourers were 
employed to do much of the labouring work under the direction of the NBJK 
members, who supervised the farm projects and spent time seeking to convince 
villagers of the value of their work as well as seeking to remain abreast of 
current ideas in other rural development projects throughout India. NBJK did 
not present an absolute model for the future, arguing that many post-
independent Gandhian organisations had tried to develop models but had not 
succeeded. 15 In this it received the support of JP, who had just embarked on 
his intensive work in Musahari. 16 
As JP rethought his ideas, NBJK also underwent a rethink. Consequently its 
members came to put less and less emphasis on constructive work, which they 
had found hindered their overtures into the local communities as people came to 
regard NBJK as :  a welfare service organisation. The villagers were not 
interested in NBJK's ideas beyond the services being offered at any one time, 
such as the construction of a well. They were not interested in organisational 
work, that did not appear to be necessary to their condition. Consequently, 
NBJK downplayed its constructive work in favour of organisational work, and 
it came to regard the lok samiti concept as an integral part of its work. 
15 Satish Girja, Hon Secretary of NBJK, in an interview with myself at Bahera Ashram, 
3.10.1985. 
16 Supra, Chapter Two. 
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NBJK was attracted to Lok Samiti, partly perhaps because they both had links 
with JP but also because it thought it represented an important means to achieve 
popular participation and was quite distinct from the party structure. Lok 
Samiti was a national organisation that promoted village level committees, and 
as such it represented an important link between localised groups, strengthening 
them into a popular force. The national body kept the local committees aware 
of individual's rights and of the existence of relevant government schemes. 
Further it formulated policy with respect to various national problems. 
Meanwhile at the local level the lok samitis were responsible for the direction of 
their respective village development, for the implementation of national policy, 
for sharing their ideas, and for taking problems that they may have had to a 
higher level within the national organisation. 
Lok Samiti aimed to remain aloof from party politics and its guidelines 
suggested that party office holders ought not be members of Lok Samiti. 
Ordinary party members could be members of Lok Samiti but they could not be 
convenors or office holders, nor could they represent the people's committees 
at higher levels. These guidelines were specifically laid down to prevent any 
party political attempts to control Lok Samiti. 17 This did not mean that Lok 
Samiti was supposed to be apolitical. JP envisaged the lok samitis being 
involved in the choosing and supporting of their own people's candidates and 
representatives, and then acting as watchdogs over whoever was elected. This 
watchdog role involved asking questions, checking on whether work had been 
done, meeting with local members regularly as well as assisting the 
representative in whatever way they could. 18 NBJK recognised Lok Samiti as 
an organisation through which local bodies could become an integral part of the 
democratic structure that JP originally envisaged. 19 
17 Narayan Desai (ed) Guidelines for People's Committee, (Varanasi: Sarva Seva Sangh, 
1978), p.3. 
18 Ibid, pp.35 - 36. 
150 
NBJK became involved with Lok Sami i but this move also seemed to 
precipitate a split in NBJK leading to the development, in 1981 - 1982 of a rival 
organisation, Jan Jagaran Kendra. The immediate reason for the split involved 
the Lok Samiti's (and NBJK's) alleged support for Jaswant Singh, a Janata 
Party candidate, in the 1980 General Election. This was viewed with concern 
by some active members of NBJK's lok samitis, who thought that given 
NBJK's association with Lok Samiti, it should remain aloof from politics. It 
will be recalled that JP's views on the matter seemed somewhat ambiva1ent.20 
On the one hand he acted as the catalyst to the very formation of the Janata or 
people's party and he actively spearheaded its election campaign in 1977. On 
the other hand he was against the involvement of parties within the Lok Samiti, 
and yet he supported the notion of people's candidates who would compete 
with party candidates at election time. Jaswant Singh was not a people's 
candidate in the sense JP intended. He was a party candidate who apparently 
received support from NBJK. The resultant disagreement and dissatisfaction 
resulted in a split, out of which Jan Jagaran Kendra was formed. 
However this participation in the election would seem to have been only the 
immediate cause of the split. Underneath there seemed to be a rejection, by the 
Jan Jagaran, of JP's whole concept of Lok Samiti as it leaned more towards a 
Marxist philosophy. In particular it believed it could not reject violent means 
and it favoured 'active rather than passive resistance. Jan Jagaran formed its 
own popular organisation, Mazdoor Kisan Morcha,  in place of Lok Samiti. 
The two groups rivalled each other for support although they seemed to come to 
an understanding that neither would operate in the other's local areas. 21 
19 Jayaprakash Narayan, "A Manifesto for Bihar", The Sunday Standard, 11.5.1975, 
reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol. 4:170. 
20 Supra, Chapter Two. 
21 Reported at the monthly meeting of NBJK's lok samiti workers, Bahera Ashram, 
IV. 	IMSE 
The Institute for Motivating Self Employment, IMSE, sought to become an 
organisation through which it could mobilise people towards a more just 
society. LMSE's founding members including Biplab Halim, the Director, had 
been active in the Naxalite movement during the late 1960s so their 
philosophical background was Maoist. They were imprisoned and tortured as a 
result of their part in the Naxalite movement. 22 During their imprisonment 
they were able to rethink their ideas and goals. 
Most commentators agree that the Naxalite movement failed primarily because 
of its inability to mobilise the masses. The IMSE founders realised that "the 
political struggle between CPI(ML) and CPI(M) degenerated into a tragic feud - 
a war of annihilation between the cadres and supporters of the two parties - a 
war that bewildered people and served only the interest of the ruling 
classes".23 So they were concerned to reassure the people and build bridges 
towards the establishment of a socialist state. The former Naxalites rationalised 
that it had been their approach and not their ideals that were wrong. 
Nevertheless, they maintained that the concept of a mass line was still valid, 
that is, a mass line developed by cultivating base areas in the countryside with a 
view to smashing the existing state structure, believing that social change could 
only come about as a result of the people's own liberating force. 
30.9.1985. 
22 Supra, Chapter One. 
23 Prabhat Jan, "An Appraisal", Samar Sen, Debabrata Panda, Ashish Lahire (joint editors), 
Naxalbari and After, vol. 2 (Calcutta: Kathashilpa, 1978), p.124. Prabhat Jan was a writer for 
Frontier during the Naxalite movement. This Calcutta-based paper was sympathetic to the 
Naxalite movement in so far as it expressed a resurgence of political activity reacting against 
the lethargy or cowardice of the Marxist parties. Frontier saw hope for the young and poor 
through the Naxalite movement which showed promise that the system could be overturned. 
Nevertheless it was critical of ill-conceived Naxalite strategies. 
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However the means had to be reviewed and it was deemed that violent means 
were not appropriate. After all, violence had been the strategy employed by the 
Naxalites and had achieved poor results. People had been frightened by 
Naxalite terrorist activities and consequently had not supported them. At the 
same, time the Naxalite violence invited government suppression, which, in the 
absence of any popular support for the Naxalite cause, was able to crush their 
activities. Therefore the former terrorists concluded that the solution lay in 
non-violent means, at least for the present. This required building up a strong 
mass base and it was decided that this could best be done by developing a 
strong organisation to unite the people to the revolutionary movement and by 
promoting economic conditions for self-reliance. Without a strong organisation 
the peasant masses would remain weak and disunited. However, IMSE 
recognised Mao's point that unless the masses "are conscious and willing, any 
kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality 
and will fail".24 
The chief objective of the ex-Naxalite cadres was the promotion of self-reliance. 
They saw self-reliance, as Mao had done, in political, economic and social 
terms.25 On the political level they hoped to develop an independent thinking 
by local people as to their current plight and ideas on how to overcome their 
situation and just what they hoped to achieve. Having stimulated people's 
consciousness IMSE hoped they would go further and organise themselves 
towards the realisation of these goals. Many of the people with whom they 
worked had not enjoyed this independence of thought. Decisions determining 
their future tended to be made by the local land-owners or moneylenders to 
whom they were indebted. They had no effective organisation amongst 
24 Mao Tse-Tung, "The United Front in Cultural Work", 30.10.1944, Mao Tse-Tung, 
Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 3, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p.119. 
25 Supra, Chapter One. 
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themselves. By freeing their minds from dependence on the local moneylender, 
IMSE hoped people would free themselves economically by pooling their 
resources, generating self-employment and developing and investing in their 
own credit unions and cooperatives. By these means a measure of 
independence from moneylenders was built up as well as generating a sense of 
self-confidence that exploitative social forces could be defeated. Moreover, in 
becoming self-reliant, people would themselves begin to take steps towards 
liberation for social change and a new consciousness could be engendered. 
IMSE was influenced by the work of Paulo Freire who was involved in adult 
education programmes in South America for a number of years before taking up 
the post of education consultant to the office of education of the World Council 
of Churches in Geneva. 26 Freire viewed the pedagogy of the oppressed as 
humanitarian and libertarian for he saw the poor as dehumanised by the 
oppression they suffered and dependent upon their oppressors, economically 
and emotionally. He began by recognising and understanding the 
characteristics of the poor, in particular their total lack of confidence in 
themselves. Therefore, first there was a need to deal with the consciousness of 
the oppressed. In doing this it was necessary to recognise their dependence and 
seek to transform it into independence. He believed that this was to be achieved 
by determining a process of reflection and action with the oppressed. In this 
way the oppressed could reflect on the causes of their oppression, confront the 
reality critically and act upon that reality struggling for liberation. 
Freire saw reflection as essential to action, maintaining that the more people 
unveiled the reality, the more critically they would enter that reality and seek to 
activate change. Their perception of oppression would change as they realised: 
that struggle goes beyond simply having more to eat; and that they must be 
26 Interview with Biplab Halim at Bolpur Guest House 28.1.85. 
cf Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed  (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). 
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responsible for any struggle to develop a new structure. This he thought could 
be achieved only through dialogue and a process of reflection and action. 
Freire's pedagogy involved not simply participation but committed 
involvement, and he spoke of co-intentional education, that is both teachers and 
students intent on reality, somewhat like JP's idea of a continuous "total 
revolution" to achieve "both internal and external change, changing the entire 
social frame from within and also from the outside, individuals as well as 
institutions". 27 JP had envisaged changing both the oppressors and the 
oppressed. Similarly Freire maintained that the oppressors could be converted, 
but he warned that conversion involves a constant re-examination of oneself 
and it does not allow for ambiguous behaviour. He demanded that converts no 
longer remain as they had been but that they become comrades with the 
oppressed. This contrasts with Vinoba's sulabh gramdan approach which 
called for a theoretical commitment to change but did not require any practical 
change in lifestyle. 
IMSE did not have a concrete model of an alternative future but by drawing on 
Mao's and Freire's ideas IMSE hoped to popularly mobilise the development of 
a society that functioned outside the modern idiom's formal state structure, 
presenting an alternative economy based largely on agriculture and small 
industries. Thus an environment would be created in which radical social and 
economic change could occur. It was envisaged that this would take the form 
of Maoist type base areas that would be as independent as possible from the 
cities which these Maoist-schooled former terrorists saw as being controlled by 
the apparent class enemy. 
27 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Why Total Revolution", Everyman's, 22.12.1979, reprinted in 
Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4: 117. 
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On their release from prison the ex-Naxalites found that they were ostracised 
from society. Consequently they were not able to find jobs and so did not have 
any means by which to support themselves, let alone continue their struggle. 
Thus they decided to find their own employment. With the encouragement of a 
number of important figures, in particular JP and the academic staff of the 
Institute of Social Change and Social Welfare, and Pannalal Dasgupta, they 
were able to establish a self-employment agency. JP had been attracted to 
Marxist violence in his youth and he appreciated the feelings of the young 
Naxalites and admired their commitment and self-sacrifice, even though he now 
disagreed with their methods. So when these Bengali youths appeared to 
forego terrorism JP sought to direct their efforts in a constructive fashion. The 
Institute of Social Change and Social Welfare had strong links with JP and 
shared his concern. Much of its initial work centred on the problems of the 
Naxalite movement as well as efforts to develop a new concept of development 
based on the principles and practices of non-violence. IMSE leader, Biplab 
Halim, suggested that perhaps they thought 
these naxalite young people are no waste to us and society, they are 
essentially dreamers who like their forefathers want to build up a society 
where men will not be exploited by men, where social justice will rule. 
The methods used by these young people might have been wrong and 
many of them have now well realised it. So let us extend out helping 
hands to these young fellows who are going to serve the rural poor. 28 
It is likely that Pannalal Dasgupta thought along similar lines. Pannalal 
Dasgupta was a Bengali who was committed to a violent overthrow, firstly of 
the colonial government and then the Congress government. Later he modified 
his approach. He was a founding member of the Revolutionary Communist 
Party of India (RCPI), one of Calcutta's numerous small Marxist left political 
28 Biplab Halim, "IMSE stands for a Radical Social Change", IMSE '81, Calcutta: IMSE, 
1981), p.15. 
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groups. In 1948 he attempted to create a base area for communist guerilla 
activities in North Calcutta but he was arrested and imprisoned for 14 years. 
After his release in 1962 he took up rural development in a more peaceful and 
orthodox manner and he worked in the Birbhum district. Then in 1969 he 
stood for election and was elected to the State Legislative Assembly. However 
that time was a very unsettled period in West Bengal's parliamentary history 
and when the assembly was dissolved Pannalal Dasgupta chose not to re-enter 
the political sphere but to devote the rest of his life to the Tagore Society for 
Rural Change. 
The Tagore Society for Rural Change was inspired by Rabindranath Tagore 
who had been a prominent Indian writer and thinker during the nationalist 
struggle. Tagore had held that swaraj was something that had to be found in 
the mind, winning humanity for all humanity. 29 Thus he was anxious to 
promote liberation and improvement of people's minds, believing that freedom 
would be achieved only by the awakening of each individual's conscience. He 
saw this as necessitating an economic and cultural renaissance in rural India 
synthesising Western practicality and Eastern spirituality and believed that 
agricultural methods, health programmes and the revival of village crafts and 
culture would play an important part. Education was fundamental to the 
development of the individual, believing that if an individual was denied 
education then that person was crippled being unable to enjoy the benefits of 
civilisation. Tagore undertook a number of experiments in education. 3° His 
29 Rabindranath Tagore in a letter to Mr Montagu, Secretary of State for India in the British 
Cabinet, 6.4.1918. Reprinted in Krishna ICripalani, Rabindranath Tagore. a Biograpgy  
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p.264. 
30 In particular: Santiniketan, a boy's residential school in Bolpur where the boys undertook 
a large measure of responsibility in meeting the daily requirements of both their individual and 
community life, such as washing, cooking and cleaning, and where classes were held outside 
and conducted in the boys' mother tongue, Bengali, and gardening, dance and drama were 
important features of the curriculum; Visva Bharati was an international university that also 
emphasised cooperation and self-government; cf Santiniketan The Bolpur School of 
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experiments in education aimed at incorporating the merit of modernity and the 
scientific and technical aspects of education with the universality of spirit. 
Further he emphasised self-government and self-education within the schools. 
He believed that the aim of education should be to develop complete manhood 
such that each individual was liberated from ignorance, superstition, poverty, 
poverty of the 'mind and from narrowness. Underlying all this were three 
fundamental principles; that is freedom, fullness or inclusiveness, and vastness 
or universalisation. Tagore expanded his concept of education beyond that of 
any single institution to the much broader idea of Sriniketan, which 
encompassed all his basic ideas on education but operated within the actual 
villages emphasising agriculture and rural industries, but also included health 
and sanitation aiming to win the confidence of the villagers so that rural 
problems could be studied and research experiments could be conducted for 
their solution. Then the knowledge gained could be passed back to the villages 
so as to move towards a joint cooperative basis of all round regeneration of 
rural life. 
The chief goal of the Tagore Society was to continue the Sriniketan idea. Its 
work included building small farmer cooperatives and consolidating small 
holdings. Such moves had important implications with regard to the level of 
consciousness of the peasants involved for it assumed a certain measure of 
responsibility on the part of each individual member for the ordering of his own 
life and that of the community. In addition to the high degree of mental self-
sufficiency suggested, cooperatives contribute to economic self-reliance by 
Rabindranath Tagore (London: MacMillan & Co, 1917). In these education experiments 
Tagore stressed the use of the immediate environment including the use of the mother tongue 
in order to facilitate the assimilation of knowledge for oneself. Tagore regarded the medium of 
a foreign language as inhibiting the understanding of the indigenous civilisation for he 
explained that alien languages had hardly any connection with the reality of daily life. He 
used songs, drama and dance to encourage students' expression. 
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facilitating the acquisition of bank loans, seeds, fertilisers and the establishment 
of electricity, irrigation facilities and cold storage plants. Pannalal Dasgupta 
travelled through Bengali villages seeking to convince poor peasants that 
cooperatives could help them to move above their poverty. 
Pannalal's actions supported M N Roy's shift away from Marxist dogmatism 
towards the idea of educating the masses towards their own independent 
thought and actions. Roy's orthodox Marxist experience though had been with 
the CPSU. On the other hand, Dasgupta was influenced by Mao and the 
experience of the CCP, which also rejected Soviet dogmatism. Mao had 
adapted Marxism to the Chinese situation and he had placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the role of the peasant, which was particularly significant in the 
largely rural Indian situation. The Naxalites also were influenced by Mao. 
Thus there was quite a strong affinity between them and Pannalal. No doubt 
this contributed to Pannalal's encouragement of the former Naxalites as well as 
making it easier for the ex-Naxalites to accept his support and with it that of JP 
and the Institute. Thus it was that the demoralised, ostracised ex-Naxalites 
were encouraged to begin their new work. Moreover, this type of support 
served to discourage any potential moves by the state or other forces to 
dismantle the emerging movement which soon grew beyond its initial self-
employment agency to become an increasingly mass-based village level 
organisation. 
All IMSE members were expected to be active members working towards 
strengthening the movement in much the way that Mao advocated that all 
communists had a duty to play an active part in building up the communist 
party. 31 There was no ceiling on who could join IMSE but it was expected 
31 Supra, Chapter One. 
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that middle class members effectively declassed themselves and did not 
compromise their membership of 1MSE by exploiting workers etc. This is very 
similar to JP's idea that the middle and rich peasants limit their profit margins 
and consumption patterns. 32 
As an organisation IMSE affiliated with AVARD and it was instrumental in 
establishing a Rural Press Agency. 33 Thus it developed a strong 
organisational structure that supported and strengthened its continuance, with 
committees at the village, block and district level, implementing WISE policy 
and contributing to IMSE policy. 
So IMSE's ideas were not rooted in those of JP although they had been 
associated with him and JP initiated organisations, in particular the Institute of 
Social Change and Social Welfare, and AVARD. IMSE's ideas more likely 
represented an extension of its Naxalite philosophy which was based on Mao's 
teachings. Nevertheless many of its concepts were not inconsistent with those 
held by JP such as its emphasis on developing local resources while at the same 
time cooperating and sharing ideas and experiences, enabling it to deepen its 
knowledge and understanding of other like-minded organisations and of rural 
India generally. 
V. 	SAREEK 
Like IMSE, SAREEK, which stands for the Society for Rural Economy, 
Education and Kultur and means "partners" in Bengali, also began by wanting 
to present an alternative to Naxalism. The idea behind SAREEK's formation 
was a cumulative process. During the late 1960s and early 1970s quite a 
32 Supra, Chapter Two. 
33 That is, a committee that has been formed to network rural newspapers in order to 
facilitate the dissemination of news and ideas. 
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number of Calcutta-based youths, many of whom were Christian, became 
concerned with the problems of poverty and rural development on the one 
hand, and with the rise of the Naxalites and such groups as the Jharkand tribal 
separatist movement on the other. They became involved in organising work 
camps, undertaking such activities as building roads or putting on cultural 
programmes that emphasised popular action. However, their work was fairly 
sporadic. Meanwhile the government and the large international institutions 
sponsored large-scale development projects such as building canals or, more 
dramatically, the Green Revolution. It became apparent to these youths that 
such programmes were not providing the necessary solution. They also 
realised that if they were to achieve anything constructive themselves then they 
would have to systematise and consolidate their work. This led to considerable 
rethinking and determination to find new strategies. 
It roused the interest of other established groups, in particular the William 
Carey Study and Research Centre, Calcutta, which gave a small fund for 
organising a series of seminars to discuss the issues. It was from these 
workshops that the concept of SAREEK emerged and was eventually 
established in 1978 with some financial support from Bread for the World. 
SAREEK had strong links with Christian organisations such as the Christian 
Institute for the Study of Religion (CISRS) and the National Christian Council 
of India although it was not a Christian organisation. Its first director, Sanjeev 
Sarkar, had been the regional secretary for CISRS. Those involved with 
SAREEK did not hold to any particular philosophical tradition such as Maoism 
or Gandhism but they seemed to be continuing the liberalism advocated by such 
Bengali thinkers as Rabindranath Tagore and Ram Mohan Roy. 34 They 
regarded movements such as Gandhi's nationalist movement and Martin Luther 
34 Supra, Chapter One and this chapter. 
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King's civil rights movement as paradigmatic and were concerned to find an 
alternative society based on non-violent struggle.35 
SAREEK and the JP-based Institute of Social Change and Social Welfare 
which was also anxious to promote new theories and practices, shared a mutual 
interest in each other's work. One of the Institute's programmes was to 
undertake an evaluation of voluntary organisations and in doing this it paid 
special attention to SAREEK. 36 Also SAREEK workers undertook a job 
training course with the Institute in June 1983 on methods of working with 
poor people. Thus SAREEK enjoyed an indirect contact with JP's philosophy. 
When it was established, SAREEK basically consisted of a Calcutta 
headquarters group which established contact with youth groups in rural areas 
encouraging them to undertake various development projects in their areas. 
SAREEK was to provide the groups with moral and some financial support as 
well as encouraging the formation of a coordinating committee within each area 
that it worked. Each youth group was to be represented on the respective 
committees and the committees' main task was to take up initiatives for 
development purposes within their areas. It was in this manner that SAREEK 
undertook its practical work. 
On the ideological side, SAREEK's analysis of the problems of injustice tended 
to be in Marxist terms, speaking of class enemies etc. However, its solution 
did not seem to be as clear cut. It was concerned to develop the powers of 
analysis by local people with respect to investment, employment, occupation, 
land-holding patterns and so forth so that it could be realised just who were the 
35 Sanjeev Sarlcar, Sugata Das Gupta, R K Bhattacharya, Interim Report on Activities and 
Programmes of SAREEK, September 1981, draft, c/- Jayaprakash Institute of Social Change, 
p. IV/3. 
36 See Saricar et al, Interim Report and Jayaprakash Institute of Social Change Report for 
Ihe Year 1980-1981 (Prof Sugata Dasgupta: Calcutta, 1981), p.4. 
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allies and who were the exploiters. The ultimate goal was to realise power for 
the powerless but the means were not very clear. It saw itself as adapting 
Maoist type guerilla strategies, though it did not accept violence as a practical 
means. From the Naxalite experience it was seen that violence alienated the 
masses and encouraged government suppression. Nevertheless, the Maoist 
idea of not confronting the total problem headlong but rather concentrating on 
developing base areas was regarded as viable. SAREEK sought to build up 
such base areas through locality based programmes, the use of indigenous 
cultural tools, training and educational work. 
In conscientising people, SAREEK's main thrust was to develop a basic 
science and technology awareness among the people in order to help them 
overcome various myths and prejudices influenced by fatalism, which inhibited 
their development and left them particularly vulnerable to exploitation. 
SAREEK maintained that through organisation the onus of social change could 
be transferred to the poor and the depressed communities. Moreover it was a 
means of crossing lines of religion, caste, clan and provincialism, enabling 
people to participate actively in every field of society. Further SAREEK 
believed that through this organisational work and resultant constructive activity 
a clearer vision for the future would emerge. 
Organisation in West Bengal is generally seen along party lines but SAREEK 
was concerned to promote a concept of class instead of party. Thus it opened 
the way for a new mode of politics, a mass politics, generating awareness 
amongst all people irrespective of creed, status or politics, that is, an awareness 
of each individual's responsibilities to and roles and rights within the wider 
community. 
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SAREEK never had any direct link with JP but the thinking behind it developed 
as a reaction to very similar conditions that JP faced when he realised that a new 
approach was necessary to reach the masses and counter the Naxalite 
movement. From the Naxalite movement JP was able to recognise the potential 
of the youth and he became determined to harness them towards constructive 
change, a change that could best be achieved through their own actions and 
decisions. This required a people's forum allowing for such discussion and 
decision-making. It would seem that a number of parallels can be drawn 
between the ideas of SAREEK and JP, for SAREEK too chose to concentrate 
on the youth as the main motivators for change and at the same time sought to 
establish some village organisation through which this change could be 
actualised, enabling the participation of all. It sought to woo the youth, interest 
them in understanding the plight of their communities and engender within them 
a caring attitude towards their communities so that they might direct their 
energies towards overcoming the prevailing injustices. This involved 
convincing, organising and involving the whole community, developing a 
participatory structure capable of responding to needs within the community, 
determining and resolving the grievances that affected the local and even wider 
communities. Thus SAREEK tried to combine the ideas of a yuva vahini and 
lok samiti. 
VI 	CONCLUSION 
The type of ideas that JP expressed within a voluntarist idiom would seem to 
have been relevant to the work of the four above mentioned organisations in 
their work to organise people, develop their consciousness and experiment 
towards a means for mobilising for popular revolutionary change. The CYSV 
and NBJK were directly linked with JP and they maintained that they were 
pursuing the path he had directed. On the other hand the driving force behind 
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IMSE was its founders' Marxist (and Maoist) experiences, from which it 
extracted a non-violent way. It was encouraged to pursue this road by JP and 
the Jayaprakash Institute of Social Change. Meanwhile the SAREEK founders 
had not been involved with Marxist forces but they were influenced by the 
Naxalites' sense of urgency. SAREEK understood the Naxalites' frustration 
with the prevailing injustices but it did not agree with their means. Thus 
SAREEK was anxious to explore alternative means of overcoming these 
problems. SAREEK also received support for its work from the Jayaprakash 
Institute, which maintained a close interest in the structure, activities and overall 
progress of both organisations. The study of the four organisations is 
continued in the next chapter which examines their structures and respective 
scope for democratic participation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
I. 	INTRODUCTION 
This chapter re-examines JP's ideas on organisational structure and democratic 
participation, then continues the examination of Lok Samiti with NBJK, 
CYSV, IMSE and SAREEK looking at their respective organisational 
structures. 
JP believed that power came through organisation both at the local and national 
levels and through cooperation with like-minded organisations in order to share 
knowledge. In so far as he sought to ensure effective working of the existing 
structure, he recognised the need for organisational structure, the basis of 
which was the Tok samiti, gram sabha or *anata sarkar. He sought to give 
concrete shape to this concept through the Lok Samiti, a national organisation 
which promoted village committees through which information could be 
disseminated, and which could be used to encourage, support and develop 
models of self-management. JP was concerned that everyone should participate 
in the democratic process and that the organisational structure should provide 
opportunity for this, breaking down societal barriers of caste, poverty, social 
status, illiteracy and gender. 
JP also envisaged some form of organisational structure for training motivators 
working along with Lok Samiti. He believed a revolutionary vanguard was 
important to lead the people, that is, committed supporters who could be 
166 
flexible in their movement. The vanguard needed constructive direction for its 
energy and the frustrations it felt in the current situation. Thus JP hoped to 
harness its strength towards leading people to a "total revolution". JP thought 
that students would be ideal for this leadership role for he saw them as 
discontent with the existing system and anxious for change. Furthermore, 
generally they were not tied down with family and business responsibilities so 
had time to devote to the movement. 
Organisational work requires finance both for maintenance of the infrastructure 
and for the activities undertaken by the organisations, although JP saw the 
youth cadres as being dependent on the people with whom they worked for 
their food and shelter. JP believed that as they had no family responsibilities 
their needs would not be great during the few years that they devoted to the 
movement. This approach was also likely to promote the development of a 
spirit of cooperation between the cadres and people, and amongst people 
themselves. Furthermore, JP hoped that everyone could be independent and 
mobilise their own resources especially through the use of man power and by 
making use of local materials. Villagers could contribute towards a gram kosh, 
establish grain banks and other cooperatives. They could also be made aware 
and take advantage of available government programmes, although he also 
hoped to reduce bureaucracy, leaving a corresponding portion of revenue to be 
decentralised. JP's emphasis was on local responsibility. 
II. LOK SAMM AND NBJK 
1. 	Structure 
The concept of Janata Sarkar or Lok Samiti was promoted by JP. On the one 
hand this organisation was intended to represent a national body capable of 
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disseminating information for the use of all local groups and of providing moral 
support and guidance for the same groups. On the other hand it was an attempt 
to provide an infrastructure through which the formation of village level 
committees was feasible, but it did not provide the actual structure of these 
groups. That was to be determined at local level. Basically the idea was that 
self-government would be advanced through understanding brought about by a 
full discussion of the issues involved at regular village meetings. 
Generally speaking, according to the Lok Samiti guidelines, anyone above the 
age of 18 years could be a member of a lok samiti including members of 
political parties. However, there were three conditions: office holders of 
political parties could not be members; anyone who was a member of a political 
party could not be a convenor or office holder of a lok samiti; and anyone who 
was a member of a political party could not be a representative of a lok samiti at 
higher levels. Thus it was hoped to prevent party politics from controlling the 
lok samitis and this view reflected JP's idea of lokniti.  
The organisation, Lok Samiti, worked from two levels, from top to bottom and 
bottom to top, operating at the village, panchayat (or in the cities at the 
neighbourhood and mohilla or ward), block, constituency, state and national 
levels. It did not lay down any organisational rules but rather presented a series 
of guidelines. 1 At the top end the functions were: to draw attention towards 
national problems; to study some specific problems; to help organise lok 
samitis at lower levels; to educate the people about the concept of lok samitis, 
and to bring out publications to publicise people's committees and training. 
One of the general organisational tasks of the national and state people's 
committees included preparing lists of those who were interested or wished to 
1 Narayan Desai (ed) Guidelines for People's Committees (Varanasi: Sarva Seva Sangh 
Pralcashan), 1978). 
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help organise lok samitis and to harness their energies. Nay Bharat Jagriti 
Kendra took on this responsibility in the district of Hazaribagh, Bihar, and 
neighbouring areas. 
In order to organise village and nanchayat level lok samitis the Lok Samiti 
guidelines suggested - choosing first to work in those villages where 
favourable conditions prevailed, and then working so as to create an appropriate 
atmosphere in which to call a general village meeting. It was advised that 
special efforts should be made to involve weaker sections of the community 
such as women, Harians and Adivasis. Bearing this in mind the guidelines 
further advised that special attention should be paid to the place and time when 
the meeting was to be held. Then, it warned, in publicising the concept of lok 
samiti, false expectations should not be raised and a realistic understanding 
needs to be conveyed. At the general meeting the villagers should be asked 
whether they would like to form a lok samiti now or later. If later, a time and a 
place should be fixed. 
The basic unit of Lok Samiti was the village people's committee. There could 
be a number of , separate committees within one village depending on its size. 
The size of the committee was dependent on the size of the village, usually from 
five to 15, with proper representations being given to Harijans, Adivasis, 
Muslims, women and youth. These members were to be selected at the public 
meeting by public consensus and a conscious effort was to be made to choose 
only people of integrity. The guidelines continued: each committee should 
have a convenor who was responsible for calling meetings and recording 
decisions; members should meet at least once a month; information about 
committee proceedings like income and expenditure should be given and plans 
made for the next programme, and meetings should not be organised like units 
of a political party. 
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The representatives and convenors of the village committees were to form the 
panchayat lok samiti with its members numbering from 11 - 15. This 
committee was to have one convenor. Then the representatives and convenors 
of the nanchayat formed the block lok satniti. So if there were 20 nanchayats in 
one block and each panchayat had formed its committee and each committee had 
five representatives, the number of block lok samitis would be ten. It could 
number up to 600. The representatives of the Panchavat PC were also to be 
members of the constituency level PC. 
NBJK which undertook this type of organisation, was registered under the 
Charitable Society Act 1860  in 1971. It began with a self-appointed governing 
body of seven , members and grew to eight, including six of the original 
members and two new members. The quorum for decision making by the 
governing body was five and the governing body had responsibility for 
financial questions. Every three years the positions of secretary, treasurer and 
president were changed by the governing body. NBJK established itself at an 
ashram at Bahera, near Chouparan. There it ran its office and an experimental 
farm. The ashram consisted of a fairly modest collection of buildings where the 
NBJK members and some of their families lived and worked. It also had a 
homeopathic clinic and a classroom where it conducted a school for local 
children. In addition there was a large barn-like room where it stored its motor 
cycle and held monthly meetings with its workers who usually were 
accommodated overnight. The ashram was connected to the main power line 
but generally there was no power. It had its own pump, used for irrigation 
purposes and water was carried by buckets to the buildings for domestic 
requirements. 
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2 . 	Participation 
The Lok Samiti guidelines were important but they were taken as guidelines 
rather than as rigid rules as NBJK workers sought to adapt the concept of lok 
samiti to local circumstances. Perhaps the biggest divergence was in 
representation and participation. The workers found it very difficult to 
implement the Lok Samiti ideals of proper representation in situations where the 
whole concept of lok samiti and the popular participation it entails was new. 
On the one hand, the socially dominant sectors of the society were reluctant and 
not used to sharing decision-making with everyone else. On the other hand, the 
socially weaker sectors, in particular the Hari' ans and the women, found 
themselves inhibited by such organisations. 
With regard to the Hari•ans, NBJK workers sought to overcome their 
inhibitions by establishing separate organisations in specifically Harijan  
communities where the Harijan community was more than one kilometer from 
the village proper. This separate, and perhaps sheltered participatory 
experience, did not seem to reflect the true spirit of Lok Samiti. Nevertheless, 
the NBJK workers' argument in favour of these separate organisations was that 
it was important to ensure that the Hari'ans experienced the kind of participation 
afforded by the local samitis, for these committees played an important role 
within the Harijan communities developing a sense of responsibility and 
solidarity. They hoped that eventually the Harijans would develop the 
confidence to participate actively in the wider community. Meanwhile they also 
hoped that the wider community would come to accept such participation, 
recognising parallels between all forms of social and economic exploitation 
perpetrated at different levels of society. There are difficulties with this 
argument, the main one being that the promotion of separate organisation 
effectively promotes a separate identity and thus exacerbates and perpetuates the 
problem. 
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Certainly the Indian constitutional experience would seem to confirm the idea 
that the problem is exacerbated and perpetuated by separate arrangements. The 
Indian Constitution sought to resolve the backwardness of a number of 
communities, in particular the Hari'ans and Tribals, by scheduling them within 
the Constitution and reserving for them so many seats within the parliament, so 
many civil service posts and so many places within educational institutions etc. 
In addition, successive governments of India - and the various states - made 
special grants available to certain sectors of society, ostensibly to give them a 
chance and enable them to overcome their backwardness and compete within 
the larger community. However, constitutional attempts to compensate for 
historical injustices resulted in creating new suspicions and resentments. The 
flood gates to the welfare booty opened up as other so-called 'backward' 
groups sought to stake a claim. These are groups who were not really so 
socially inferior within the caste system, but who perceived themselves as 
economically disadvantaged. This rush deepened social cleavages and 
effectively ensured that the Hari' ans remain just that - Harians or 
Untouchables. Moreover, it encouraged a communal style of politicising as 
caste-based factional politics were promoted amongst political elites who 
emerged from the Reserved communities. 2 
The whole system of Reservation seemed fated to perpetuate itself as it created 
vested interests as well as making the communities more conscious of their 
separate identities. Thus it seemed to defeat its purpose. 3 The fact is that the 
Hari' an problem is an emotional one caught up in a spirit of charity and piety 
and it really poses a dilemma for those involved in trying to overcome it. 
2 Supra, Chapter Two. 
3 cf: Chetakar Jha, "Reserved Representation", Seminar, 243 (1979): 29-30. 
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With regard to women, NBJK did not establish separate women's 
organisations. (Nor did the Constitution reserve special positions for women.) 
It was open to women to become involved with NBJK's lok samitis as indeed 
some did, but their participation rate was very poor. They felt inhibited; 
indeed, it appeared that they were actively discouraged by many men who felt 
that their prestige would be lowered if women were to realise their full potential 
within the lok samitis, and society as a whole. The NBJK workers were 
concerned at the low level of female involvement. However, they believed that 
the women were making progress and that basically this was due to the 
operation of lok samiti, which they claimed increased general awareness within 
the community. 
To some extent there may have been a relaxation of social barriers imposed by 
men but, more particularly, women became aware of things that they could do 
to improve their situation and that of their families. For example, they could go 
to the Block Development Office and apply for loans to finance small economic 
projects that would not only boost their morale and living standard, but also 
give them some financial independence, and consequently social independence 
from their menfolk. Furthermore, women tended to play a predominant role in 
protests organised by the lok samitis against such issues as local corruption, for 
example, health workers who refused to give treatment unless they received 
some extra consideration. The women perceived many such issues as affecting 
the welfare of their families and as such they could identify with the problems 
and were willing to take an active role in working to overcome them. The 
NBJK workers believed that this type of involvement was giving the women 
confidence to speak out within the lok samitis and they hoped that the men were 
beginning to respect the women's views.4 Nevertheless the participation of 
women was poor and it presented a problem if NBJK and the lok samitis were 
going to achieve JP's "total revolution". 
4 Interviews with NBJK workers, Bahera Ashram, 1.10.1985. 
3 . 	Field Workers 
NBJK's work was carried out by its field workers whose main task was to 
organise the villagers to form lok samitis. The workers who were recruited by 
NBJK were already motivated and conscious. Usually they were not local to 
their field work areas but they shared NBJK's belief in basic grass roots 
organisation and were committed to the sort of community organisation work 
that NBJK was undertaking. 5 Generally they had some experience in 
community organisation and enjoyed extensive links with other organisations. 
A number of the NBJK workers were formerly involved in and arrested during 
the JP movement. After they were released many were unable to find jobs until 
they were recruited by NBJK in the post-Emergency period. Workers were 
often recruited through contacts made at seminars on social organisation and 
related development issues. Then perhaps they were invited for two or three 
months training with NBJK after which they might be recruited. Most of the 
workers were male from a poor to middle class background. Generally they 
had attained a high level of formal education; some were graduates and the 
majority had matriculated. 6 Education was seen as important in enabling 
them to communicate adequately with government officials. 
In establishing the lok sami is NBJK field workers generally began by setting 
up an office near the headquarters of the block in which they were working. 
This was basically for convenience; however, they frequently worked in the 
5 This does not necessarily mean that they are all committed in the long term. 
For example, one worker is a former Naxalite who believes that when the time is 
ripe, then violence will be the correct strategy. Interview with NBJK field workers, 
1.10.1985, Bahera Ashram. 
6 Interview with NBJK secretary, Prabhunath Sharma, Bahera Ashram, 
2.10.1985. 
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villages, staying overnight. Apparently, evenings were the most convenient 
time for the villagers, for it was the time when those who worked in the fields 
came home. Then the NBJK workers organised meetings, surveyed and 
discussed problems, and worked out a strategy to deal with the situation. Their 
main role was to motivate and activate distressed people, encouraging them to 
find out their own solutions to the problems they faced, starting by establishing 
their own lok samitis, which provided a forum in which issues could be raised 
and discussed, responsibility accepted and action taken. 
Of course, there were many problems and frustrations that the NBJK workers 
had to face. Thus NBJK sought to provide them with moral support to help 
them work through any particular difficulties they might face, not to mention 
help them work through the whole of the task that they had undertaken. NBJK 
kept itself and its workers abreast of workshops and conferences on relevant 
subjects. In addition NBJK usually organised two training camps a year to 
which different workers were invited to attend to share in the group discussion 
and ideological action. 
Also, the workers all met together monthly at Bahera Ashram to discuss and 
evaluate the work for the past month. This served as a morale booster and an 
invaluable sounding board from which good advice could emanate. These 
monthly meetings helped both NBJK and the workers keep in touch and thus 
appreciate each others' positions. Indeed NBJK recognised that it was an 
institutional establishment and represented a hierarchy. As a consequence, 
misunderstandings sometimes arose, particularly with regard to the village-level 
workers whose problems were not always understood. Generally these 
workers stayed with NBJK and there was not been a high turnover which 
suggested that they were happy and committed to their work. Certainly they 
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did not remain for the financial rewards as they were paid only a subsistence 
allowance, although they sometimes received additional benefits such as 
medical care. 
There were 32 full-time workers in addition to about 200 part-timers.7 In 
Hazaribagh district NBJK worked in 500 villages over 13 blocks with two or 
three workers in each block.8 Outside Hazaribagh it worked in about 300- 
400 villages over 12 blocks. 9 However, it only had one full-time worker or 
perhaps only part-time workers active in these blocks. There were no full-time 
female workers, although three or four had worked with NBJK in the past. 
The main reason for their poor participation seemed to be competing domestic 
commitments and resultant social pressures. Meanwhile, about 10% of the 
part-time workers were female. 
4 . 	Funding 
All this work required funding which proved to be an important and 
controversial issue. NBJK received foreign funding for some of its 
development projects. JP was not in favour of receiving outside funding for 
lok samitis, which he wanted to be self-reliant. Thus in so far as NBJK 
purported to support JP's ideas it needed to rationalise its use of foreign 
funding in accordance with JP's views. NBJK decided not to aid the lok 
samitis directly. They were required to raise their own finances which they did 
through membership subscriptions, establishing village funds and grain banks. 
Also NBJK encouraged them to tap into government sponsored programmes 
which provided finance for projects such as building wells or training schemes. 
7 Interview with NBJK secretary, Prabhunath Sharma, Bahera Ashram, 
2.10.1985. 
8 Interview with NBJK president, Satish Girija, Bahera Ashram, 3.10.1985. 
9 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless the lok samitis received indirect foreign funding through the 
support they received from the NBJK workers who acted as both the initiators 
and motivators of these lok samitis. It is not clear whether this conflicted with 
JP's belief that village committees should be independent and mobilise their 
own resources. JP did not appear to have thought in terms of motivators who 
are salaried from outside the communities with which they work. He thought 
they should be dependent on the local community. NBJK's approach was not 
likely to facilitate the same level of understanding between people and workers, 
and there was always a danger that while the workers were externally funded 
the lok samitis might take their work for granted and become dependent on their 
continued presence. However, the workers regarded themselves and the Lok 
samitis as independent from each other. They believed that the important point 
was that the community worked for itself, for the workers saw that as lasting, 
while they regarded their own presence as temporary. 
For its part, Bahera Ashram was self-sufficient. Initially two of its members, 
both engineers, left Bahera in 1972 in order to earn some money to provide 
funding for the Institute. By 1981 they felt sufficiently confident to resign their 
posts and return to the ashram full-time. The self-sufficiency of the ashram 
covered the running costs of the ashram such as supporting the Institute's 
members and any workers who might have been employed there, as well as 
maintaining the motorcycle etc. 
However, it did not cover the projects or the payment of field workers. This 
funding came from two main sources. Firstly, the lok samitis contributed 
towards the actual work of NBJK, paying one rupee every year per member 
and contributing one to five kilograms of paddy per family at harvest time. 
This was in addition to the actual lok samiti subscription. The money that went 
to NBJK helped cover the expenses of local camps, block level meetings, mass 
demonstrations, poster and pamphlet publications etc. Meanwhile funding for 
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the field workers and for any other programmes that might be undertaken by 
NBJK, such as legal aid and education classes, had come mainly from overseas 
sources, in particular OXFAM, Community Aid Abroad and Bread for the 
World. NBJK was very conscious of its dependence on foreign aid and 
sometimes felt it was pressured in certain directions as foreign agencies may 
have had different ideas. Nevertheless NBJK also feared that if the money was 
stopped its work will be negatively affected. 
III. 	CYSV 
1 & 2. Structure and Participation 
The Vahini regarded itself as the vanguard of the JP proposed total revolution. 
It was an organisation of motivators and aimed to raise the consciousness and 
sense of responsibility of its members. It did not hold itself out as representing 
the "total revolution". JP had not conceived it as such. Instead that was 
represented by the Lok Samiti, which encouraged the Vahini to participate in its 
organisation at all levels. Meanwhile the Vahini organisation was restricted to 
serve the vanguard purpose, for example, membership was open only to those 
who were between the ages of 14 and 30 years, which was a time when many 
people were likely to have much energy and few responsibilities such as family; 
thus they were able to devote much time towards such work as the Vahini  
undertook. They had to pledge to achieve the aim of "total revolution", to rise 
above caste, creed and piety, and not to accept membership of any political 
party. 
The CYSV's organisational activities extended beyond the actual Vahini in so 
far as the members sought to mobilise the peasants into such groups as the 
Maaloor Kisan Samiti, that is, the Farmers' and Labourers' Committee, which 
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was active in Bodh Gaya. The Mazdoor Kisan Samiti took its lead from the 
CYSV but it was quite separate and many local youths who had been involved 
with CYSV could move into this organisation once they had turned 30 and were 
obliged to leave the Vahini. Nevertheless the fact was that the CYSV's 
organisational structure was oriented very much towards its limited 
membership. 
There were three levels of membership - primary, active and full-time. Greater 
committment was required from the active and fulltime members. The active 
members had to attend at least two training camps and give 45 days a year to 
intensive work. Full-timers were active members who devoted all their time to 
the cause. However all members had to subscribe to the "non-violent" 
philosophy in the spirit of "total revolution". As mentioned in the last chapter 
problems over the definition of "non-violence" actually led to a split in the 
organisation in , August 1985. The moderate faction was stronger in Bihar. 
However lines of division were not always clear cut, and informal cooperation 
occurred between the two factions. 10 
The Vahini membership 11 had a large turnover due to the self-imposed age 
limit. Past members often maintained links with the CYSV but they did not 
participate in the organisation. They could sympathise or lend it support, or 
they could take up their own intensive work. The point was that the Vahini was 
regarded as a training ground, giving youth a sense of direction. It was 
organised at the national level although a quarter of its members were in 
Bihar. 12 
10 cf Philip Eldridge and Nil Ratan, "Voluntary Organisations And Popular 
Movements in Bihar," Lokayan Bulletin 6 (1988):15. 
11 Supra, Chapter Five. 
12 Geoffrey Ostergaard in an interview with Kumar Shubamoorty, former 
national convenor in Patna, 26.9.1985. Geoffrey Ostergaard, Nonviolent 
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There were four tiers in its organisational structure. At the lowest level, basic 
committees were organised amongst students in their respective colleges or 
amongst youths 'at the ward level in their local areas. These committees elected 
a representative and a convenor, and similarly a block committee representative 
and a convenor represented these groups at the state level. The local 
committees took up local issues and also carried out state or national 
programmes such as demonstrating against government policies. Meanwhile 
the state committee was responsible for wider programmes such as Bodh Gaya. 
3 . 	Field Workers 
The State committee directed its active and full-time members in their work. 
Full-timers were likely to be required to work in one particular area, where they 
would be dependent for material support on the people with whom they 
worked. The thinking was that if the workers were doing good works then 
local support would come. This approach was supported by JP, and it 
facilitated the development of a rapport between - the cadres and villagers. 
However the state committee could also subsidise full-timers as regards 
additional expenses such as travelling. 
The CYSV workers differed from the NBJK workers because they were not 
looking at any lifetime commitment to their work within the CYSV. They were 
required to quit the organisation by the age of 30 years. Vahini workers tended 
to spend only between one and five years in full-time service, and this was at a 
time when they were young, energetic and with no additional responsibilities 
such as family. Their work was on-going but the idea was that younger people 
Revolution in India, (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1985), p.294. 
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would come up and take on the responsibility. Workers were continuously 
being drawn from a rising pool of energy, and questions of financial support 
and burn-out were not considered to be problems. They received moral support 
in the form of training camps and the help of active members or new full-
timers. 
4. 	Funding 
As mentioned CYSV workers were dependent for financial support on the 
communities with whom they lived. Nevertheless the CYS V faced other 
running expenses in the management of its organisation such as travel and 
communication. It would not accept foreign assistance. There were a number 
of reasons for this. Firstly, it regarded its work as revolutionary, moving 
towards an Indian revolution. So it did not want to be directed, or seen to be 
directed, in any way by any outside agency. In this regard, it was suspicious 
of overseas agencies and it was concerned not to be infiltrated by what it 
regarded as counter-revolutionary groups such as the CIA. Another reason was 
that it did not want its revolutionary work to be jeopardised by a sudden 
withdrawal of funding which was always a possibility with overseas agencies, 
either owing to the volition of the donor agencies or action by the Government 
of India. Nevertheless the extremity of this argument was another point of 
contention at the time the split occurred in the CYS V. 13 The moderates 
distinguished the Vahini's revolutionary work from work that might be 
undertaken by other organisations with which the CYSV or some of its 
members might be involved. They argued that the latter ought not be precluded 
from accepting foreign funding. 
13 cf Eldridge and Ratan, "Voluntary Organisations in Bihar," pp.14-15. 
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The Vahini relied on local donations but not if they came from commercial 
houses or represented known "black money" as this would be seen to 
compromise the Vahini's ideals. Commercial houses, after all, had a stake in 
the prevailing system, and "black money", by its very definition, was illegal. 
Consequently much of the CYSV's funding came from its members who 
worked outside the organisation, and may not have had a great deal of time to 
give to the CYSV but were willing to support those who did. Nevertheless, 
sometimes a shortage of funds meant it could not promote issues as effectively 
as it would have liked. 
IV. 	IMSE 
1 & 2. Structure and Participation 
The nature of IMSE was such that participation was very much an integral part 
of its structure as it sought to mobilise its members within its fold. It was 
registered under the Society's Registration Act (West Bengal) which gave it 
legitimacy within the existing state structure and presumably some protection 
from potentially unfavourable state forces as well as enabling it to apply for 
government grants to fund various projects. The Act required it to have a 
Board of Directors and IMSE enlisted the support of a number of influential 
persons such as Pannal Dasgupta who was Chairman. The Board maintained a 
fairly inactive role although its members had the potential for asserting 
themselves, at least in so far as IMSE represented a registered society. 
However, the actual working of IMSE went far beyond the formal constitution 
that it represented as a registered society. IMSE was organised very much like 
a political party. It had its own song and flag, and it demanded loyalty from its 
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members. There were several tiers to the organisation. From the lowest these 
were: village, cluster, area, district and central committee. There was no state 
level although there was a growing presence in Bihar and Orissa as well as in 
West Bengal. Whilst the emphasis was on decentralisation and apparently only 
a coordinating role was designated to the higher levels, the real situation was 
more a case of democratic centralism. Overall, policy direction came from the 
IMSE hierarchy. IMSE's organisation was different from JP's inverted 
pyramid of power. IMSE was working towards a socialist state, not self-
government, but it envisaged its socialist state occurring through a structure of 
responsible and conscious members who were prepared to contribute to the 
welfare of the state as a whole. 
The lower committees, which met at least once a week, were concerned with 
ongoing and continuing evaluation processes of their own work and of wider 
political and national issues. Meanwhile the district committees, which were 
attended also by the Director in his coordinating role over the whole 
organisation, took the major decisions especially on large projects where 
technical assistance was required or outside funding needed. They also served 
as planning and evaluating bodies. IMSE aimed to be responsive to its local 
groups. Policies were adapted to local circumstances, and guided involvement 
from the grass roots was encouraged through their participation in various 
projects and programmes at both the local and broader levels such as grain 
banks and long marches. The channels of communication between the local 
groups and the centre were open, both for the local groups to implement the 
centre's decisions and for the centre to understand the grass roots' needs and 
grass roots' reaction to its decisions. The decision-making process thus was 
designed to be democratic, although it tended to be somewhat centralised - 
ostensibly to censure coordination and expertise but above all to give direction. 
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IMSE had a number of employees, mainly technical staff, such as a driver and 
an accountant. They had to be sympathetic to the IMSE cause and were 
required to work under the guidance of the elected bodies at the base of which 
were the villages. At the village level were the IMSE members, about 10,000 
of them, who paid a nominal subscription of 25 paise per annum. 14 Only 
IMSE members could benefit from its programmes. There was no restriction 
on who could join but the members were expected to involve themselves in 
IMSE's work. Only about 30% of the members were women and their 
involvement significantly decreased further up the hierarchy. 15 IMSE 
presented no structural barriers towards the participation of women and other 
socially disadvantaged groups but their participation rate was poor. This was a 
fact of which the central committee was conscious and many of its activities 
were designed to promote greater participation. 
3 . 	Field Workers 
The village committee consisted of president, secretary and working committee 
members. The village secretaries were the representatives at the cluster level; 
and the cluster secretaries were recognised as full-time field workers, and thus 
received a subsistence allowance. However, they were not employed as such. 
Rather they were regarded as whole-timers. At the village level there were no 
paid whole-timers although the role of secretary tended to be very much one of 
whole-timer. The workers came from within its own ranks and were local to 
the communities they represented. 
14 Interview with the Director, Biblap Halim and District Secretary, Rabi 
Dasgupta, 28.1.1985, at their office cum guesthouse at Amar Kuter near Bolpur, 
Birbhum district. 
15 Ibid. 
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Leadership was emerging from the villages but Biblap Halim did not regard it 
as capable of taking up the coordinating role he fulfilled. He believed that this 
gap was due to a lack of experience and he realised that being older and having 
been involved with the Naxalite frontline he himself had that experience. 
Biblap's attitude was indicative of the extent to which IMSE aimed to assume 
the character of a mass movement. However, it also raised the question as to 
whether IMSE had clear goals and strategies to achieve these. Nevertheless, 
Biblap believed that time and continued involvement in IMSE's struggles would 
reduce that leadership gap. 16 
4 . 	Funding 
IMSE's funding sources included foreign and local donations, membership 
fees, whatever moneys could be raised locally, and government grants. With 
regard to village level projects IMSE tried to encourage the utilisation of local 
resources as far as possible, requiring the villagers to devise ways of making 
their own money through self-employment, the formation of cooperatives or by 
making applications to local government offices. The actual coordinating body 
of IMSE received donations from local and overseas sympathisers such as 
Bread for the World, Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid and 
Community Aid Abroad. These moneys were used in the general running of 
the organisation as well as for holding training seminars and camps; for 
example, those involved in the instruction of adult education. However, it was 
loathe to spend much of these funds at the village level for anything other than 
training purposes. 
Government funds, from both the central and state governments were 
channelled towards adult education, mother and child health programmes and 
for various training schemes with which IMSE was involved such as the 
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), khadi, leatherwork and 
16 Interview with Biblap Halim, 28.1.1985, Santali campus. 
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smokeless chullas. The question of whether or not to accept government 
funding was a subject of debate within IMSE. Its decision to accept was 
significant partly because it was a voluntary organisation working outside the 
government sphere but more particularly because of its Naxalite origins. 
Clearly the acceptance of government funds by any voluntary organisation can 
be seen as a compromise for such organisations have chosen to establish 
themselves independently of government. By accepting government grants 
IMSE was bound by certain ties laid down by the government, for example, the 
appointment of individuals employed in the training programmes and the 
selection of students. 
IMSE recognised that it could not match the resources that were available in 
government programmes, and that many government projects had the potential 
for considerable impact if they were implemented effectively. Therefore, IMSE 
regarded itself as having a responsibility to tap into such projects, partly to 
ensure their potential would be realised and partly to promote its own 
organisation. For example, with the mother and child health programmes this 
project was very important for ensuring primary health care and thus the 
physical well-being of the villagers. IMSE regarded this as important for 
humanitarian reasons and also recognised it as necessary if the people were 
going to be able to take on an increasing responsibility and actively work for 
their communities - perhaps through WISE but not necessarily. 
Moreover, in so far as IMSE was seen by the villagers to be concerned with 
their immediate welfare, the villagers were likely to be attracted to IMSE. It 
provided IMSE with an entry point to mobilise and organise the poor and 
generate awareness to demand quality services and accountability from the 
government, and it provided IMSE with a communication channel to ensure that ci 
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the government understood and responded to the needs of its citizens where it 
had the capacity to do so. From a JP perspective this approach was quite 
consistent. The JP Institute, for example, had undertaken a number of 
government sponsored programmes such as ICDS and anganwadi workers. 
In order to apply for funding from the central government IMSE had to apply 
through the state government. It did not feel entirely confident about having to 
rely on the West Bengal Left Front government with which its relations tended 
to be rather strained. For example, in 1985 IMSE's Calcutta office telephone 
was out of order for five months and no attempt was made to repair it in spite of 
frequent reminders by IMSE. Eventually IMSE filed a case in the High Court 
which ordered the telephone company to repair the phone. It was subsequently 
repaired. IMSE attributed the failure of the company to repair the phone 
beforehand to a deliberate ostracism policy on the part of the CPI(M) towards 
IMSE. 17 There was no doubt that the CPI(M) was antagonistic towards 
IMSE, which was identified by an article published in the CPI(M)'s journal, 
The Marxist, as an organisation involved in an imperialist strategy specifically 
aimed at undermining the CPI(M)'s work. 18 For the moment IMSE felt that it 
was strong enough to resist any government threat. Indeed it had received 
notice to quit a number of areas in West Bengal by the CPI(M) which was the 
major party in the state coalition government, but it had not budged, and 
because of its popular support in those areas the CPI(M) let it be. 
Nevertheless, IMSE's West Bengal district committee took a deliberate step to 
strengthen its position against the CPI(M) by moving into two other states, 
Bihar and Orissa. IMSE's registration in West Bengal under the state 
legislation, was valid on a national level and so in no way reduced its legitimacy 
17 Interview with Biblap Halim, 14 8.1985, IMSE Calcutta Office. 
18 Pralcash Karat, "Action Groups/Voluntary Organisations: A Factor in 
Imperialist Strategy", The Marxist, 2 (April - June, 1984): 19 - 54. 
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beyond the Bengali borders. The IMSE district committee chose two up-and-
coming young WISE members to go into Bihar and Orissa. Both of them were 
given the position of cluster secretary and they were effectively in charge of 
initiating IMSE operations in these states. While this movement into Bihar and 
Orissa expanded the organisation, it also consolidated its position as a voluntary 
organisation, giving it a national character, that was determined by its presence 
in three or more states. This being the case it could apply directly to the central 
government for central funding rather than being dependent on the West Bengal 
government. By moving into other states IMSE also aimed to strengthen its 
position against potential threats by any one state government. That it had done 
so was demonstrated in its High Court challenge against the Bihar state 
government. IMSE was given notice to quit Bihar by that state government but 
it resisted and took the case to the Bihar High Court. The ruling that ensued 
held that provided IMSE did nothing unlawful, it could not be dismissed. It 
was only because of the strong backing that it received from the West Bengal 
branch that it was able to take the firm stand against the Bihar government. 
However, it was not sufficiently confident to approach the Bihar or Orissa state 
governments for funding. 
Meanwhile IMSE secured further its relationship with the central government 
by accepting its appointment as Nodal Agency for West Bengal. The central 
government appointed one Nodal voluntary organisation in each state, under its 
Department of Rural Development. Nodal agencies were voluntary 
organisations whose role was basically one of liaison between the government 
and other voluntary organisations. They were provided for specifically under 
the Seventh Plan as an arrangement to identify and evaluate local organisations 
for assistance. The concept had been developed because of a concern at the 
failure of government poverty alleviation programmes to be implemented 
effectively. The idea was that the people, that is, the poor people who were the 
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intended beneficiaries of many of these government schemes, had to be made 
aware of the schemes and encouraged to participate in them; and it was the task 
of the Nodal agencies to ensure this happened. In undertaking this 
responsibility the Nodal agencies were supposed to select other voluntary 
organisations who would organise the beneficiaries for awareness building. 
For IMSE this meant training organisers from other voluntary organisations 
which IMSE selected as suitable participants. The organisers then would 
mobilise groups and run awareness generating camps, and of course follow up 
their work. 19 
The idea of nodal agencies was abandoned later as groups tended to ignore 
them and apply direct to Delhi for funds but the fact that IMSE was chosen was 
symbolically important. It further secured IMSE's position vis a vis the 
government's. IMSE's appointment suggested an appreciation by the central 
government of IMSE's credibility. However, given IMSE's background and 
its attitude towards the state structure it seemed surprising that the central 
government should have chosen it, giving rise to possible speculation about the 
government's motivation, particularly in view of the strained relations between 
the Union and Bengal governments. 
IMSE's role as Nodal Agency placed it in an invidious position as it involved 
further compromise with IMSE's ideology. IMSE rationalised its apparently 
reactionary position (from a Marxist view) of participating in government 
schemes because this course enabled it to have access to funds that it otherwise 
would not have had. Moreover it enabled it to influence the way in which those 
funds were used and ensured that they were not used for purposes that would 
19 "Workshop on 'Organisation of Beneficiaries", IMSE News Bulletin, VI 
(October-November 1986): 3 - 4. 
189 
counter its activities. However, participation in the Nodal agency scheme could 
have affected IMSE's future priorities particularly as regards challenging the 
state structure. 
V. 	SAREEK 
1. 	Structure 
The Society for the Advancement of Rural Economy, Education and Kultur was 
quite different to IMSE. It did not promote its own organisation. Instead it 
promoted local independent groups. Like IMSE, SAREEK was a registered 
body but unlike IMSE, SAREEK identified itself in terms of that official 
registered institution, that included the Board of Directors and the Calcutta 
headquarters group. Nevertheless, its organisational network extended beyond 
this structure; it operated in three project areas - Raidighi, Deula and 
Narayangarh - and encompassed local village organisations that were 
independent of SAREEK. SAREEK's role in this respect was one of a 
catalyst. 
The Board of Directors was the supreme decision-making body and it was 
theoretically responsible for all final policy directions regarding the annual 
budget, field organisation, training programmes and the appointment of the 
director who was charged effectively with the ultimate control of the 
organisation. The director, Indrajit Samanta, formed the headquarters group 
consisting of five members. Each worker had his own area of responsibility 
but they were all familiar with each other's work so that SAREEK was not 
dependent on any one person for a particular job. 
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Basically SAREEK was involved in working with local youth clubs. Each club 
had a stated list of aims and objectives towards achieving the uplift of the 
people. Some groups were registered in their own rights but not all had direct 
registration. Registration brought financial benefits in that the clubs could more 
effectively mobilise resources through local government for club purposes. 
While they remained unregistered the clubs could still mobilise some local 
government funds but not as a club. Rather, individuals applied for funding, 
from a scheme under which they were entitled to benefit. They could do this 
with the support or encouragement, or even at the initiative of the local club. A 
club's involvement would depend on the extent to which it perceived the 
community as benefitting; for example, a club might have regarded pisiculture 
as a desirable project and the local government might have offered a course in 
the same. Then maybe a local youth would show an interest in the course and a 
willingness to share any knowledge gained. In such a case, the club would 
support that person's application. The resources could be utilised effectively 
for the benefit of the community. 
Nevertheless the unregistered club was limited, but to become registered and 
remain registered required the drawing up of a memorandum of association, the 
completion of forms for the initial registration as well as the submission of 
annual returns. In these largely illiterate communities, club members often 
shied away from this type of responsibility. 
All the SAREEK associated clubs were affiliated to a coordinating committee in 
their respective areas, that is the Udyog Parishad. The term, Udyog Parishad 
(People's Initiative Committee) was coined by SAREEK but the actual 
committees were developed by the local groups in their respective areas, albeit 
at SAREEK's behest. SAREEK explained that it was not prepared to provide 
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funding or training to the clubs unless they organised themselves in a coherent 
manner such that they could responsibly plan, coordinate and review their 
activities. Each club had one representative on its respective Udyog Parishad. 
The Udyog Parishads met about once every two months and more often if there 
was pressing business such as during harvest time. They took the 
responsibility for the establishment of grain banks in their respective areas, for 
the work of community health workers and the direction of the new education 
centres and for new initiatives in the area. Very local issues would be dealt 
with by the local clubs but sometimes these required wider support especially if 
there were financial considerations. 
2 . 	Participation 
Originally SAREEK began with existing youth clubs whose primary functions 
were sporting and religious and SAREEK persuaded them to take up 
community work. The initial step of undertaking community work did not 
appear to have been difficult, 213 for these were the sorts of groups of whom 
Reverend Long spoke, reading newspapers and generally taking an interest in 
current affairs.21 Since then SAREEK promoted the formation of other youth 
groups, based in the village or even hamlet. At first these groups were 
dominated by vested and middle class interests; however, poorer elements 
were increasingly attracted to these clubs. In some cases, this resulted in some 
of the original members deserting their respective groups.22 Many new clubs 
were inspired by the work of existing clubs. The clubs were the grass roots of 
the organisational network that SAREEK was promoting. Within each project 
area SAREEK worked with about 30 groups of between 25 and 75 members, 
20 Although resistance to means developed later, infra, this chapter. 
21 Supra, Chapter Four. 
22 Interviews with the SAREEK director at the Calcutta Office, 9/IF, Dr Suresh 
Sarcar Rd, Entally, Calcutta 14, 18.2.1985 and 29.8.1985. 
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averaging out at 40 to 41. 23 In Narayangarh the clubs consisted of both men 
and women. This was a tribal area and participation by the women was 
indicative of the comparatively more equal status afforded to tribal women 
within their own communities. In the other project areas, most of the clubs 
were male only, with a few separate mahila mandals (women's organisations). 
For example, in Raidighi there were 30 youth (male) groups and six women's 
organisations.24 
The concept of separate mahila mandals raised problems such as those that 
occurred with the separate Harijan committees with which NBJK worked. 
Separate organisations were formed because the SAREEK workers saw the 
women, and the women perceived themselves, as being restrained from 
speaking out in mixed meetings; thus many more women became involved and 
they participated to a greater degree than they would have at mixed meetings. 
Furthermore, all women meetings could be held at times convenient for women 
whereas the times for the mixed meetings were generally set to suit men's 
working hours. It was thought that the women gained more confidence from 
their role in mahila mandals. Yet the prevailing social conditions emphasised 
the separate identity of men and women. It raised the question as to whether it 
would help bring about any equality between the sexes or whether it would 
serve to perpetuate the existing inequalities. 
Nevertheless it must be noted that the mahila mandals were represented on the 
Udyog Parishad, that is, the higher level committees to which all village 
23 These figures were given with respect to Raidighi at a meeting consisting of 
the SAREEK director, another headquarters' member, the local field worker, 
representatives of local clubs and also instructors, health workers etc, 9.9.1985. I 
was then told by the Director that similar figures applied to the other two areas. 
24 Ibid. 
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committees sent a representative. The female representatives were accorded 
equal status with the men. However, there were not so many women as men 
because there were not so many mahila mandals. Prior to SAREEK's entrance 
there were no mahila mandals although there were quite a number of male only 
youth clubs. Thus it would seem that women were becoming more actively 
involved in community participation through these bodies. 
SAREEK chose to begin its work with the existing youth groups as they had 
demonstrated already some interest in organisation. Also SAREEK believed 
that youths tended to be more active and enthusiastic as well as open minded 
and receptive to new ideas than elders. Thus like JP, SAREEK hoped to 
redirect the energy of the youth towards working for the uplifting of their 
communities. However, the youth groups presented problems for popular 
organisation. They were not the representative bodies that JP envisaged of his 
lok samitis, consisting of all the members of the respective villages. Initially, 
the youth groups associated with SAREEK tended to be dominated by middle 
class male youths and it is difficult to envisage how the whole village populace 
could be mobilised into this form of organisation. There was no suggestion 
that any other form of structure will be forthcoming through SAREEK apart 
from the Udyog Parishad. However, it also appeared that the clubs were 
expanding in participation and were adapting themselves as more and more 
people were being mobilised within the existing organisations and they were 
losing their middle class character, 25 although the majority of the populace 
tended to be spectators. 
3 . 	Field Workers 
SAREEK employed one full-time and two part-time workers in each project 
area. The field staff were in addition to the headquarters group. They were 
25 Interviews on 18.2.1985 and 29.8.1985 
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local youth chosen according to the ability and potential that they may have 
demonstrated for leadership qualities when SAREEK first became involved 
with their respective areas. Of course other potential leaders, often more 
dynamic, emerged later. The SAREEK projects were overseen by the field 
workers, who provided feedback to SAREEK. The full-time field workers also 
served as SAREEK's representatives on their respective Udyog Parishads. The 
field workers did not necessarily hold any positions of office on the committee. 
This was decided by the committee when it determined its office bearers. 
Apart from the presence of the SAREEK worker each Udyog Parishad 
functioned independently of SAREEK although they could look to SAREEK 
for guidance, and of course if they sought SAREEK's financial assistance then 
SAREEK had the final say in the advancement of such a project. Most of 
SAREEK's funding through the Udyog Parishads went to provide honorariums 
for education instructors and health workers. However, as far as possible, 
SAREEK encouraged the Udyog Parishads, registered bodies in their own 
right, to mobilise resources for themselves. For example, with the education 
centres it was up to the villages to provide a suitable building and to find the 
necessary educational materials such as readers and writing materials. Some 
government funding was available for educational projects but it wa up to the 
local organisations to make the necessary applications. Further, once a 
SAREEK funded project was initiated it was really controlled by the Udyog 
Parishad, with the SAREEK field workers playing only a general supervisory 
role. SAREEK funds were received directly by the treasurer of each 
committee. Each treasurer had to account for these funds to the respective field 
worker. Of course if the project did not meet expectations or certain conditions 
SAREEK could withdraw its funding but it did not try to use this power in any 
coercive fashion. 
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The new leadership structures that SAREEK encouraged bear a number of 
parallels to JP's ideas. JP wanted to mobilise the youths to provide leadership 
in the development of a new village committee structure. SAREEK was 
seeking to do the same although it envisaged the new village committees as 
developing from an expansion of the youth structures whereas JP saw the two 
working hand in hand. In effect SAREEK developed two levels of trained 
motivators; those involved with the headquarters group, and the new local 
leadership whom the headquarters group were trying to motivate. The 
headquarters group was very conscious of its role as motivator and the position 
of influence with which this placed it on the local scene. It was anxious to 
ensure that the local areas were not dependent on that influence and that they 
developed their own leadership structure through the youth groups and Udyog 
Parishads. The organisation work with which SAREEK was involved was 
quite separate at the local level, that is, quite separate from SAREEK's formal 
identity. 
4 . 	Funding 
SAREEK received some local donations for the running of its organisation and 
the cost of the projects, but most came from Bread for the World. It recognised 
the vulnerability of its dependence on foreign funds, in particular its 
dependence on only one agency. However, SAREEK hoped that the local 
groups would develop to the extent that they could continue to function without 
the need for outside funding. So whilst it did not aim to make its headquarters 
group self-sufficient, the emphasis at the local level was one of independence. 
From a JP perspective the important factor was that SAREEK emphasised the 
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mobilisation of local resources and that the existence of the Udyog Parishads 
was not dependent on access to SAREEK funds. 
Meanwhile, members of the headquarters group were often hired by other 
organisations such as the Lutheran World service and the Rural Welfare 
Society. The latter organisation was initiated by a former SAREEK worker, S 
N Basu, who was anxious that SAREEK should start a project in his own area, 
Diamond Harbour. Instead, however, Indrajit Samanta urged him to form his 
own organisation after gaining valuable field experience with SAREEK and 
establishing relationships with some funding agencies. Although the versatility 
of the SAREEK workers sometimes left the office temporarily short-staffed, 
SAREEK believed that it benefited from any subsequent sharing of 
understandings, both in boosting morale and widening contacts. 
VI. COMPARISON OF ORGANISATIONS  
A number of JP's ideas are applicable to the SAREEK situation, in particular 
his thoughts on a student vanguard and people's committees. SAREEK sought 
to actively promote a working together of youth groups and people's type 
committees. It harnessed the youth groups as the vanguard for its own 
revolutionary work although it was concerned that these groups be independent 
of it and that they had no formal organisational connections other than the local 
field workers and funding ties. The workers and organisation were local. The 
youth groups could be regarded as something akin to CYSV in that they served 
as catalysts to their communities. However, they differed from the CYSV in 
that instead of trying to establish separate people's committees SAREEK hoped 
that the youth groups themselves would expand into people's committees 
although there was little evidence that this was happening. There were some 
important differences between SAREEK and CYSV that may have helped to 
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make this possible, such as the fact that the youth groups were local groups 
whereas many of the CYSV activists did not work in local areas, nor had JP 
expected them to do so. JP regarded the CYSV as providing its members with 
a learning experience as well as giving them direction for their energies. In 
order to emphasise this educative role the CYSV placed restrictions on its 
membership. The youth groups associated with SAREEK did not. Instead 
their membership was apparently expanding although some social restrictions 
such as the participation of women could still occur. Nevertheless, women 
participated equally at the Udyog Parishad level. 
Udyog Parishad, an umbrella organisation, was established at the district level 
and it enabled the local groups to meet together and provide each other with 
moral support as well as taking joint decisions with respect to their communities 
such as the formation of grain banks, which required the cooperation of a 
number of clubs. There were many similarities between SAREEK and Udyog 
Parish ad on the, one hand, and NBJK and Lok Samiti on the other, for just as 
SAREEK promoted Udyog Parishad, NBJK promoted the Lok Samiti with the 
aim of developing people's power. Lok Samiti represented a more structured 
and sophisticated organisation than Udyog Parishad in that it extended to the 
national level. Moreover, theoretically it was seeking to develop an alternative 
to the prevailing political structure of the modem idiom. However, in practice it 
served much along the lines of Udyog Parishad: disseminating information, 
sharing ideas and providing moral support. It did not commit the lok samitis to 
take a particular line, but by facilitating communication it assisted them to play a 
more effective role in the wider political structure. 
CYSV and IMSE presented a much more fixed ideology and structure, but they 
were quite different from each other. The CYSV had a restricted membership 
so it did not seek to impose its ideology or structure on the community at large, 
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although JP hoped that it would provide direction to the wider community. 
IMSE was also concerned to pave a revolutionary path but it attempted to 
involve everyone within the fold of its organisation following any revolution 
through to its totality. In developing its revolutionary path, IMSE attempted to 
understand local situations so that it could gain local confidence and spread its 
ideology. It did this through a democratically centralised process that allowed 
for a two-way communication between the grass roots groups and the central 
organisation. All IMSE members had the scope to come forward with their 
views. IMSE pushed its ideology on its grass roots for it believed this ideology 
came from them and it was an integral part of the expansion and strengthening 
of the IMSE organisation. IMSE's ideas of organisation seemed to be akin to a 
non-violent Maoist view of the communist party rather than JP's voluntarist lok 
samitis. Mao believed that the party had to be fully consolidated ideologically, 
politically and organisationally with every communist having a duty to play an 
active part to build up the party forging close links between the progressive 
elements and the broad masses so as to fulfill his idea of: "from the masses to 
the masses".26 
The CYSV also was concerned to develop appropriate strategies according to 
the situation and it did this by its workers living with the people with whom it 
worked. Howeyer, the CYSV did not have as comprehensive an approach as 
IMSE for the CYSV was not concerned to follow its revolution through to its 
totality. It regarded that as the role of organisations such as Lok Samiti and 
indeed it was JP's hope that the CYSV and Lok Samiti would work hand in 
hand to fulfill his 'total revolution'. Lok Samiti had provision for the 
involvement of the Vahini but the Vahini's participation was not apparent 
amongst the lok samitis associated with NBJK. In Bodh Gaya the CYSV had 
26 Supra, Chapter One. 
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not connected with Lok Samiti. Instead it formed a separate organisation, the 
Mazdoor Kisan Samiti, which - like the CYSV - appeared to be concerned with 
mobilising people along a negative theme, for example, demonstrating against 
the injustices of the Matt. 
Like JP, the CYSV, NBJK and Lok Samiti, SAREEK and the Udyog Parishad 
did not rely on the absolute spontaneity that Vinoba seemed to expect but nor 
did they demand and command loyalty in the way that IMSE did. Rather they 
concentrated on motivating and mobilising people and providing guidelines but 
not attempting to centralise their work. The difference was that the IMSE 
claimed to be working towards developing a complete alternative to the existing 
system, although it must be noted that IMSE's relationship with the government 
vis a vis funding and training programmes did not fit into this model. The 
others wanted to revolutionise the existing system by developing a new force, a 
people's force, which they seemed to regard as complementing the current 
system. Nevertheless, they did little to take over or replace the basic functions 
of government such as law and order and the provision of major infrastructure. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
All four organisations offered structures that were quite distinct from political 
parties and in which a number of JP type ideas were manifested as the 
organisations served to strengthen the grass roots position. Their strength came 
from the horizontal and vertical links that they promoted. Horizontally they 
looked beyond their own organisations through workshops and affiliations, 
sharing knowledge and pooling resources. Within their own organisations they 
seemed to be developing vertical channels that provided for the reception and 
articulation of the needs and wishes of the people with whom they were 
involved, and they seemed capable of translating this into policies that could be 
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implemented effectively by those people themselves. There was still a large gap 
between theory and practice but this was the type of work that JP had in mind 
when he advocated a partyless democracy, and he realised that it would not be 
achieved overnight. 
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CHAFFER SEVEN 
EXPANDING LOKNM THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE WORK 
This chapter briefly reflects on JP's ideas as to the means by which people 
should be mobilised towards lokniti and then considers the means employed by 
CYSV, NBJK, IMSE and SAREEK. 
I. 	JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN 
JP's "total revolution" was based on lokniti, popular empowerment and 
consciousness-raising with a focus on self-reliance through local development. 
He envisaged steps being taken towards "total revolution" through the 
voluntarist idiom, mobilising people by way of constructive work, that is non-
violent social, economic, political, cultural and ideological, and educational or 
spiritual programmes that educate and organise "the people so that they might 
by their own action change and better their condition of life". 1 
JP's concept of constructive work covered a multitude of ideas and was adapted 
according to locally identified basic needs such as: promoting village industry 
and village sanitation; overcoming sources of internal decay such as 
alcoholism; and changing people's hearts, for example with regard to 
encouraging inter-caste marriage and thus removing untouchability. Also he 
encouraged a gradual movement towards self-government, for example, by the 
resolution of local conflicts by mutual adjustments and generally reducing 
dependence on a centralised system of administration. Constructive work is an 
1 Jayapralcash Narayan, "A Manifesto for Bihar", The Sunday Standard, 11 May 1975, 
reprinted in Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4: Total Revolution, ed, 
Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1978), p.168 
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integral part of Gandhian philosophy although the approach to it has varied. 
This is the nature of constructive work and indeed of voluntarist politics, which 
depend on the prevailing conditions and situations. During Vinoba's bhoodan 
and gramdan campaigns the emphasis was on prapti work, which JP described 
as extensive and widespread. When JP retreated to Musahari he thought it 
appropriate to change this line to a more intensive and penetrating approach. 
He also recognised a need to revise the role of struggle through non-violent 
non-cooperation in pursuing constructive work. 
II. 	CYSV 
The CYSV did not undertake constructive work in order to strengthen lokniti. 
It regarded that as requiring sustained effort to be undertaken in the long term. 
It saw its own work as more immediate, dealing with the prevailing injustices 
that prevented the growth of lokniti. These injustices were generally the result 
of rajniti. Consequently the CYSV focused its energies on opposing the state 
forces. JP had not expected the CYSV to undertake the totality of his 
revolution. Rather, he saw it as emerging in a leadership role both in so far as 
it directed the students and other youths, and in so far as it led the people 
towards change. 
During the period of the JP movement, when the CYSV was founded, the 
challenge to change was seen to lie with struggling against the forces of rajniti. 
The CYSV maintained this line. With this perspective it was not interested in 
placing priority on undertaking any systematic constructive work programme. 
Any constructive work that it undertook in order to directly raise lokniti was 
incidental to its major work to oppose rajniti. Consequently its work should be 
understood in this light, and it would seem more appropriate to review it in the 
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next chapter which focuses on the organisation's involvement with rajniti. 
III. 	NBJK 
In examining NBJK there are two levels at which constructive work towards 
lokniti needs to be considered. These are at the level of the Institute itself, that 
is the Ashram; and secondly the work undertaken by the NBJK field workers 
with respect to their work with the lok samitis. 
NBJK undertook a number of constructive work programmes that were 
independent of its work with the lok samitis. It was involved with legal aid; it 
had a homeopathic clinic; it ran a number of primary schools; it used its 
Ashram as an experimental farm; and it carried out relief work. All these were 
undertaken as services to the surrounding communities and it regarded them as 
in keeping with the sarvodaya service ideals. The work met important 
humanitarian needs. It also enabled NBJK to familiarise itself with the local 
areas so that it might better understand local situations. In addition the work 
was creative in that it provided scope for experimentation with appropriate farm 
technologies and medicine; this followed in the Schumacher tradition that JP 
admired, making for a comprehensive approach for working towards a "total 
revolution" when combined with the mobilisation strategies pursued by its field 
workers. 
The field workers' main task was to mobilise people to establish lok samitis and 
then lend moral support to the established samitis. The first step was to raise 
awareness, but this was an ongoing task and did not end once the lok samitis 
had been established. A very important means of raising general awareness 
was NBJK's cultural team, comprising of a number of full-time workers who 
performed sketches, usually humorous, depicting typical misfortunes and 
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exploitations suffered by their audiences. The team demonstrated that these 
situations could be overcome if their audiences worked towards self-reliance 
and were not gullible to the tricks of charlatans who played on people's 
superstition and ignorance. Also the cultural team sang freedom songs, 
sometimes very provocative ones. Basically the team's efforts served a two-
fold purpose. They started people thinking, raising awareness and they 
provided moral support and reinforcement as well as an entry point for NBJK 
workers so that they were able to introduce the concept of lok samiti. 
At the village level the workers' task was one of more specific contact. They 
began by organising a village meeting, which was publicised widely and 
attempts were made to involve as many people as possible. The meeting served 
as a forum for starting the people to think about their situation, and for 
organising a lok samiti. In establishing a lok samiti the village would begin to 
mobilise itself. One of the most significant steps towards lokniti that the tolc 
samitis represented was the breakdown of communal barriers. Ideally the lig_c 
samitis were representative of all local groups. However, this effect was not 
likely to be as far reaching in the Harijan lok samitis that were established by 
NBJK. Nevertheless NBJK workers believed that consciousness and 
confidence were being raised and communal barriers lowered as lower castes 
no longer seemed hesitant to sit with higher castes and raised, discussed and 
solved problems that faced their community as a whole. 
Concern over the establishment of a brothel in their locality, was a particular 
issue raised amongst some lok samitis quite independently of the NBJK 
workers. Their approach revealed a growing confidence and consciousness on 
the part of the lok samitis. The brothel had been established illegally while 
officials accepted bribes in order to turn a blind eye to its existence. The 
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villagers believed that its presence was detrimental to the society and they were 
concerned by its exploitation and degradation of the women who were 
associated with it. 2 The issue was raised in five neighbouring villages which 
subsequently collaborated and agreed to organise a public meeting on 21 
September 1985. It was attended by five hundred people and a resolution was 
passed that the BDO was required to take action to stop the business within two 
months otherwise they would resort to direct action and physically remove the 
brothel themselves. 
In effect the lok samitis represented a move towards self-government which 
was another important aspect of constructive work. This trend could be seen 
further in the concept of lok adalat which NBJK workers promoted. Lok adalat 
involved the local resolution of disputes. It was a relatively informal concept 
that might include a panel of objective observers to mediate while the disputing 
parties put forward their cases. A solution was sought by consultation between 
the mediators, the parties, friends and relatives who came to lend their support. 
The people's courts were more effective than the formal, expensive and often 
geographically distant legal system imposed by law and which often involved 
long delays. People's courts also effectively ended much of the corruption to 
which the villagers were subjected by the local judiciary. Moreover, it 
presented opportunities for villagers to manage their own affairs moving 
towards a "parallel administration" as JP had suggested. 3 
2 This was raised at NBJK's monthly meeting Bahera Ashram, 30 September 1985. It also 
was raised by a number of NBJK field workers in their discussions with me on 1 October 
1985. 
3 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Important Changes", Everyman's, 3 August 1974, reprinted in 
Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4:97. 
206 
IV. SAREEK 
SAREEK promoted lokniti by raising awareness and organising people on two 
levels. Firstly, it sought to conscientise local youth groups, encouraging their 
development and extension as well as the formation of new groups. Secondly 
it aimed to have these groups educate their fellow villagers and mobilise them 
within the fold of their organisation. 
Initially SAREEK workers from the headquarters group began by making 
informed contacts with existing youth groups. In many instances some contact 
already existed as some of the workers had worked in the areas previously, 
with other organisations. The aim of SAREEK workers was to motivate these 
groups beyond their narrow social objectives and sport orientation. Groups 
were encouraged to establish education centres in order to achieve a deeper level 
of consciousness-raising. 
However, before these education centres were established SAREEK had each 
club that was interested in participating conduct surveys of their village or 
hamlet, for example with regard to land-ownership, occupations, service 
facilities and the location of these facilities. This survey served a two-fold 
purpose: raising the awareness of the participants with respect to their own 
communities as well as providing a basis on which to analyse the problems 
faced and devise strategies for their solution. After the surveys had been 
completed SAREEK reviewed them with the youths. The poorest area was 
determined from the findings and subsequently was suggested by SAREEK as 
the place where the education classes should be established. The idea, of 
course, was to involve as many of the most depressed people as possible as 
well as to draw their plight to the attention of the youths. Apparently this met 
with some resistance from some groups who were not interested in setting up 
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centres in such areas. 4 However, those groups that were prepared to follow 
SAREEK's lead received its support. 
Nevertheless they were expected to be responsible for fmding or constructing a 
suitable building as well as preparing their own teaching materials. In addition 
they were required to join forces with other groups in the area by forming some 
kind of body on which they were all represented, a body that was envisaged as 
strengthening the youth groups as they shared ideas, experiences and 
responsibility for the direction of their communities. For example, Udyog 
Parishad, which was established in each of the three areas where SAREEK 
worked, had an education committee which helped establish new classes, 
monitored the effectiveness of all classes and determined their direction. 
The educational classes were central to SAREEK's strategy. On the one hand 
they educated the youth groups involved in running them, mobilising them into 
action and strengthening their organisational basis. On the other hand it 
provided an entry point into the rest of the community and enabled the youth 
clubs to share their increased awareness, involving greater participation from 
the larger community. SAREEK saw the education centres in terms of people's 
education as distinct from adult type education promoted by the government 
primarily to teach functional literacy. Functional literacy adult education classes 
had quite a long history in independent India but the country still had a low rate 
of literacy. 5 The main problem seemed to have been that the programmes 
were not relevant to the needs of the participants. 6 The assumption had been 
that education was the end goal but SAREEK approached it as though it were 
4 Interview with the SAREEK director, Indrajit Samanta, at the Calcutta headquarters, 9/IF 
Dr Suresh Sarcar Rd, Entally, Calcutta, 18 February, 1985. 
5 According to the 1981 census, the literacy rate was 36.2%. This figure was published in 
Tata Services Ltd, Statistical Outline of India 1984, (Bombay: D R Rendse, 1984), p.30. 
6 Interview with Professor Ahmed, Department of Adult Education, Xavier Institute of 
Social Services, Ranchi, Bihar, at XISS on 26 February 1985. 
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the means, believing that education was useless unless it could lead to social 
action. Learning only how to read and write was not sufficient. Therefore 
SAREEK concluded that it was important that education emphasised 
organisation and cooperation. It believed that the poor were powerless owing 
to the fact that they had no organisation. Thus the education centres were seen 
as stimulus, providing a forum for the dispersal of new ideas. 
Historically had have been a number of movements of popular education in 
Bengali history. Perhaps the antecedent to these was Rammohan Roy's attempt 
to popularise Hinduism and promote English education. The renaissance which 
this precipitated was reflected in the growing importance of the vernacular 
press which gave a comprehensive coverage of current European and Indian 
affairs. Whilst numerical circulation of these papers was comparatively limited, 
the oral communication of their contents was widespread, for example through 
Kathaks, that is professional readers who would read to very large gatherings 
of villagers. 7 Popular songs were another powerful form of education 
throughout Bengal; they included religious, political and social topics such as 
the oppression of the indigo planters. Furthermore, Rabindranath Tagore 
undertook some very important experiments in education based on cooperation 
between students and teachers. He used the vernacular language and cultural 
tools such as song, dance and drama. Education was generally made relevant 
to day-to-day life while encouraging creativity to improve that day-to-day life. 
So SAREEK had a strong tradition on which to draw. 
7 Reverend James Long in his testimony to the Indigo Commission appointed in Calcutta 
1860, cited in John R McLane (ed), The Political Awakening in India (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1970), pp.30-36. Also supra, Chapter Four. 
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SAREEK sought to motivate and train club members to develop new ideas and 
share these through the education centres. During the slack times on the rural 
calendar, SAREEK held local training camps thus encouraging as many 
participants as possible. The emphasis of the camps was very much on self-
reliance, and making use of local materials for teaching aids etc. In this way the 
theme of self-reliance, one stressed by JP, pervaded the education classes. 
Meanwhile constant contact between SAREEK and the youth clubs was 
maintained through seminars based on such themes as "social realities and 
people's reaction in the continent of Asia" as well as the newsletter, published 
in the Calcutta office and dealing with such topics as food additives and the 
anniversary of Hiroshima. The aim was to broaden the youths' horizons so 
that they might share their new ideas through the education classes and 
whatever other means they devised. 
The youths were mobilised further through SAREEK's biannual self-evaluation 
programme, a participatory process that involved the drawing up of a draft 
questionnaire from the headquarters, which was then discussed with the three 
area workers, instructors, supervisors and voluntary workers. Subsequently 
the questionnaires could be revised accordingly. The evaluation was required 
by Bread for the World, the sponsors, but SAREEK found it invaluable as a 
learning and conscientising process. Basically the questionnaire began as an 
objective exercise, seeking to ascertain various data with respect to the situation 
of each community and the services available, land-ownership patterns etc. 
Then it sought to assess the community education centres. If any centre seemed 
to be failing according to the results of the questionnaire SAREEK's policy was 
to withdraw funding. However, it would reconsider this decision if the 
instructors proved sufficiently committed and continued regardless. The 
questionnaire then led on to questions concerning the types of activities in 
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which the centres were engaged, and then the changes and initiatives that had 
occurred as a result of the education programmes including conflicts, tensions 
and difficulties encountered. Local workers had no problem in completing the 
factual questions but often left the subjective type ones, dealing with goals and 
achievements, blank. In these cases SAREEK returned the forms to the groups 
for completion. 
The local workers were responsible for tabulating the results. This was often a 
lengthy process as they could be caught up in harvest or other busy agricultural 
activities. However, the SAREEK office believed that for it to undertake the 
evaluation, instead of the local workers, in the name of efficiency, was not 
justified as the learning process outweighed any considerations of efficiency. 
SAREEK regarded it as an integral part of its conscientising and mobilisation 
programme. The assessment generated a sense of responsibility as the workers 
were forced to think about what they had done, their achievements and failures. 
It also gave them a basis on which to determine future priorities. 
Some groups combined to form a number of cultural teams, which gave 
performances in neighbouring areas. Themes included social awareness such 
as conservation and health as well as providing moral guidance about 
overcoming fear of moneylenders etc. Thus the teams served as another entry 
point for raising consciousness and they believed that they were successful. 
Firstly they cited the fact that their performances were becoming more popular. 
There were greater demands for their services, usually from education centres, 
and each time they returned, the audiences seemed larger. Secondly they 
observed that people were going to clinics and hospitals more often; also they 
were making an effort to keep ponds clean and were not using the same ponds 
for humans as were used for animals. 8 Meanwhile, SAREEK mobilised the 
8 Interview with the Raidighi cultural team, Raidighi, 7 September 1985. 
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cultural teams in so far as it trained the performers in such practicalities as 
prop, puppet and costume making, script writing, etc, again emphasising self-
reliance making use of whatever materials were available locally. 
Another programme that some groups undertook in order to further their 
education task was the formation of science clubs. The science clubs provided 
a new avenue for exposing local people to new ideas ranging from their 
environment with its floods and droughts, to atomic warfare, attempting to link 
the macro with the micro. In promoting an understanding about the nature of 
things, the clubs also hoped to overcome superstitions and ignorance that 
resulted in practices that threatened people's health and could entail enormous 
expenditure, such as employing charlatans who often charged extortionate sums 
for dubious practices. 
In order to mobilise people into some form of organisation, SAREEK built on 
the existing organisational structure of the youth clubs, widening their scope 
and expanding the actual organisations through the Udyog Parishad. The 
Udyog Parishad was a new initiative that provided all member clubs, including 
women's groups, with equal representation. It gave the clubs an opportunity to 
share ideas, pool resources, and participate in joint decision-making exercises. 
Initially SAREEK played a greater role in the determination and supervision of 
programmes. However, like NBJK it was disappointed with the results of this 
approach. It realised that projects had to be determined locally if they were to 
be managed locally. For example, one negative experience involved a fishing 
cooperative that SAREEK promoted in the Raidighi area, and for which it 
provided some funds after the 1978 tidal wave destroyed many of the 
fishermen's assets. The government also subsidised the scheme. Boats were 
212 
built and nets were made, and under SAREEK's guidance the cooperative 
flourished. However, the cooperative became too ambitious. It bought a motor 
launch against SAREEK's advice, although SAREEK agreed to help in 
negotiating the purchase of the launch. Unfortunately the cooperative was not 
equipped for this type of asset management and as a result it went into debt and 
effectively disbanded. There were some attempts to revive this scheme 
including requests to SAREEK to assist in the purchase of a new launch. 
SAREEK resisted this involvement although it encouraged a number of small 
non-formal fishing cooperatives in the area, and they seemed to be working 
well. SAREEK became very wary about investing in, directing, or interfering 
with any economic projects. Nevertheless, it recognised the motor launch 
experience as a valuable one in helping it to understand the limitations of its 
role. 
SAREEK continued to play some role in a number of projects but it emphasised 
local initiative and responsibility. For example it encouraged the establishment 
of grain banks and was prepared to advise groups on this issue. Generally a 
grain bank was the joint project of a number of villages. It was a cooperative 
that provided villagers with a means to secure their grain until such time as they 
needed it. Loans were made and interest rates were accrued and charged. It 
provided an alternative to services offered by moneylenders whose practices 
were often exploitative. The grain bank concept represented a variation of 
swadeshi for on the one hand it served to reduce the grip of the moneylender 
and on the other hand it built up the local economy and generated cooperation 
and community spirit. 
SAREEK was also involved with health projects, providing funds for the 
employment of locally-based community health workers. However, the 
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responsibility for appointing and supervising the workers lay with the Udyog 
Parishads. Basically the main concern of the health workers was one of relief 
and their services were necessary in view of inadequate government facilities. 
They also served as an entry point into poorer sections of the communities. 
The importance of health was generally recognised, and it was an issue that was 
pursued through the education centres and by the cultural teams. 
The youth groups and Udyog Parishads depended on SAREEK's financial 
support to their education and health programmes, as well as its guidance in 
many other matters. Nevertheless it appeared that they began determining many 
priorities for themselves and accepting responsibility for their undertakings. 
One venture that was quite independent of SAREEK was a campaign for fair 
prices. This involved a number of farmers in an anchal in the Sundarbans. The 
farmers banded together in order to be able to take appropriate action to achieve 
higher prices for their crops of bhindi. They were receiving only thirty paise  
per kilogram and the wholesalers refused to pay more. The farmers could not 
afford to stockpile their produce so they hoped to find an alternative buyer. 
However, the wholesalers, who were based on the main road to Calcutta, 
threatened to prevent trucks carrying the farmers' crops from passing. 
Nevertheless, the farmers continued their action. First they approached the 
police and BDO to warn that there might be trouble. The next step was to go to 
Raidighi where the farmers sold directly to the consumers. However, this was 
only a temporary arrangement as the market was limited, and the farmers had 
neither the time nor expertise to continue their own marketing. Consequently 
one of their number went to Calcutta in search of a new buyer who was found. 
Arrangements were made to ship the produce from Raidighi rather than truck it, 
and so a confrontation with the wholesalers on the road was avoided. This 
particular struggle arose largely as a result of concern voiced during the 
discussions at local education centres, and it demonstrated a growing spirit of 
cooperation. 
V. 	IMSE 
Like SAREEK, IMSE's lokniti work focused on consciousness raising which 
was centred around its education centres. It differed from SAREEK in that 
IMSE's education centres were an integral part of its own organisation, not a 
part of any separate organisational structure that it was trying to promote. 
IMSE's classes served as an entry point into the communities and their chief 
purpose was to conscientise these communities, making them aware of the 
causes of poverty, bringing them closer together in order to work for a 
solution. IMSE was influenced by Paulo Freire's work, and undertook much 
pioneering in the area of adult education , receiving some government grants for 
its work. 
IMSE's classes evolved around a literacy programme, designed according to 
IMSE's own concepts of literacy. Literacy started with a sentence - a sentence 
that everyone could understand, and more importantly was related to their day-
to-day situations, in particular the problems that they faced. For example, it 
may have related to dowry, moneylending, drinking, minimum wages, 
poverty. Then from the sentence students went to the word and then to the 
letter. This system was designed to increase students' awareness and help them 
to learn far more quickly as it gave meaning to what they were learning. 
In the Santal area, Bihar, the local IMSE recruits had to develop their materials 
from scratch as the Santal tribals had no script. Consequently, they adapted 
Santali to the Hindi script and then devised what they considered to be 
appropriate learning materials. The first reader had a picture on each page with 
a descriptive sentence underneath. For example, a picture of a fat rich man 
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beside a poor thin man: "there are two classes - haves and have-nots". Under 
the sentence came the words and then the individual letters. Posters to match 
the reader pictures were printed too. The second reader also had pictures but 
rather than simple sentences each picture was accompanied by a short story. 
Moreover the pictures and stories tended to be of a more constructive nature, 
dealing with ways of overcoming the problems faced by the people such as 
establishing grain banks and setting up open courts. Discussion was generated 
over every issue raised. Magic lanterns also were used with slides of the same 
or similar pictures, and these shows provided an opportunity to reach larger and 
wider audiences. 
IMSE's aim was to raise the students' level of consciousness from being 
submissive and fatalistic to being aware of the injustices perpetrated against 
them. Then having developed the students' observation skills, the education 
sought to develop analytical ones, generating a desire by the students to 
determine their own future. In helping the students clarify their socio-political 
position IMSE drew on Freire's "dialogue" and Mao's idea of taking the ideas 
of the masses back to the masses. 
However IMSE assumed quite a deal of direction in so far as it was responsible 
for projecting the initial ideas from outside. This gave rise to the possibility of 
IMSE workers having so much control that they were able to direct the efforts 
of their classes towards apparently desirable goals. This use of what Freire 
termed "liberation propaganda" appeared to be IMSE's way. It could also be 
seen in the manner in which IMSE ran its training camps, such as the ones it 
held for education instructors. Each morning the camp began with an assembly 
where the students received a brief lecture and then sang the IMSE song that 
told how people could liberate themselves from exploitation by joining with 
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IMSE. IMSE's approach contrasted with Freire's position which was more 
one of facilitation, under which the community organiser's role was a 
coordinating one to draw out people's ideas in action reflection type of 
sessions. 
IMSE's main concern was to mobilise people towards an alternative society, a 
socialist society, and it saw this as best being achieved through the expansion 
of its organisation at the village level. Anyone who became convinced of 
IMSE's objectives was entitled to join. Members were expected to be actively 
committed. They included mainly labouring classes and small peasant classes 
but those from the middle classes were welcomed provided that they accepted 
IMSE's wages, agreeing for example to pay minimum wages and not doing 
anything that would compromise themselves in their commitment to IMSE. 
This attitude towards the middle classes was similar to that of Freire towards 
converted oppressors. 
IMSE members were mobilised from the village level committee, and the 
organisation extended to the district level, where major decisions concerning 
IMSE were taken. It regarded its strength as the expansion of its organisation 
at the grass roots level, lending support to and legitimising its decisions. 
Through its structure IMSE aimed to develop something of a parallel 
government, and an alternative society; this was different to JP's idea of 
people's government that was to ensure that the people had effective control 
over their government. 9 
Many village level projects were undertaken under the auspices of the village 
level committees. These committees were involved in the education and health 
worker projects as well, assuming responsibility for their operation at the 
9 Jayapralcash Narayan Towards Total Revolution, vol.4:117. 
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village level. Other programmes included establishing grain banks, which, as 
an example of liberation-type propaganda, were described by an IMSE worker, 
at an adult education training programme, as being like a mosquito net 
protecting villagers from the money lenders' sting just as the net protected one 
from the sting of mosquitoes. 10 
Other forms of cooperatives were also undertaken such as village and cottage 
based industries jointly purchasing large assets that assisted their production 
such as weaving looms, and various joint farming societies based on fish 
culture, poultry or piggeries whereby members shared the costs of stock and 
feed as well as the labour involved in maintaining and developing their 
livestock. IMSE provided some legal and financial training for the operation of 
such cooperatives. IMSE believed that the rural economy could be developed 
and strengthened only through this type of group action for it held that the ideal 
of "land to the tillers" was not sufficient without financial support and this 
could not be achieved while farmers worked individually. 11 This appeared to 
be along the lines of JP's communitarian society. Further IMSE encouraged 
the development of village-based people's courts - lok adalat - in order to 
resolve local disputes at the local level. This type of development would help 
avoid the long delays and costs associated with legal action, which often meant 
travelling long distances and involved procedures quite foreign to most 
villagers. Thus it would promote the type of independence from the 
bureaucracy that JP advocated. However, IMSE's aim was for these 
programmes to create a socio-psychological infrastructure that would ensure a 
receptive atmosphere in which a struggle for IMSE's alternative society could 
be generated. 
Hasakul Islam at the IMSE training programme for education instructors, IMSE office, 
Santal Parganas, Bihar, 30.1.1985. 
11 "Joint Farming Society organised at the Initiative of IMSE Workers", IMSE NEWS  
BULLETIN, IV (February 1985):3. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
JP had envisaged the development of local organisational structures through 
which people could develop something of a parallel administration and work 
towards some degree of self-government. This was something of a departure 
from Vinoba's way for Vinoba concentrated on prapti work and there was no 
attempt to consolidate it through organisational work. Vinoba's way was to 
seek to change the hearts of the oppressors so that they might change their ways 
to ensure a just society. 
The most important facet of constructive work for lokniti pursued by IMSE, 
SAREEK and NBJK, through the lok samitis, was consciousness raising 
through organisation, that is developing an organisational structure based on 
cooperation and the mobilisation of local resources. This was undertaken 
through a variety of socio-economic and even struggle programmes. By 
concentrating on organisational work, IMSE, NBJK and SAREEK placed the 
onus of responsibility for change on the oppressed sectors. They were urged to 
be independent of the prevailing power structures so that they could take control 
of their lives, such as doing without any branches of government administration 
that they did not need. For example, the concept of lok adalat represented a 
move towards parallel administration. It involved people whose participation in 
the alien court system would serve to perpetuate it, whereas their avoidance of it 
contributed towards taking away its reason for being. Cooperatives and grain 
banks similarly served as steps to self-government while challenging and 
weakening the power of moneylenders and middle men. 
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People's participation and mutual cooperation also facilitated their active 
struggle against perceived injustices that they suffered, such as the prices 
received by the SAREEK bhindi growers for their crops. IIVISE systematically 
worked to generate an atmosphere of struggle right from the beginning of its 
literacy programmes. The readers that it developed demanded that its students 
recognised the unjust situations that they faced, provoking them to feel a sense 
of injustice and making them determined to overcome these situations. 
JP had come to believe that some struggle was necessary to generate 
psychological forces so as to attract people and drive them to accept challenges 
to change themselves and others. In advocating the use of struggle JP departed 
from post-Gandhi Gandhian practice. Vinoba had emphasised gentle 
persuasion to remove the prevailing social disparities so as to move towards lok 
swara". However, JP thought that whilst this approach had brought about 
"some remarkable moral changes in some individuals" it was largely 
ineffectual. 12 It was not a total approach which was what JP believed was 
needed. JP's "total revolution" was based on a faith in man and his 
potentialities for self-government. Therefore he reasoned all men should be 
involved in striving towards that goal. In so far as the restructuring 
necessitated overcoming clashes of interest and the attitudes that maintained 
them, then resistance and struggle were likely unless the immediate cooperation 
of everyone was secured. In doing this JP had come to realise that it was not 
enough to work for lokniti at the micro level, building up people's power. He 
thought it was necessary also to work at the macro level at which rajniti  
operated for rajniti was the main clash of interest with lokniti. The next chapter 
will concentrate on the theme of diminishing rajniti through the voluntarist 
idiom, thus bringing the voluntarist idiom beyond the margin of wider politics. 
12 Jayapralcash Narayan, 18 August 1975, Prison Diary (Popular Pralcashan: Bombay, 
1977), p.22 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
GOOD GOVERNMENT 
I. 	INTRODUCTION 
The most significant aspect of JP's rethinking on the Gandhian legacy was his 
focus on the macro-political system and his aim to have people directly 
participate in changing the state. He envisaged this as being achieved through 
the participatory party-less lok samiti structure, with its emphasis on the macro 
level. On the one hand he hoped this would gradually develop an alternative 
political structure, under which effective decision making would rest with the 
basic grass roots level, who would control the selection of delegates to 
secondary institutions and ensure their accountability. This system would place 
considerable responsibility on the village committees, requiring them to direct 
and support their representatives. JP believed that if people had a proper 
understanding of the nature of such a system then they would assume their 
responsibilities and obligations and it would run smoothly. 
However he also realised: firstly that people did not yet have this 
understanding; and secondly, that they lived and operated within a different 
structure, that of rajniti based on representative party democracy in the modem 
idiom. JP knew that his ideal of raising lokniti could not be achieved 
overnight, and that it could only be a step by step process in which it was 
necessary to take cognisance of the existing structure so that it might gradually 
be transformed. He thought that the lok samiti structure could be used for this 
end also, for he envisaged it as serving as a two way channel of communication 
between the existing state structure and the grass roots. It could facilitate the 
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active involvement of people in the implementation of government programmes 
designed for their benefit such as health, education and economic type 
programmes. In addition, it could link village level groups to form mass 
movements prepared to struggle against any injustices perpetrated by the 
modern state structure, such as corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Thus 
JP hoped that power would be increasingly decentralised from the state to the 
people, diminishing rajniti. So in effect he sought an essential role for the 
saintly idiom within the operation of the modern one. 
This chapter explores the relationships between CYSV, NBJK and Lok Samiti, 
IMSE and SAREEK with the state structure, and their attempts to reduce its 
power by extending the active lokniti component of macro level politics beyond 
simply voting. 
II. 	CYSV 
JP thought students had no vested interest in the continuance of the existing 
system. Thus he regarded them as being able to form an ideal revolutionary 
vanguard working to reduce rajniti. Launched against the background of the 
Emergency, the CYSV's initial task was to inform people about and mobilise 
them towards democracy, seeking to purify the government by demanding its 
resignation and mobilising support for the honest candidates, seen to be 
represented within the Janata party. The 1977 election was regarded as a vote 
for democracy or dictatorship. 
After 1977 India did not face quite the same crisis and therefore the role of 
elections did not receive so much attention. However, the CYSV maintained 
the ideal of supporting the most honest candidate. Also CYSV excluded 
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candidates from communal parties as well as Congress (I) and CPI. 1 Its 
aversion to communal parties was understandable as communalism ran against 
the very grain of "total revolution". However, CYSV's prejudice against 
Congress (I) and its Emergency ally, CPI, were historical. This ran counter to 
JP's idea that actions should be against the evil that had to be fought rather than 
against any individual group or party2 for the CYSV seemed to be working 
specifically against the Congress (I) and the CPI rather than any perceived evil. 
Whilst JP had seen the 1977 election as a crossroads to dictatorship or 
democracy he generally regarded elections as providing only a superficial role 
to voters in a popular democracy. He wanted the electorate more actively 
involved by other means in order to keep a constant vigilance over the workings 
of good government. Thus in the wake of the Janata victory the Vahini needed 
a new issue around which it could mobilise support in order to make the people 
aware of prevailing injustices and organise them so as to overcome them. 
The situation in Bodh Gaya provided the youths with this opportunity for they 
believed that the Shankara Matt, who was based there, epitomised the injustices 
suffered in rural Bihar due to government inaction. It applied to all rural India 
and clearly demonstrated the need for reform. The Shankara Matt, one of the 
most powerful religious trusts in Bihar, was based in Bodh Gaya and during 
the course of the movement JP had drawn attention to the injustices associated 
with the Matt, claiming that the Matt held thousands of acres of surplus land. 3 
Both Gandhi and JP had seen land as the central issue on the rural scene.4 
1 Interview with Shekwara Villagers, 29,9,1985. 
2 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Moral Regeneration, A Role for You", Everyman's, 29.2.1973, 
reprinted in Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4:32-33. 
3 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Moral Regeneration: A Role for You", Everyman's, 2.9.1973. 
Reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4: 166. 
4 Jayaprakash Narayan, "The Land Grabbers", (1965). Reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, 
Towards Total Revolution, vol.3: India and the Problems, ed., Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular 
223 
For its part the Matt was the largest land-holder in the Gaya district but there 
was no separate or complete record of its holdings. The Matt admitted to 
holding only five hundred acres which was within the permissible land 
ceiling. 5 However, it seemed to be accepted fairly widely that the Matt held 
considerably more property, quite illegally through benami transfers etc.6 
Moreover, the Matt employed most of the landless Harijans in the area, paying 
them less than the minimum wage. As far as the Mahant was concerned there 
was no question as to whether the labourers had a right to education and good 
health let alone the right to own land, or sow, reap and harvest the crops for 
themselves. He simply did not regard these as issues, explaining quite 
uncompromisingly that "clothes, food and shelter" were the most important 
needs of the people. 7 All else was apparently irrelevant. Thus the Matt 
demanded total obedience from its workers and refused to surrender its surplus 
land. 
Consequently the CYSV believed this situation highlighted the need for struggle 
and at the same time it provided an ideal opportunity for a campaign as attention 
focused on only one land-owner, thus reducing any confusion in directing the 
labourers' grievances. Work had begun already in the area for in 1974-5 under 
the leadership of two JP supporters, Jagannathan from Tamil Nadu and his 
wife Krishnamma, attempts were made to mobilise the villagers to make 
complete records of the land holdings in their respective areas. They faced 
resistance from the Matt's men and also the police. 8 
Prakashan, 1978): 126 - 132. 
5 Social Justice and Legal Support Cell, AVARD, "GREEN ACRES OR RED: Bhoomi 
Andolan in Bodh Gaya", GREEN ACRES OR RED?, (New Delhi: AVARD, 1980), p.l. 
6 eg Sudip Mazumdar, "Matt destroys Harijans' paddy crop", in AVARD, GREEN ACRES  
OR RED?, p.42. 
7 Harji Malik, "Whose crop The Destitute or the Deity?", in AVARD, GREEN ACRES  
OR RED? pp.50-58. 
8 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Its Concept", pp.155-6. 
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Thus it was that the Vahini came to the area in 1978. Their first task was to 
raise awareness about the issue and win support from the people. So Vahini  
full-timers moved into the area, living with the people and establishing a base at 
Shekhwara, a few kilometers from Bodh Gaya. In order to give a 
comprehensive picture they needed to take a total approach to the situation and 
tackle a broad spectrum of issues, including, for example, the problem of 
drinking. Alcoholism was rife among labourers, especially the men. This 
contributed to numerous problems such as poor health and domestic violence 
and it hindered their participation in any movement as it left them weak and 
divided, a fact that the Matt seemed to appreciate fully as it freely distributed the 
ingredients from which the liquor was made, encouraging drinking and 
effectively maintaining a subservient labouring class. Therefore the CYSV 
worked to raise consciousness about alcoholism and its associated problems, at 
the same time exposing the Matt's role. Women, especially, were urged to take 
up this cause, dissuading their husbands from drinking, boycotting their 
husbands and homes if the drinking persisted. 
The Vahini youth began their struggle to obtain the Matt's surplus land by 
issuing a leaflet declaring that the Matt's possession of the land was illegal and 
stating that the Matt's workers had been turned into slaves. They also held 
informal discussions and organised village meetings to promote the issue. This 
was reinforced by their encouraging the formation of mazdoor kisan samitis, 
which were to be the struggle committees around which the Bodh Gaya land 
movement would pivot. More than fifty villages in the Gaya district took the 
initiative to form mazdoor kisan samitis, consisting of local workers and small 
farmers. Thus under the leadership of the Vahini they came together under the 
banner of "land to the tiller" and they decided to take a firm stand, refusing to 
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work for the Matt in support of their claims for the redistribution of the surplus 
lands. The Matt responded with threats and brought in outside labourers, 
against whom the Mazdoor Kisan protested. The CYSV and Mazdoor Kisan 
Samiti also took possession of some of the Matt's lands which were lying 
fallow because of their refusal to work. They worked these cooperatively but 
also met with considerable opposition from the Matt as it sent its goondas to 
terrorise the people.9 Violent clashes resulted. 
Meanwhile JP, who was the CYSV's supreme leader, became alarmed at the 
deteriorating situation and he urged the Bihar government to enquire into the 
agrarian movement in Bodh Gaya. The Saxena Committee was set up to look 
at the Matt's land-holdings and submitted its report on 10 October 1980. On 26 
November 1980 the Government of Bihar accepted that the Matt was in 
possession of 8687.54 acres.M In its report the committee had spelt out many 
important recommendations with regard to the violence and atrocities; 
however, little action was taken by the government although some land was 
recovered in two blocks. It was surrendered to the government which 
redistributed it through block offices in cooperation with the villagers which 
were led by the mazdoor kisan samitis. Nevertheless the Matt still possessed 
considerable lands and the general struggle continued. It was only in 
September 1987 that the High Court of Bihar ruled against the remainder of the 
Matt's land, ordering that it could keep only one hundred acres and that the rest 
was to be distributed by the government of Bihar. 
" 9 This is well documented in: the AVARD report, Neshat Quasier, "Youth and Peasant 
Movement: A Case Study of Bodh Gaya Struggle", The Other Side, (New Delhi) 4 (1984) 12 
- 19; and also in Anirudh Prasad, People's Perception of Harijan Atrocities in Bihar, (Patna: 
A N Sinha Institute of Social Studies, 1983). 
10Quasier, "Youth and Peasant Movement", p. 16. 
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The Vahini maintained a strong presence in the area and was concerned to 
continue the struggle through the organisation of village meetings and 
provoking the people to action. As a consequence much of the Mali's land lay 
fallow for the labourers refused to work it. By offering satyagraha they sought 
to prevent others from working too. This was not a satisfactory situation, as 
JP previously lamented: it was a sad waste to see land lying fallow in a poor 
state where 80.5% of the total workers were employed in agriculture and yet the 
state still fell short of its minimum requirements of food grains. 11 There were 
other problems too. For example, there were very few opportunities for 
alternative employment open to the displaced labourers who refused to work the 
Matt's land, and in many cases those who received redistributed land could not 
afford to work it. Consequently many of them went to the towns and sought 
work in the secondary sector such as rickshaw pulling or road and construction 
work where they were at the mercy of contractors. Some turned to 
begging. 12 Others started to brew liquor again. 13 All this diverted their 
energies away from the main struggle. 
As the vanguard of the revolution the CYSV saw its role as very much one of 
watchdog, that is watching out for any injustices caused or allowed by the 
prevailing system of government. Bodh Gaya was a case in point. Firstly the 
Matt's land-holdings demonstrated the inequalities on the rural scene. 
Secondly, and more importantly, they demonstrated the government's failure to 
act against these inequities. The Matt held most of its land illegally and yet the 
government did not make any attempt to enforce the law. Moreover when the 
11 Jayapralcash Narayan, "A Manifesto for Bihar", The Sunday Standard, 11.5.1975, 
reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Total Revolution, vol.4: 172-3. 
12 Prasad, People's Perception of j-larijan Atrocities p. 42. 
13 Interview with Shekwara villagers, who were also members of Mazdoor Kisan Samiti, 
Samanvay Ashram, 29.9.1985. Translator: Dwarko Sundrani, Samanvay Ashram, Bodh 
Gaya. 
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people protested and the Matt responded with brute force, the police allowed 
this to happen. 14 After the state government undertook to redistribute the 
Matt's surplus lands the CYSV played an important monitoring role. 
However, the CYSV's watchdog role was not reinforced by any systematic 
constructive programme beyond that connected to its goal of forcing the 
surrender of the Matt's surplus lands. The CYSV did not regard it as its role to 
undertake a comprehensive constructive work programme. However, Gandhi 
had stressed the importance of the connection between constructive work and 
satyagraha. He said: "civil disobedience without the backing of the 
constructive programme can never lead us to independence. Shorn of it, civil 
disobedience becomes a method of violence bound to prove ineffective in the 
end". 15 The ideological split that occurred within the Vahini in 1985 
supported the merit of this argument. Nevertheless CYSV deliberately 
neglected some areas that JP regarded as important; for example, it left land 
uncultivated rather than allow the Matt possession of that land. This 
contradicted JP's concern not to upset production. Similarly Mao had stressed 
that economic construction was necessary to sustain any prolonged struggle. 
Mao held that it was wrong to think that there was no time for this sort of work 
because meeting the practical needs of people was essential to revolutionary 
work. Indeed whilst JP had come to emphasise the role of struggle, his "total 
revolution" assumed the continuation and expansion of other forms of 
constructive work. Certainly he envisaged that the Vahini should direct its 
energies more towards struggle but he also thought that it would work more 
closely with broader constructive programmes such as that that the Lok Samiti  
undertook. 
14 See for example Sudip Mazumdar, "Armed Police Terrorise Bodh Gaya Landless", 
Express News Service, reprinted in GREEN ACRES OR RED? pp. 46 - 49. 
15 M K Gandhi, "Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place", 13.12.1941, reprinted 
in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. X (Ahmedabad: The Publications 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1963), p. 137. 
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The Vahini took up work in other areas but Bodh Gaya was its first major 
experiment in intensive work for the education and organisation of people into 
organs of struggle. Bodh Gaya remained its major focus. Although it may 
have had some far reaching implications the work was limited. For example, it 
focused upon, or rather against, one particular body, the Bodh Gaya Matt. 
This seemed to go against JP's earlier directions that action be directed against 
the evil that has to be fought, rather than against any individual group or one 
party, 16 though of course the Matt was seen to epitomise injustice on the rural 
scene just as Mrs Gandhi's Congress had come to symbolise the impurities of 
government. Thus although the work in Bodh Gaya might have been limited, 
the Vahini viewed it as an important experiment in social revolution amongst the 
masses and as a catalyst to action on the rural scene. Indeed this was how JP 
envisaged the work of the CYSV which he regarded as the revolutionary 
vanguard. It was never seen to represent the whole revolution, which he 
thought would be more along the lines of janata sarkar or lok samiti the work of 
which was to educate and organise the people to take responsibility for their 
own affairs, at the same time struggling against injustices that impeded their 
progress. 
III. NBJK AND LOK SAMM  
1. 	Elections and the Party Process  
JP had foreseen an active and continuous role for people in the working of 
government through the lok samitis. He hoped that lok samiti activities would 
include choosing and supporting candidates for election. NBJK tried to 
16 Jayapralcash Narayan, "Moral Regeneration", pp.32 - 33. 
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mobilise the support of the lok samitis for a Janata party candidate in the 1984 
General Election. Strictly speaking NBJK could not become involved in 
government elections because of its terms of registration. However, the NBJK 
members took leave from the organisation so as to overcome this technicality. 
The candidate whom they supported in 1984 was a follower of JP and 
originally he had planned to stand as an independent. Later he joined the Janata 
party ticket believing that this would improve his chances and the members of 
the NBJK maintained their support for him. NBJK failed to mobilise the 
people and the candidate was not successful. It seemed that the electorate was 
not interested in elections or it was afraid. Instead the elections were 
determined by influential people with money and goondas who captured polling 
booths so that even those who wanted to cast their votes were prevented. In 
addition it was thought that many of those who were able and had wanted to 
vote had been moved by Mrs Gandhi's assassination. 17 
There are two factors here: firstly that the NBJK supported candidate was 
defeated and secondly that NBJK had very little effect at all. People did not 
relate their lok samitis to the political structure. Moreover the election 
experience resulted in scepticism amongst lok samiti members regarding 
NBJK's motives. They thought that it was not possible to work for both the 
poor and politics and that power politics and development were quite different 
concepts. Thus NBJK's participation gave rise to a competing identity. 
Consequently it had to rethink its role and whilst it did not eliminate the 
possibility of participating in elections again, it had no immediate plans. The 
December 1984 elections demonstrated that there had been a failure by people in 
the area where NBJK was working, to link the wider political structure to their 
situation. 
17 Prabhunath Sharma, Secretary NBJK, Bahera Ashram, 2.10.1985. 
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JP had seen a role for the lok samitis in choosing people's candidates, honesty 
being the most important selection criteria. The essence of the concept was to 
focus on the person, not the party. NBJK did this but the lok samitis were not 
involved in the selection process. They did not choose any delegates to be 
responsible for nominating candidates as JP had suggested or have any other 
say in the candidate. It was Nl3JK's decision and effectively amounted to an 
hierarchical imposition. In these circumstances the people could not be 
expected to relate the Janata candidate and the election to the people's 
committees. It was no wonder that they saw a competing identity. Power 
politics as they understood it was quite removed from their situation and 
presumably this situation would not have appeared any different. No matter 
that the candidate was honest, the point was that he was not their candidate. 
2. 	Awareness of and Participation in Government  Programmes 
In order to develop people's awareness to the extent that they will confidently 
put forward people's candidates, JP had envisaged their role as watchdog being 
developed. This role would enable them to gain experience in an understanding 
of the workings of government. Lok Samiti emphasised this and its major 
approach (as well as that of NBJK through the lok samitis), was to publicise 
people's rights and entitlements, government reforms and programmes from 
which people might benefit. For example NBJK workers promoted various 
government schemes designed to benefit specific disadvantaged groups. The 
provision of cheap credit facilities was an important scheme as lack of credit 
was a binding constraint preventing the conversion of poor economically non-
viable households into economically viable ones. Access to credit facilities 
gave the beneficiaries some degree of independence from money-lenders or 
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employers as well as boosting their confidence. The NBJK workers often 
assisted potential beneficiaries in their applications, at least initially. Now it 
seemed that many villagers, both men and women, who were involved with the 
lok samitis in NBJK's area, were approaching the Block and bank offices 
themselves; this suggested that their confidence and independence were 
growing. 18 
3. 	Struggle 
Sometimes the people came up against bureaucratic inertia delaying receipt of 
their rights, or corruption within the government offices as officials demanded 
some consideration for the provision of facilities. Usually when this occurred 
the first step taken was to report the problem to the Block Development Officer 
(BDO), the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), and finally to the District 
Commissioner. Both the Lok Samiti infrastructure and the availability of the 
NBJK workers played an important role here in assisting claimants to go 
through these motions. Often satisfaction could be achieved in this manner but 
if it not, the next step was to continue the process through agitational activity, in 
particular organising processions demonstrating against, and thus drawing 
people's attention to the injustices perpetrated. Such demonstrations were 
organised by the peasants themselves with the NBJK workers perhaps having 
created the awareness and confidence for such a venture. In accordance with 
NBJK's registration with the state government, its workers were not supposed 
to demonstrate against the government or take political action. Nevertheless, 
the people, both men and women, seemed sufficiently enthused to carry on 
alone. 19 Similar types of action were undertaken when problems of non-
payment of minimum wages occurred or when people were refused treatment at 
the hospital unless they paid a bribe. 
18 Interviews with NBJK workers, Bahera Ashram, 1.10.1985. 
19 Ibid. 
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The effectiveness of the lok samitis against local corruption resulted in the 
authorities taking increasing notice of their demands. For example, one 
industry near Tilaiya was not paying the minimum wages, so this was reported 
to the SDO who took the appropriate action. Thus the situation was rectified 
and there was no need for additional agitation. 
However villagers were not always so enthusiastic about supporting activities 
which they did not see as relevant to their interests. Firstly they had to regard it 
as relevant to their situation. For instance, Lok Samiti took a stand against the 
central government's textile policy which placed an increased emphasis on the 
manufacturing sector and much less on the already minor role played by cottage 
industry. The NBJK workers were keen to mobilise the local lok samitis' 
support for the national Lok Samiti's position. However, there was little 
support for this position from the actual lok samitis which did not perceive the 
relevance of this stand to their immediate situation. The NBJK recognised that 
a greater awareness needed to be generated before popular pressure could be 
brought to bear. 
It seemed clear from NBJK's experience that whilst the people might be aware 
of local issues they did not appear to have linked these to the macro-political 
structure. Yet JP had envisaged "total revolution" as including a political 
revolution, at the centre of which would be the lok samitis. 
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IV. SAREEK 
1 . 	Elections and the Party Process 
In West Bengal the general populace tended to be more aware of elections as 
political parties were more competitive and so played a more active role in 
mobilising people towards elections. For its part SAREEK tried to remain 
apolitical in accordance with its registration. Moreover whilst seeking to 
develop a political consciousness uniting the people across caste lines it down 
played the role of the political party. However, SAREEK did not try to restrict 
the involvement of the youths with political parties. In fact the political parties, 
in particular CPI(M) but also Congress (I) were attracted to the youths involved 
in the Udyog Parishads and the associated clubs in an attempt to develop their 
party organisation in these areas.2° 
The parties perceived the youths as motivated people concerned with mobilising 
the people towards the same sort of goals. Thus the parties actively recruited 
their membership. So in the Raidhighi area, for example, most of the male club 
members belonged to the political parties.21 Nevertheless, the youths did not 
appear to comprehend any link between the political structure and the situation 
in the villages nor was it clear as to just what they expected of the political 
parties. Generally they were not familiar with the parties' manifestoes or 
programmes22 and they did not believe that they had much influence on party 
decisions. Instead they found that they were expected to be bound by party 
decisions that did not allow much for the local situations. They perceived the 
20 Interview between myself and Indrajit Samanta, SAREEK headquarters, Calcutta, 
29.8.1985. 
21 Discussion between myself, SAREEK workers, instructors and local volunteers, 
9.9.1985 at Raidighi. 
22 Indrajit Samanta, 29.8.1985. 
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parties as bureaucratic and hierarchical. 23 Moreover, they expressed their 
concern at their inability to control local representatives from acting purely for 
self-gain such as swapping political parties after the elections.24 
JP had urged that those participating in the process of moral regeneration ought 
not to belong to any political party, otherwise their actions probably would not 
transcend partisan motivation.25 However, the SAREEK youths tended to 
separate their party political work from the community development type work 
which they associated with the Udyog Parishad and SAREEK. This seemed 
very much in accordance with SAREEK's aim to develop a new political 
consciousness that was quite distinct from the power politics of the parties and 
involved an independence of thought. Indeed they sought to keep an open 
mind to party directives and concentrated on working with each other rather 
than opposing each other politically. For example, the CPI(M), at the block 
and district levels, was alleged to have urged that with respect to the registration 
of bargadar titles, preference be given to CPI(M) supporters at the expense of 
and even possible eviction of non-CPI(M) people, thus hoping to strengthen its 
position. 26 However those SAREEK youths who were also members of 
CPI(M) reasoned that a sharecropper was still a sharecropper no matter what 
his political affiliation. Their concern was to ensure justice for the 
sharecroppers. 
Another situation where the CPI(M) members apparently came into conflict 
with the CPI(M) hierarchy was regarding the payment of minimum wages. In 
many cases the SAREEK people advocated a negotiated wage on the grounds 
of a fair wage for work done and the amount the farmer could afford to pay.27 
23 Meeting at Raidighi, 9.9.1985. 
24 ibid . 
25 Supra, Chapter Three. 
26 Indrajit Samanta, 29.8.1985. 
27 ibid . 
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In some cases this was less than in others and the point was that if the minimum 
wage was pushed then some farmers would not be able to afford to employ 
anyone and the land would be unproductive. It was an exercise in community 
cooperation and the local CPI(M) committees seemed to acquiesce; thus in 
effect the SAREEK workers were able to influence party policy at the local 
level, acting as watchdogs in the interest of their villages. The community spirit 
with which they approached their task seemed very much in line with JP's 
thinking. In fact JP advocated that in the absence of participatory democracy 
the political parties ought to assume responsibility for ensuring a fair 
distribution of land and a general prevalence of justice and equality on the rural 
scene.28 JP's attitude towards political parties seemed to have been a question 
of balance and indeed this was what the SAREEK youths appeared to be trying 
to achieve. 
2. 	Awareness of and Participation in Government  Programmes 
Rather than focus on elections and parties SAREEK urged the youth groups to 
be vigilant and take action for themselves. They did this quite independently of 
SAREEK. For example, the Narayangarh Udyog Parishad undertook a 
government promoted gobar programme. Under this the government paid for 
the gobar units and the recipient households were responsible for labour, 
cement, blue metal, provision of a toilet and actual installation. The Udyog 
Parishad approached the Kharagpur IIT which had developed a very efficient 
gobar unit. Subsequently a workshop on the installation and maintenance of 
gobar units was organised. Thus it was that the government provided most of 
the funding, the HT provided the expertise and SAREEK contributed nothing 
beyond its initial organisational work that had brought the Udyog Parishad into 
28 Jayapralcash Narayan, "The Land Grabbers", (1965). Reprinted in Jayaprakash Narayan, 
Towards Total Revolution, vol.3: India and Her Problems, ed Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular 
Pralcashan, 1978), p.130. 
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being. However, SAREEK provided continual moral support and the director 
was asked to participate in the presentation of gobar training certificates. 
The gobar units, which took animal and human excreta as well as all kinds of 
vegetable waste, could provide a valuable role in conserving forests, producing 
a good source of organic fertiliser and encouraging the use of a toilet, thus 
reducing the amount of open defecation and associated spreading of diseases 
and worms. The local cultural team put on a performance after the prize giving 
in order to demonstrate the benefits of biogas. 
When the biogas programme first began only a few households took an 
interest, and mostly they were related to members of the Udyog Parishad. 
Others did not understand what it was about and were rather sceptical for 
despite the government subsidy it still involved a considerable financial 
commitment. To construct a toilet could cost from between 80 rupees and 140 
rupees,29 while the statutory minimum wage for an agricultural labourer in 
West Bengal was just under 15 rupees a day (1985). Also many people were 
suspicious about using toilets and about cooking with gas but through the 
example of the first few participants many others became involved. 
Nevertheless it was of little use to the very poor, who could not afford a toilet 
and were too preoccupied with wondering where their next meal was coming 
from. 
This project clearly was an important community development constructive 
programme with implications in general education, health, environmental and 
quality of life issues, raising lokniti. In addition by taking advantage of such a 
government initiated programme, it would seem that organisations could use the 
29 Interview between myself and Indrajit Samanta, Daharpur, Narayangargh, 20.2.1985. 
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state structure, rajniti, to expand lokniti. It just needed grass roots 
implementation if it was to be effective. The Udyog Parishad's involvement 
showed growing initiative and confidence. Other projects undertaken by many 
clubs mobilising government resources included the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme and social forestry. 
3. 	Struggle 
The SAREEK clubs were not strong in the area of struggle for they showed 
some reluctance by the clubs in following up their projects if they confronted 
government inertia or resistance. For example people in the Raidighi area 
simply took a fatalistic attitude when contractors, who were employed by the 
local government, did not sink the tube wells to a sufficient depth, pocketing 
the money instead. Clean drinking water was a national problem and was 
included as one of the priorities on Congress(I)'s twenty point programme. 
The situation on the Sundarban Islands, Raidighi area, was especially acute due 
to the low lying land and salinity of the region. The villagers complained about 
the situation to SAREEK but were reluctant to take their complaints to the 
contractor and the government. Their lack of education tended to undrmine 
their confidence to assert themselves. Nevertheless, it was clear that the youth 
groups gradually were assuming some watchdog role as they were becoming 
actively interested and involved in the management of government resources. 
V . 	IMSE 
1. 	Elections and the Party Process  
With its Naxalite background, IMSE had been rather sceptical of political 
parties and elections. It did not support or encourage support for any political 
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party. This was a question for individuals. If IMSE did proffer advice then it 
was to suggest supporting candidates on merit rather than on the basis of any 
political party. Alternatively, it could support a boycott of the booths in order 
to demonstrate what it regarded as the farcical nature of elections. In assessing 
the eighth General Election (December 1984) the Santali monthly bulletin, 
published by IMSE, pointed out that no more than 60% of the voters went to 
the polling booths to cast their votes while the remaining 40% were 
indifferent. 30 Further, it doubted whether the common people consciously 
exercised their franchise, stating that 65% of the population were illiterate and 
ignorant, unconscious of their own rights.31 Thus it concluded that the 
casting of votes was done out of inertia. 32 It criticised the government for not 
trying to build up awareness amongst the electorate about elections and 
government processes generally. 33 IMSE was more concerned with 
developing its alternative society than with supporting and improving the 
current system through the ballot box. 
2. 	Awareness of and Participation in Government  Programmes 
Nevertheless given that the modern idiom prevailed and that people had to 
contribute to it by way of taxes, IMSE also played an active role as a guardian 
of the people's resources invested in the current system of government, that is 
as a watchdog. In this role IMSE became involved with a number of 
government programmes. These included training programmes such as 
anganwadi workers under the ICDS; building smokeless chullas which were 
also associated with ICDS; khadi spinning and weaving and other trades. The 
30 "Election and our People", IMSE NEWS BULLETIN, IV (December - January 1985): 1 - 
2. 
31 Ibid. 
32 mid . 
33 Ibid. 
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government chose the students and teachers for these courses. Nevertheless 
IMSE sought to influence those involved. Assemblies with lectures based on 
IMSE ideology were held early in the morning and were followed by the IMSE 
song. Then in the evening trainees gathered for informal type meetings led by 
IMSE leaders to teach and encourage the singing of freedom songs. IMSE 
sought to introduce the trainees to as many new ideas as possible. For 
example, in February 1985 all the ICDS trainees attended a conference for rural 
newspapers, a conference that arose largely as a result of IMSE's attempts to 
develop greater cooperation in sharing news, promoting issues and training 
journalists by establishing a Rural Press Service. Thus these courses served to 
reach and conscientise other sections of the populace with a further view to their 
spreading the IMSE word, particularly through ICDS workers. The 
participants' reaction to this 'indoctrination' 34 was mixed. According to Rabi 
Dasgupta, the principal at Pannagram Training Centre, the IMSE college at 
Labpur, most of those involved in longer term courses developed a favourable 
response; however, there tended to be some resistance with the short courses 
(that is one to two weeks) to this 'brainwashing'. 35 
The extent to which 'brainwashing' replaced rather than supplemented IMSE's 
efforts at dialogue was not clear. The government-sponsored training 
programmes differed from the adult education classes. With adult education the 
main aim was to liberate the oppressed. However, the main aim of the 
government-sponsored training programmes was to train people according to 
the government's volition, for example in a trade or in health care. There was a 
specific time period in which to undertake the programme, varying from a few 
days to a few months and there was some set syllabus. The type of dialogue 
envisaged by Freire does not fit in with this situation. 
34 Interview with Rabi Dasgupta, Labpur campus, 29.1.1985. 
35Ibid. 
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IMSE realised the limitations of these programmes but rationalised that these 
programmes were going to be undertaken any way. Furthermore, they 
provided IMSE with entry points into communities that it might not otherwise 
have had. IMSE was able to demonstrate its concern with basic issues that 
affected day to day living by its association with government programmes such 
as health and job training skills. Thus it developed a relationship with the 
people involved, strengthening its position with regard to their communities. 
So IMSE's influence spread. Also IMSE believed that it could use these 
programmes to undermine the prevailing power structures. On the one hand 
this was done directly by teaching the participants the job skills for which the 
courses were designed; these new skills enabled the participants to gain 
independence and confidence that would help them stand up for their rights and 
against oppression. On the other hand IMSE directly challenged participants' 
consciousness by exposing them to as many new ideas as possible, including 
the IMSE way. For example, the smokeless chulla programmes also provided 
scope for this type of consciousness building. Smokeless chullas were a 
special design of mud stoves. They were built with chimneys that diverted the 
smoke outside. The training course provided IMSE with an opportunity to 
expand the curriculum to include environmental issues and the need for 
domestic consumers to conserve energy, as well as explain how it was actually 
the large commercial enterprises that were the main exploiters. Thus IMSE 
sought to educate and influence its students. 
IMSE constantly emphasised that the basic concern was poverty. This was 
brought out by the anganwadi workers who not only taught mothers about 
nutrition but about the causes of malnutrition as they demanded to know from 
the mothers: "why don't you feed the child sufficient food?" "Why can't you 
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afford proper food?" "Why are you poor?".36 Thus the aim was not simply to 
treat the symptoms but to use the health programmes as a means to conscientise 
the people. It was argued that to treat people with conventional medicines only, 
such as antibiotics and vitamins, would help perpetuate their plight. The point 
was that the diseases from which they suffered were often diseases of poverty 
and unless they overcame their impoverished situation they would not 
overcome the diseases. This approach had some parallels with Gandhi's views 
on medicine for he warned that by treating people's symptoms the doctor 
promoted a continuation of the lifestyle that caused those symptoms. 37 
In addition to the government-sponsored training and health schemes, IMSE 
became involved with the central government's nodal agency scheme. 38 This 
could have enabled it to wield a great deal of influence in determining which 
other non-government agencies should receive government funding, if the 
scheme could have worked effectively. In so far as the direction of these 
resources assisted people to become independent and confident so that they 
would stand up for their rights and assume greater power within the state 
structure, it gradually decentralised it. However, the responsibility would have 
placed IMSE in danger of compromising itself vis a vis the government for it 
had to conform to certain government requirements if it was to continue in this 
role. Consequently, it may not have been able to put the resources to what it 
regarded as people's maximum benefit within government guidelines. The fact 
remained that if IMSE did not assume this responsibility the task might have 
gone to another organisation that would have been less effective than IMSE in 
ensuring the expansion of people's power. 
36 Interview with Rabi Dasgupta and Biblap Halim, Labpur campus, 29.1.1985. 
37 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Hind Swarai, 1909, reprinted in Gandhi, The Collected  
Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.X, (Ahmedabad: The Publications Division, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1963), p.35. 
38 Supra, Chapter Six. 
3 . 	Struggle 
Besides its direct cooperation type involvement in government schemes, IMSE 
operated at another level to raise lokniti, that is the grass roots level. It 
encouraged people to take up issues and struggle in order to ensure their just 
treatment by government authorities. IMSE mobilised people both for general 
and specific causes. 
One general and far-reaching attempt at mobilisation was the organisation of a 
300 kilometer Great March from Bolpur to Calcutta in 1983. Both IMSE 
members and other villagers were invited to join in. The simple step of 
participation forced those involved to be confronted with the issues that were 
raised such as minimum wages, dowry, afforestation and price rises. It also 
engendered an atmosphere of struggle. During the evenings, workshops and 
seminars were held and at the end of the march a huge rally with speakers was 
organised. By popularising these issues and involving general participation 
IMSE not only stirred people's consciousness and boosted their confidence, it 
drew the government's attention to their concerns. Many similar smaller scale 
marches were organised at the district level. They were well planned 
beforehand in order to: maximise their effectiveness as training programmes 
for the participants; direct the issues to the attention of relevant government 
authorities; and publicise IMSE's role in seeking to overcome the difficulties. 
In addition the participants were brought together, and through group 
participation they became more confident about standing up to the authorities 
for their rights and about finding solutions to the problems themselves. Thus 
the marches demonstrated also the importance of organisation for the purpose 
of overcoming their situation. 
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Two specific causes for struggle with which IMSE was involved included the 
failure of the Block Office to provide loans for the purchase of handlooms 
promised by the government, and wage struggles. The handloom incident 
involved 60 women who wanted to form a cooperative. In 1982 these women, 
from Labpur block, underwent government sponsored training in handloom at 
the Pannagram Training Centre with the expectation of government support in 
establishing a cooperative. However, the applications were shelved by the 
panchayat office and despite numerous deputations they received no 
satisfaction. 39 Basically the problem was one of apathy on the part of the 
administration. Despite their frustrations these largely illiterate women 
maintained their commitment and a united front. Finally on 30 March, 1985 ten 
women started a fast until death outside their Block Office. The fast lasted for 
57 hours and ended when government officials agreed to organise a meeting 
with the women in order to discuss their demands. The meeting was arranged 
for 19 April, 1985, when the problems were sorted out and after which loans 
started being made available to the women. The women involved were not 
actually members of IMSE but they received their initial training from IMSE 
and the organisation provided them with moral support and guidance over the 
years of their struggle. 
One wage struggle with which IMSE was involved occurred in July 1985 when 
IMSE organised strikes amongst agricultural labourers in support of a claim for 
the payment of minimum wages both in Bihar and West Bengal, that is eight 
rupees and ten paise in Bihar and almost 15 rupees in West Bengal. A number 
of agitations were arranged in support of the strikes. The strikers met with 
considerable resistance from the landlords who launched attacks, apparently 
39"Training of the Distressed Women for Self-Employment ends in Smoke", IMSE NEWS  
BULLETIN, IV (February 1985): 3 - 4. 
244 
with police support, against the strikers. Many IMSE members were arrested. 
However they persisted in their demands. Eventually payment of the minimum 
wage was achieved in Bihar while in West Bengal a compromise was reached 
with the payment of ten rupees plus some paddy. 
As Nodal agency in West Bengal IMSE would have had to be careful as to how 
it involved itself in such struggles. According to IMSE's ideology it was more 
concerned with developing an alternative society than with watching the right 
ordering of the current one. Yet IMSE was very much involved with this latter 
approach. In so far as the state existed and held the forces of power to which 
people must contribute IMSE was concerned to make the state work for its 
cause as far as possible by mobilising government resources, and demanding 
good government policies and their effective implementation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Linking the organisation to the macro-political structure would seem to increase 
people's participation in government, making it more effective in its response to 
people's needs. Although it is not clear that the organisations were able to 
directly affect government policies they were able to ensure the effective 
implementation of some government policies that were intended for their 
benefit, with improvements in health and material well-being. This led to an 
increase in confidence amongst people involved. Further the programmes 
provided scope for general awareness about many issues: social, 
environmental and political; this was very important if a comprehensive 
approach towards "total revolution" was to be taken. In so far as confidence 
and awareness were raised government forces were decentralised to the extent 
that they were more responsive to people's needs, thus helping democracy to 
work more effectively and honestly. It was a move towards good government. 
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JP also hoped that good government would facilitate self-government as it 
would generate an environment that would favour the growth of lokniti from 
below, gradually erasing the need for the state structure. However, JP did not 
anticipate that lokniti would develop spontaneously in order to promote good 
government. He believed it required a deliberate and conscious effort to 
mobilise the grass roots forces to that end, thus entailing a balanced approach: 
diminishing rajniti by actively working for good government, and expanding 
lokniti by organising for self-government. JP seemed to envisage them as two 
parallel and complementary forces, but they also appear contradictory. To raze 
rajniti by working for good government would surely strengthen that system by 
making it more representative, thus reducing the need for any alternative 
structure. JP seemed to appreciate this point too, and explained that it would 
take a long time before his ideal of Janata Sarkar was achieved, if ever. What 
seems to have been important in JP's approach was his belief in the role of the 
individual while taking cognisance of prevailing state structures, and he 
constantly strove to reconcile the two in a voluntarist type of approach. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
OVERVIEW OF VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS IN RELATION TO 
ACHIEVEMENT OF JP'S GOALS 
The influence of JP's ideas could be found in the work of the four 
organisations that have been studied, although no definitive conclusions can be 
drawn as to their providing a blueprint for social change. This chapter will sum 
up the parallels in their ideas with those of JP and it will draw out the issues 
that arose as a result of attempts to implement them, but firstly it will look again 
at the broader context affecting the working of JP's ideas within the various 
organisations. These concern the Bihar and West Bengal socio-cultural 
contexts. 
I. 	BIHAR AND WEST BENGAL SOCIO-CULTURAL  
CONTEXT 
Some differences could be noted in the operations of IMSE and SAREEK on 
the one hand, and the CYSV and Lok Samiti on the other. First was the use of 
education by both IMSE and SAREEK starting with matters which were of 
interest and relevance to the villagers' lives using the local environment, 
language and culture as primary media of education. At the same time they 
seemed to be aware that education was a two-way process and they were 
concerned to draw on all participants to contribute to the educational process. 
The role of education was treated very much as one of awareness raising and 
was pursued not only through education classes and cultural performances but 
day to day issues such as health. 
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West Bengal has a strong tradition of education which was demonstrated by the 
widespread use of vernacular newspapers last century. This was also another 
characteristic of IMSE's and SAREEK's approaches and could be seen in 
IMSE's association with the Rural Press Agency, and SAREEK's use of a 
newspaper in order to widen communications with the local groups. There 
seemed to be a widespread interest in popular education throughout Bengal. 
This came out in SAREEK's ability to link up with the youth groups by 
promoting their active involvement in education projects. The Bengali 
philosophers, Rammohun Roy and Rabindranath Tagore, played an important 
role in promoting popular education, and Tagore particularly strove hard to 
gain maximum benefit for the whole community. Tagore's legacy was apparent 
in the work of both IMSE and SAREEK. IMSE sought to add to it by studying 
the work of Paulo Freire, who specifically worked with exploited people. 
Education proved to be a very useful tool for both IMSE and SAREEK and it 
was not used to the same extent by CYSV and Lok Samiti as an integral part of 
their overall approach, although, for example, the NBJK workers recognised 
the value of cultural tools as a means of education. 
The two Bihar organisations, especially Lok Samiti, stressed the total 
involvement of the whole village with all sectors being adequately represented. 
Lok Samiti's approach would seem to be very Gandhian. Further its main 
office was on the same site as the headquarters of the Sarva Seva Sangh in 
Varanasi. This was not to say that IMSE and SAREEK did not share this ideal 
or were any less successful at achieving it but they did not give it the same 
immediate emphasis. IMSE on the one hand stressed democratic centralism and 
SAREEK's approach was to gradually try and expand a relatively elite group 
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firstly with regard to their consciousness and secondly with regard to their 
participation. IMSE's approach clearly showed its Maoist influence as it 
stressed the organisation rather than the individual. Whereas JP saw 
organisation as a means to strengthen the individual, IMSE seemed to use the 
individual as a means to strengthen the organisation. IMSE had a strong Maoist 
background that showed in its overtly political outlook such as its Long March 
campaigns, its criticism of the electoral process, and its antagonism towards the 
various political parties. It was perhaps JP's own Marxist background that 
encouraged him to depart from Vinoba's ostensibly Gandhian position of gentle 
persuasion to actively challenging the prevailing political order. Certainly JP 
acknowledged the importance of the Naxalite's position in challenging his 
thinking. 
II. 	COMMON THEMES BETWEEN JP'S IDEAS AND THE  
VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS  
JP's ideas were drawn out earlier. He had many interests but his ultimate goal 
was "total revolution" or partyless democracy focusing on the worth of every 
individual and on the mutual responsibility of everyone to each other. It is on 
this goal that attention has focused in this thesis seeking to determine whether 
JP's ideas on this matter were relevant to voluntary organisations also seeking a 
similar objective. The four organisations studied seemed to be in sympathy 
with his ideal. The CYSV and Lok Samiti which were launched by JP 
specifically hoped to achieve a "total revolution" in every sphere and aspect of 
society. IMSE with its Marxist background differed in many respects from 
JP's general ideas but its communist vision of a stateless society was very 
similar to the ultimate goal. Likewise IMSE's recognition of the need to act 
mainly outside the prevailing parliamentary state institutions paralleled JP's 
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focus on extra parliamentary work. SAREEK which also had only indirect 
links with JP stressed extra constitutional work too but it did not actually 
profess to any ultimate vision. Nevertheless it worked very much in the 
voluntarist idiom seeking to effect immediate albeit gradual changes towards 
expanding lokniti. In practice this was how JP and the other organisations 
worked. They gave priority to raising consciousness, increasing popular 
participation, developing a popular solidarity as well as keeping watch over the 
prevailing government structure in order to ensure its most effective working. 
JP emphasised a number of steps that he saw as necessary to achieve this end. 
These includeethe need for trained motivators, an adequate organisational 
structure, coalition building or networking, a balanced constructive programme, 
proper funding and vigilance over the government. The following sections will 
briefly sum up how the four respective organisations tackled these steps. 
Although their approaches demonstrate their different socio-cultural 
backgrounds, the significance of the sort of ideas JP had to their work is also 
apparent. Nevertheless this does not provide a clear cut path towards "total 
revolution". 
1. 	Trained, Motivators 
Promoting the use of trained motivators by both JP and the organisations 
presented a potential dilemma in seeking to establish autonomous local 
organisations for the outside organisers created a possible sense of dependency 
by the local groups. All the organisations were very aware of this. For his 
part, JP had hopes for the type of approach that the CYSV adopted. It was an 
organisation of trained motivators and provided its members with training and 
organisational support. Its members were young people for they tend not to be 
burdened with family and other responsibilities. They concentrated their work 
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in areas that they considered to manifest gross injustices. Their work required 
their active involvement in the local communities. Furthermore, the young 
motivators were required to be dependent on the grass roots for their well-
being. This had important implications in that on the one hand, there was a 
reciprocal type of dependence being developed, and on the other, the turnover 
of motivators provided a continuous stream of new influences and also reduced 
dependence on any individual. 
Although JP had high hopes for the students he recognised the transient nature 
of their involvement. Thus he acknowledged that they could not be relied upon 
to keep up the momentum necessary for any revolutionary change in the 
country. 1 The CYSV experience would seem to support this argument for 
although it would appear to have been an educative experience for its members, 
the actual extent of the work was limited by the numbers involved. 
Consequently JP did not expect the students to have a monopoly on this type of 
field work. 
In contrast SAREEK had two levels of motivators: those who were based with 
the headquarters group; and those who emerged from the local youth within the 
Udyog Parishad structures. SAREEK's aim was to tap into existing local 
groups using local workers. Thus SAREEK hoped to ensure the workers 
permanancy and maximise local responsibility as well as ensure workers' 
sensitivity to local concerns and committment to the area. Meanwhile the 
headquarters group stayed quite apart from the local movements. However, 
SAREEK also employed a number of local field workers whose position was 
somewhat ambivalent in their relationship between the two structures. Also 
1 Jayaprakash Narayan, "Total Revolution: Some Clarifications." Interview with 
Brahmanand, Patna, December 1977. Published in Jayapralcash Narayan, Towards Total  
Revolution vol.4: Total Revolution ed. Brahmanand (Bombay: Popular Pralcashan, 1978), 
p.199. 
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there still remained the problem of devolving power from the local leadership 
through the community. Nevertheless, the new leadership structures that 
SAREEK encouraged bore a number of parallels to JP's ideas. JP had wanted 
to mobilise youths to provide leadership in the development of a new village 
committee structure. SAREEK was seeking to do the same, although it 
envisaged the new village committees as developing from an expansion of the 
youth structures whereas JP saw the two working hand in hand. 
For its part NBJK recruited a number of skilled motivators to promote a 
separate organisation, Lok Samiti. Usually they had prior organisational 
experience and had wider links with other groups. Such contacts were 
encouraged by NBJK. In order that the local lok samitis not be dependent on 
NBJK's continued presence the field workers had an independent identity from 
the lok samiti structures that were established. They worked at the local level 
but were not local people and remained separate from the local organisational 
structure. Yet in so far as they motivated, initiated and supported the 
organisation of the lok samitis they were the mainstays of that organisation. 
Moreover, they received a small stipend from NBJK and were not dependent 
on their local communities for food and shelter. However, the type of work 
that they undertook was probably much the same as envisaged for the Vahini 
youth. 
IMSE's approach was different because its emphasis was on its own 
organisation and the commitment of the local groups to it, but it also recognised 
the value of individual contributions which were likely to be inhibited by any 
sense of dependence involved in the relationships within the organisation. 
IMSE's motivators came from within its own ranks although the founders 
remained its principal leaders. This meant that the motivators were committed 
to IMSE's cause. The emerging leadership were generally based in their local 
areas. Occasionally though if IMSE sought to develop new areas bringing them 
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within IMSE it moved workers into those areas, but it tried to do this with 
caution and sensitivity for the local environment.. 
2. 	Organisational Structure 
JP's concept of a far reaching representative organisational structure with 
autonomous local groups suggested contradictions in how to achieve this sort 
of inverted pyramid in a society that was structured, both politically and 
socially, the other way around. 
These problems were demonstrated by NBJK's work with Lok Samiti. The 
Lok Samiti aimed to operate on JP's inverted pyramid structure by giving 
support to and practical experience in self-government. It was based on a 
confederation of autonomous lok samitis based in different villages and adapted 
according to local conditions. In NBJK's experience it was a very loose 
organisation that served mainly as a means of disseminating information to the 
lok samiti regarding government policies and the availability of government 
programmes. Not all of this was understood by the lok samitis which were not 
really autonomous bodies at that stage and did not appear to have strong links 
with other levels of Lok Samiti. Moreover local participation by Harijans and 
women was low. Both groups were being encouraged to increase their 
involvement: Harijans were forming separate organisations, and women 
participated in lok samiti programmes. Again the situation presented the 
problem of having to accept a lesser participation at that time in order to 
generate momentum for fuller participation. 
JP had hoped that the CYS V might provide a means to overcome this. The 
CYSV was two-pronged in its organisational structure. On the one hand it was 
an organisation designed to give youths direction, and on the other to provide a 
revolutionary vanguard. Thus it aimed to raise consciousness both within and 
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outside its organisations, but the CYSV mainly attracted educated middle class 
youths and as such it did not develop into the mass organisation that JP hoped. 
However, in so far as the CYSV pursued grass roots organisational work it 
achieved a fairly high degree of representativeness. Its organisational structure 
was specifically designed to encourage members' participation within the larger 
community. Members were required to be non-communal and had to be 
prepared to live With the people with whom they worked. This approach must 
have had some influence on the local communities. It must be noted though 
that, CYSV specifically chose to work with relatively homogeneous 
communities so that organisation could be facilitated in its efforts to develop a 
model for struggle 
SAREEK started with a narrow base, that of interested, relatively aware youth 
groups, and it did not try to establish representative village committees although 
it encouraged the youth groups to move in this direction. Gradually the youth 
groups began to expand their membership, structure and content, thus raising 
the consciousness of the club participants and the wider community. Initially 
there had been some resistance to the devolution of power but participation 
appeared to be widening. In many instances the participation of women took 
the form of separate mahila mandals. SAREEK's organisational structure was 
very locally based and its aim was to strengthen the grass roots rather than 
devise an alternative structure of government. Therefore it was not faced with 
the same inverted pyramid contradiction. 
LMSE, which had a very strong organisational structure, minimised the pyramid 
contradiction in so far as it was based on democratic centralism so that whilst 
the broad masses had scope to communicate with the top echelons, they 
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remained at the base. It emphasised the individual's role in strengthening the 
organisation which could draw on everyone's knowledge, experience and 
support. As such it was a centralised albeit democratic organisation that 
emphasised the importance of establishing and maintaining two-way channels 
of communication thus serving as an educative process for both the 
organisational hierarchy and the grass roots. It targeted its membership at poor 
peasants and labourers and sought to cut across social barriers. However, the 
participation of women was poor. So IMSE also presented a contradiction in 
so far as its organisation faced a lack of representativeness of the more 
depressed sectors within the organisation. IMSE recognised this situation and 
continually sought to educate its current members while encouraging those not 
yet involved. It believed that people would only be reached by taking 
cognisance of the prevailing social structures and it did not expect to suddenly 
move beyond this. Rather it was a process of education and organisation. 
3. 	Coalition Building or Networking 
Forming a coalition can be a strengthening process but it may mean 
compromising ideals or promoting other organisations. This contradiction was 
recognised by Mao who still thought that it was useful to cultivate class allies in 
an effort to strengthen one's own position. JP's movement was faced with 
many contradictions when it joined forces with other groups for the dismissal 
of Mrs Gandhi's government. The others, notably the political parties and their 
supporters did not share JP's long term goals. Realising this, JP sought to 
maintain a distinction between short and long term goals although they were not 
always clear to everyone else. JP also hoped that coalitions need not be 
competitive, rather they might be complementary. This was the sort of 
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relationship that he envisaged for CYSV and Lok Samiti. The Lok Samiti 
guidelines made provision for the active involvement of CYSV, but CYSV did 
not seem to have been interested. As such it did not work as actively with the 
Lok Samiti as JP had hoped. Instead CYSV concentrated on specific struggles 
rather than developing a mass movement. 
Nevertheless individual Vahini members had links with other organisations and 
the Vahini promoted a farmers' and labourers' movement aimed to unite its 
members and strengthen their position in times of struggle. 
Meanwhile NBJK hoped to introduce the lok samitis to other influences. 
However, the lok samitis appeared to be weak in this regard although they 
seemed to be making strong links with each other especially for the purpose of 
achieving certain goals such as the removal of the brothel and of local 
government corruption. 
For its own part, NBJK had strong affiliations with other organisations and so 
did its field workers. NBJK actively pursued complementary coalition 
building tactics on a broad scale. For example, its association with AVARD, 
which was also strongly associated with JP, involved sharing resources, 
expertise and information in the interests of rural development. It was a form 
of networking. Such associations may have involved NBJK in assisting 
organisations that they perceived as more conservative but it would have been a 
reciprocal relationship. The benefits derived from membership of AVARD 
were useful to the general well-being of all its members. This is really the 
essence of coalition. Different, perhaps competing, organisations, which are 
not able to achieve their purposes by themselves, join forces to pool resources 
and gain access to expertise so as to strengthen their position. 
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Similarly IMSE was also a member of AVARD. The EMSE hierarchy promoted 
affiliations with other groups in order to widen its own influence as well as 
draw on their expertise. For example, it was a founding member of the Rural 
Press Agency. It also associated itself with a number of government sponsored 
training programmes as well as the Nodal agency scheme. All these 
connections brought it into contact with a variety of groups. Moreover the fact 
that the government involved IMSE demonstrated a recognition by the 
government of IMSE's strength at developing widespread associations. 
Further, the value of forming coalitions manifested itself at the local level in the 
form of interest groups formed to struggle for specific demands such as the 
khadi spinners who wanted a loan, and the labourers who wanted minimum 
wages. 
Local level coalitions were also found amongst the SAREEK groups. For 
example, the bh lindi cultivators formed their own interest group. Also, the 
Narayangah Udyog Parishad and the Kharagpur HT successfully combined to 
implement the government's subsidised gobar biogas scheme. Moreover the 
Narayangah Udyog Parishad was selected by the government for participation 
in the IRDP. SAREEK headquarters encouraged these developments, and kept 
itself abreast of other groups working in development areas and it also involved 
individual youth group members in training experiences. It sought to promote 
general interest at the local level in the work of other organisations through its 
newspaper and discussions. 
257 
4 . 	Constructive Programme 
Constructive work covers a broad range of ideas from meeting basic needs to 
raising consciousness. It would seem to be important to establish a balance so 
that the different types of work may complement each other rather than be 
undertaken at the expense of each other, otherwise work pursued is likely to be 
undermined also. This was seen with Vinoba's prapti work which really 
needed to be reinforced by pushti and nirman work. Diverting one's attention 
from what may be perceived as the major goal to a subsidiary one may seem to 
be contradictory; for example, putting efforts into food production during a 
struggle situation. Yet as Mao recognised, the struggle front could collapse for 
lack of adequate food. JP's emphasis varied throughout his life but he always 
stressed the need not to upset food production. Moreover his description of the 
people's committees seemed to assume the ongoing nature of constructive 
work. 
This approach did not appear to have been heeded by the CYSV. CYSV was 
concerned to raise people's consciousness by actively involving them in 
intensive struggle campaigns against prevailing injustices, in particular the 
implementation of government land ceiling laws in Bodh Gaya. Other forms of 
constructive work that it undertook such as cooperative farming, breaking 
down social barriers and working against alcoholism tended to be undertaken 
only in so far as they were necessary to the overall struggle programme rather 
than because of any intrinsic value that they represented in moving towards a 
'total revolution'. JP had not envisaged the CYSV as the whole of the 'total 
revolution' although it would seem that he had hoped it would be more 
integrated with the total. 
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The other organisations seemed to be mindful of a more comprehensive 
approach with an emphasis on local identity and resourcefulness in order to 
encourage local responsibility. NBJK was actively involved in a number of 
constructive programmes independently of its work with Lok Samiti such as its 
experimental farm, homeopathic clinic and relief work which served a two-fold 
purpose aimed to promote awareness and contribute towards meeting basic 
needs. In addifion the promotion of Lok Samiti was also a very significant 
form of constructive work. The lok sarnitis themselves undertook a variety of 
practical initiatives in relation to matters such as safe-drinking water, local 
corruption, establishing a gram kosh and developing the concept of lok adlat. 
IMSE's constructive work centred around its education centres from which it 
was able to expand its organisation, develop people's consciousness and initiate 
programmes that were important to the general well-being of its members such 
as grain banks. Its other main approach was its involvement with government 
training schemes and health projects which enabled it to provide important 
services as well as conscientising its participants. 
SAREEK's work also focused on its education centres serving as a means to 
raise awareness and to start other programmes including health projects, science 
clubs, biogas, cooperatives as well as cultural teams who extended the 
educational role of the youth groups. 
5 . 	Funding 
JP had urged that organisational work be largely independent of outside 
funding in order that local organisations would be self-reliant. Outside funding 
presented the obvious contradiction of reducing village level autonomy and 
possibly the viability of the whole organisation in the absence of that funding. 
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The CYSV did not lend financial support to any projects that it promoted at the 
local level and it expected its cadres to be self-reliant. However, it incurred 
some expense in general organisational work and the promotion of campaigns. 
It relied on outside funding from approved individual donations. Its approach 
had important implications in its educational value about the onus and 
responsibility for social change. 
NBJK was self-sufficient to the extent that it could support its members but it 
required some outside funding including monies from overseas sources for 
some of its constructive work for example the payment of its field workers 
involved in lok samiti. However, this money was not directly channelled to the 
lok samitis which were responsible for raising their own revenues such as 
through gram kosh, grain banks, subscriptions, as well as tapping into 
government projects. 
Similarly IMSE and SAREEK encouraged local self-sufficiency. However, 
they also accepted foreign and local donations. In addition they received 
government funding, although they tended to receive it on different terms. The 
SAREEK youth groups applied for government funding independently of 
SAREEK. This was also done by the IMSE committees but the IMSE central 
organisation sought funding too. 
Funding compromised self-reliance and had the danger of binding groups to a 
perverse pattern of linkages. Yet in the absence of adequate financial resources 
it would have been difficult for NBJK, IMSE and SAREEK to undertake any 
substantial projects that were important in promoting their organisational work. 
They all stressed the need for self-reliance and emphasised the use of local 
resources in an effort to counter the shortcomings of the situation. 
6 . 	Demands on Government 
The placing of demands on government so as to ensure good government while 
working for self-government is fraught with contradictions; one tries to 
improve it on the one hand, yet seeks to erode it on the other, and the political 
idioms become interwoven. The relationship between JP and the state was not 
always clear. He urged the government and its bureaucracy to be more 
accountable and he encouraged people's vigilance to ensure that this would 
occur. On the other hand, he also urged people to do without any wing of the 
government if it was not necessary to their condition. 
The activities undertaken by the CYSV basically involved demands on the 
government for good government such as the implementation of land ceiling 
laws in Bodh Gaya, and it actively campaigned against candidates and parties 
that it thought would be detrimental to the cause of good government. 
The Lok Samiti structure actively promoted good government encouraging 
vigilance on the part of the lok samitis to check local government corruption, as 
well as the effective implementation of programmes that directly affected them 
such as safe water and IRDP. However, the NBJK associated lok samitis had 
not yet been associated with the selection of people's candidates at election time 
and they were not interested to vote for NBJK's preferred candidate in spite of 
NBJK's encouragement. 
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Whilst IMSE sought to remain aloof from political parties and the electoral 
process generally, it did see an important role for itself in ensuring good 
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government. For example, IMSE's association with various government 
programmes placed it in a stronger position to ensure a more effective 
implementation of these programmes. It also supported local action against 
government inaction or corruption. In addition, it organised campaigns such as 
the Long March which specifically enunciated its grievances to the government 
and registered a number of demands. 
A number of SAREEK members had some association with various political 
parties but generally there was no actual involvement in electoral activities and 
there was some concern at the lack of accountability by local representatives. 
However, those members who were associated with political parties seemed to 
be able to affect party policy at the local level in what they regarded as the 
community's best interests. The SAREEK groups were also becoming 
increasingly aware and were taking advantage of government-sponsored 
projects although there also appeared to be a reluctance to complain to the 
government if it did not fulfill its promises. 
JP particularly wished to reduce the role of political parties which restricted the 
role of the electorate to the vote and even with that they had no effective choice 
over candidates nor control over policy and representatives. Thus JP promoted 
the concept of people's candidates which he thought would give the electorate a 
real choice and make the execution of their vote relevant. JP hoped that as 
people's candidates gained increasing popularity over party candidates the role 
of parties would decline to such an extent that they would no longer put 
forward candidates. Only people's candidates would stand - one in each 
electorate, making the vote a mere formality. Perhaps the next step would be to 
do away with the vote, for elected representatives would really be controlled 
through the delegates' council. Although JP did not appear to have actually 
suggested this, it would seem to be the logical extension of JP's ideas. The 
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vote demonstrates on the one hand how it could be made into a useful tool with 
the election of people's candidates, and at the same time gradually rendered 
irrelevant. 
JP advocated a partyless democracy and he demanded that party politics be kept 
out of the Lok Samiti and the CYSV although he was prepared for ordinary 
party members to be ordinary members of Lok Samiti. This may seem 
contradictory but perhaps JP regarded this as a way to show those ordinary 
party members that there was an alternative to party politics while making it 
clear that it was quite separate from party politics. The approach of the 
SAREEK groups seemed to parallel Lok Samiti in that whilst political 
affiliations were not banned, there was a consciousness that these were not 
appropriate to their work. For his part, JP's withdrawal from the CSP was 
gradual in that he retained his ordinary membership for a period even after 
joining the bhoodan movement. Given JP's background, one can understand 
his sympathy with ordinary party members who were interested to explore an 
alternative political way. 
However, JP's attitude towards the party system would seem to be more 
complex when one tries to evaluate his role in ousting Mrs Gandhi. JP openly 
supported the defeat of Mrs Gandhi's Congress and the victory of the Janata. 
NBJK's role in the 1984 election presented similar albeit smaller scale 
problems. He seemed to move from advocating self-government to a call for 
good government. Yet JP's point was that to achieve self-government there 
needed to be good government ensuring an environment in which basic 
freedoms could be enjoyed. It was only in this sort of atmosphere that steps 
could be taken towards self-government. Thus the groups had to develop a 
political strategy, of interaction with government structures so as to represent the 
interests of the people with whom they are involved. This largely took the form 
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of publicising of, and involvement in, government schemes that were of 
immediate benefit to group members and supporters, as well as demonstrations 
against government inaction and corruption. The groups were independent 
from political parties, but in so far as they developed a political strategy and 
interacted with political parties and individual politicians they established 
themselves as interest groups seeking good government. Yet at the same time 
they aimed to reduce the need for political parties by gradually developing 
people's organisations and linking with others. The basis of JP's ideas (and 
apparently that of the organisations) was to educate and organise people 
separately from the parliamentary party structure so that they not become mere 
mouthpieces of the parties, and consequently they might assume greater 
responsibility for their own lives. 
This was quite different from Vinoba's approach which seemed to be to try and 
avoid contradictions with the government, parties and large land-owners and 
thus keep voluntarist politics at the margin. Nevertheless Vinoba's approach 
did not reduce the contradictions of working towards self-government within 
the modern idiom. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has not attempted to evaluate the work of JP or the organisations 
but has sought to show the convergence of their ideas, including the difficulties 
that they have presented in implementation. The difficulties that have been 
drawn out emphasise the ongoing nature of their work. JP continually analysed 
his work and was prepared to alter his direction or emphasis. He may have 
been encouraged to do this because of his Marxist beginnings, in particular his 
admiration for M N Roy, but this approach was also consistent with Gandhi's 
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idea of one step at a time. In essence it was the style that the voluntary 
organisations adopted. It seems that this step by step approach is a very 
important strategy in working towards lokniti over rajniti for there are many 
contradictions that are not easily reconciled. What is more important is to 
recognise and come to terms with them. There are many variables involved at 
many different levels as the work of the voluntary organisations showed. It is 
not an exact science that can produce a doctrinaire solution. It is a continuing 
process. 
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CONCLUSION 
The main aims of this thesis have been to examine the ideas of Jayaprakash 
Narayan and show their relevance to India by the way in which they have 
manifested themselves in a number of voluntary organisations. In addition it 
has aimed to show that in so far as these organisations followed ideas similar to 
those of JP they effectively explored the possibilities for the foundation of an 
alternative polity based on voluntarism, emphasising the role of the individual. 
JP's broad philosophy was that of "total revolution" involving political, 
economic, social, educational, cultural and ideological changes. He believed in 
a participatory democracy, that is, a society based on social and economic 
justice where everyone participated in a meaningful way for the ordering of the 
society. Politically, this entailed active and equal participation by individuals. 
This was entailed in his "saintly" or voluntarist concept of lokniti which JP 
believed required a decentralised government structure through which local 
communities would be responsible for local affairs without interference from 
power brokers such as political parties. It also required an atmosphere based 
on mutual concern and respect, not personal power. Moral responsibility of the 
individual was seen as central. Given India's modern political idiom with its 
centralised constitutional structure, characterised by rajniti which involved 
increasing centralisation of power by political parties, moves towards lokniti  
would require a change in political idioms, that would involve a change in 
thinking and mode of behaviour by all individuals. 
Support for JP's ideas could be found in Gandhi's satyagraha philosophy 
which stressed self-government through voluntary cooperation and 
decentralisation. Also there were a number of parallels with Rabindranath 
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Tagore's emphasis on the individual, and with M N Roy who like JP made a 
deliberate shift from emphasising a centralised party structure to the role of the 
individual. In contrast there were also a number of similarities with Mao too. 
Mao emphasised the role of the party but always stressed the importance of the 
masses in the party processes. Mao's position was particularly pertinent 
because JP's experience showed that it was not realistic to achieve a complete 
polarisation between direct and representative democracy and consequently JP's 
path required him to constantly commute between the voluntarist idiom with his 
ideal of a new sarvodaya politics or lokniti and the prevailing constitutional 
politics, of the modern idiom. 
Thus JP adopted a very total approach, that is, one that integrated politics in an 
all embracing strategy that dealt with all aspects of the day-to-day reality that 
people confronted. This included an appreciation of the prevailing political, 
social and economic structure, and the possible opposition and even 
suppression from the dominant forces that could be encountered. He believed 
this required educating and organising people into decentralised organs based 
on popular participation that would empower people to sustain struggle 
enabling them to resist and subsequently undermine these dominant forces for 
he did not believe this would occur spontaneously. Also he was concerned 
with the tensions that would emerge from developing lokniti in the face of 
rajniti, that is shifting responsibility from the state to the masses, and the 
difficulties in achieving this. He wanted to achieve a realistic balance in the light 
of prevailing circumstances. 
The relevance of JP's ideas was brought out by the voluntary organisations' 
work at the grass roots level as representing an immediate form of action 
towards voluntary cooperation and the decentralisation of political and 
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economic structures. These voluntary organisations were particularly 
concerned with the suppressed and oppressed sectors of society, and the 
totality of their lives - political, social, economic and cultural. This involved 
issues such as basic necessities including clean water and other health issues, 
also reducing caste tensions and promoting the equality of women. Their 
direction seemed to be based on people's day-to-day experiences, and the 
fundamental belief was that men must solve their own problems, taking control 
over their own lives. Consequently, their main aim was to educate and 
organise people to this end, that is, towards their own empowerment. The 
organisations sought to work with people, particularly the poor and oppressed, 
rather than work for them. As they did so, they sought to raise immediate 
issues such as exploitation and oppression, trying to develop a consciousness 
about the structures that were exploiting and oppressing. Thus they wanted to 
develop a desire for freedom among an otherwise largely apathetic mass. 
Information, skills and knowledge were imparted through education classes, 
health programmes, cultural teams, production activities such as cooperatives, 
and the conscious process to evolve a local participatory structure that could 
take responsibility for the initiative and implementation of these activities. In 
this way authoritarian structures, particularly local ones, were dealt a blow as 
areas of freedom were opened up and defended, through grain banks and other 
cooperatives which reduced the control of the moneylender, and increased the 
financial power of participants. This demonstrated increasing local 
responsibility for local situations. Also lok adlat represented a means whereby 
local disputes could be determined locally. JP believed that this sort of 
immediate action would help raise people's consciousness and undermine those 
institutions that did not support their free actions. 
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These voluntary organisations operated outside the mainstream modern political 
idiom and the political parties apparently had no control over them. However, 
they were not completely detached from the institutionalised political structure. 
In so far as they interacted, this tended to be as a means of a larger total 
transformation. The type of interaction with which they were involved included 
compelling the government to implement its schemes intended to benefit the 
poor such as loans, clean water, land distribution and minimum wages. They 
were doing this by ensuring people's participation in the implementation of 
these schemes. This involvement at the local level had many implications, such 
as improvements in health, economic position as well as enhancing social status 
and generating local cooperation and community spirit. At the macro level the 
organisations presented themselves as a possible non-party political force 
promoting social actions that may have had an impact on the orientation of 
political parties and government, improving government by opening up 
channels of communication to ensure more relevant policies and more effective 
implementation, demanding accountability from government representatives and 
the bureaucracy. So whilst the organisations apparently operated outside the 
modern idiom, their role would seem to be one of a pressure group on the 
modern polity, suggesting that they would gradually be absorbed in to the same 
structure. This approach may have made for good government, but it did not 
suggest any alternative form of polity based on self-government. 
The good government/self-government issue represents the essential tension 
between modern and voluntarist politics. Good government was what Nehru 
wanted, based on a centralised form of representative democracy. Self-
government involves moving away from any centralised form to the lokniti or 
sarvodaya position that Gandhi represented based on the role of each individual 
being responsible for ordering society through voluntary cooperation and self- 
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imposed restraints. Gandhi recognised that this could be achieved only 
gradually as people were prepared to accept this responsibility and government 
devolved it. This was JP's understanding too. It followed that concrete steps 
towards self-government could best be achieved under a system of good 
government that allowed for freedoms of expression and association as well as 
limited popular contributions to government. An authoritarian government 
would prevent these things, oppressing and stultifying any growth in this 
direction. JP believed that good government could best provide an environment 
in which self-government could be nurtured, and that therefore it was essential 
to resist moves away from "good" representative democracy to an authoritarian 
regime even if this meant struggling at that level of politics. 
There are many tensions in seeking to achieve the balance that this strategy 
requires. It may divert energies from the issue of self-government, particularly 
in so far as it might involve active participation in the constitutional structure 
such as in the field of elections or as a pressure group to the extent that they 
may be absorbed into the prevailing polity. This was demonstrated by the JP 
movement's association with Janata, and also NBJK's involvement in the 1984 
elections. Nevertheless, it is clear that any realistic strategy must take 
cognisance of the modern idiom if the forms of oppression that it represents are 
to be overcome. The essential factor seems to be that the voluntary 
organisations did not view conventional party politics as the means of 
transformation that Nehru envisaged. They saw a need for greater 
decentralisation, both economic and political, and their programmes represented 
an immediate movement in the direction of voluntarism, paving the way for a 
redefinition of the scope of politics. 
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This is not to say that voluntary organisations studied represented an alternative 
polity. The scope of their work was not clear, and their ideology and 
programmes were generally vague, with the direction of their work based on a 
strategy of trial and error. However, this allowed them the flexibility that they 
needed if they were to be concerned with the wholeness of social existence and 
the immediate needs of people. On the other hand, they operated only at the 
local level and did not project a macro-structure. Moreover as small local-level 
groups they were diffused, and confronted many problems such as isolation 
from other groups, difficulties in promoting an understanding of the linkages 
between micro and macro-structures, only reaching a limited number of people, 
lack of funds to undertake their work, hostility and even persecution by existing 
power structures both local and macro-levels. 
Yet the significance of these organisations should not to be underestimated just 
because they were local and did not present an authoritative or definitive plan of 
an alternative. Their size afforded, them an independence from government and 
bureaucratic constraints. This enabled them to: pave the ground for new ideas 
that the government may have been unwilling to try, as well as assume a more 
balanced perspective towards government policies; and thus serve as an 
essential link between the government and people. Moreover their vagueness 
reflected the belief that autonomous groups could work out their own solutions 
according to prevailing conditions. This included struggling at the micro-level 
for political and economic rights "of the poor in the teeth of determined 
opposition from the watchdogs of the established macro-structures".' 
D L Sheth, "Grass-Roots Stirrings and the Future of Politics", Alternatives, IX (1983), 
p.15. 
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Furthermore, the connections between JP's ideas and the activities of these 
micro-organisations were clear. In so far as JP's understanding and vision was 
at a much broader level, his ideas make for a coherent framework in which the 
potential challenge offered by these organisations to the immediate situation can 
be appreciated. The scope of the voluntary organisations studied was limited 
by their fragmented nature and their need to develop a partnership on a macro-
level as well as develop a comprehension about the current macro-structures. 
Nevertheless, the fact was that the existing political order has so far proved 
unable to fulfill the needs of most people. So long as people continue to have 
difficulty living with the existing governing order then JP or decentralised 
voluntary organisation-type processes, which confront the immediate issues 
that concern people, have both appeal and relevance. 
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